Philippe Chuard


Associate Professor


Office: Hyer Hall 210A
Phone: 214-768-2705

Educational Background

Ph.D., Australian National University


curriculum vitae

My research is in cognitive science, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of perception. I’m writing a book defending a Lockean view of our sensory experiences of temporal features and relations (aka “the snapshot conception”). Another book for a more general audience on the temporal dimensions of consciousness is to be completed soon (“The Temporal Mind”, with Routledge).

Past research focused mostly on the divide and interaction between perception and cognition, especially when it comes to whether concepts are required for perception. I have also done some work on the phenomenal sorites paradox, as well as on epistemic norms.

Before coming to SMU, I was a postdoctoral fellow at Washington University in St. Louis and a visiting student at MIT. I obtained my PhD at the Australian National University.

I currently serve as co-coordinator, with Holly Bowen (Psychology), of the Dedman College Interdisciplinary Institute’s Research Cluster in Cognitive Science. 


"Visual Asynchrony and Temporally Extended Contents", Ergo, forthcoming.

"Experiential Holism in Time", Mind & Language, (2020), 1-19.

"Temporal Consciousness", in The Oxford Handbook of Consciousness, ed. U. Kriegel (Oxford University Press, 2020).

"Consciousness and Conceptualism", in The Routledge Handbook of Consciousness, ed. R. Gennaro (Routledge, 2018).

"The snapshot conception of temporal experiences", in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Temporal Experiences, ed. I. Phillips (Routledge, 2017).

"Temporal Experiences and Their Parts," Philosophers Imprint 11, no. 11 (2011): 1-28.

"Non-transitive Looks & Fallibilism," Philosophical Studies 149 (2010): 161-200.

"Epistemic Norms without Voluntary Control," with Nicholas Southwood, Noûs 43 (2009): 599-632.

"Non-conceptual Content," in The Oxford Companion to Consciousness, eds. T. Bayne, A. Cleeremans, and P. Wilken (Oxford University Press, 2009).

"Indiscriminable Shades & Demonstrative Concepts," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2007): 277-306.

"The Riches of Experience," in "The Interplay Between Consciousness and Concepts," ed. R. Gennaro, special issue, Journal of Consciousness Studies 15, nos. 9-10 (2007): 20-42.

"Demonstrative Concepts without Re-identification," Philosophical Studies 130 (2006): 153-201.

Courses Taught

PHIL 3324: Consciousness: Theoretical and Empirical Approaches
PHIL 3321: Space and Time
PHIL 3319: Identity, Persons, and Other Objects
PHIL 3318: Colors, Sounds, and Other Appearances
PHIL 3317: Philosophy of Perception
PHIL 3314: Metaphysics
PHIL 3313: Knowledge and Skepticism
PHIL 3310: Advanced Topics in Philosophy: The Philosophy of Psychology & Cognitive Science
PHIL 1305: Introduction to Philosophy