|Office:||Hyer Hall 210A|
Ph.D., Australian National University
Most of my work is in the philosophy of perception, with a focus on the nonconceptual content of experiences and whether concepts are required for perception. I have also done some work on perceptual appearances, their identity conditions, and the phenomenal sorites paradox, as well as on epistemic norms.
Currently, I'm attempting to write a book on our perceptual experiences of temporal relations, where I plan to defend and explain the Lockean (or snapshot) view of such experiences—namely, that we don't really experience such relations.
"Temporal Experiences and Their Parts," Philosophers Imprint 11, no. 11 (2011): 1-28.
"Non-transitive Looks & Fallibilism," Philosophical Studies 149 (2010): 161-200.
"Epistemic Norms without Voluntary Control," with Nicholas Southwood, Noûs 43 (2009): 599-632.
"Non-conceptual Content," in The Oxford Companion to Consciousness, eds. T. Bayne, A. Cleeremans, and P. Wilken (Oxford University Press, 2009).
"Indiscriminable Shades & Demonstrative Concepts," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2007): 277-306.
"The Riches of Experience," in "The Interplay Between Consciousness and Concepts," ed. R. Gennaro, special issue, Journal of Consciousness Studies 15, nos. 9-10 (2007): 20-42.
"Demonstrative Concepts without Re-identification," Philosophical Studies 130 (2006): 153-201.
PHIL 3319: Identity, Persons, and Other Objects
PHIL 3318: Colors, Sounds, and Other Appearances
PHIL 3317: Philosophy of Perception
PHIL 3314: Metaphysics
PHIL 3313: Knowledge and Skepticism
PHIL 3310: Advanced Topics in Philosophy: The Philosophy of Psychology & Cognitive Science
PHIL 1305: Introduction to Philosophy