Jennifer Matey

Jennifer Matey

Associate Professor

Contact

Office: Hyer Hall 211B
Phone: 214-768-2140
Email: jmatey@smu.edu
Professional website: http://people.smu.edu/jmatey/

Educational Background

Ph.D., Stony Brook University

About

curriculum vitae

Profile

My work concerns topics in the philosophy of mind and the philosophical foundations of Psychology and the Cognitive Sciences, often intersecting with moral psychology, aesthetics, ethics and epistemology. My published research has focused on: the nature of consciousness, perceptual, and emotional experience, related issues in epistemology and metaphysics, and relevant research in the cognitive and biological sciences.

Publications (Selected)

“Meaningfulness and grief: you don't know that you got till it's gone.” Synthese 202, 174. 2023.

"Sexual Consent and Deception About One's Self" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Vol.102 Issue 2: 380-400. 2021

“The Perception of Virtue” in The Epistemology of Non-Visual Perception eds. B. Brogaard and D. Gratzia. Oxford University Press. 2020

"Color Synaesthesia" in The Springer Encyclopedia of Color Science and Technology co-authored with B. Brogaard and D. Gatzia. 2019

“Phenomenal Intentionality and Color Experience” Topics in Cognitive Science. Vol. 9. Issue 1. 2017

“Good Looking” Philosophical Issues: A Supplement to Nous Vol. 26. Issue 1: 297-313. 2016

“Can Blue Mean Four?” Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness eds. David Bennett and Chris Hill. MIT Press. 2014

“Representing the Impossible” Philosophical Psychology Vol. 26. Issue 2: 188-206. 2013

“You Can See What ‘I’ Means” Philosophical Studies  Vol. 162. Issue 1: 57-70. 2013

“Synesthesia” in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2012

“Reduction and the Determination of Phenomenal Character” Philosophical Psychology Vol. 24 issue 3: 291-316. 2011

“Two HOTs To Handle” Philosophical Psychology Vol. 19, issue 2: 151-174. 2006

Courses Taught

3323: Philosophy of Psychology and Neuroscience
3315: Philosophy of Mind
3313: Knowledge and Skepticism
1318: Contemporary Moral Problems