Ph.D., University of Arizona
Hyer Hall 210C
Much of my research concerns the relationship between the two central features of mentality—consciousness and intentionality. I'm particularly interested in the idea that conscious experiences have a certain kind of intentional content in virtue of their phenomenal character. Much of my work is devoted to defending a Fregean rather than a Russellian theory of this "phenomenal content." I am also particularly interested in related issues concerning the relationship between appearance and reality. Are the phenomenal properties that are present to us in veridical perceptual experience mind-independent properties of external objects, or are they mental or mind-dependent properties?
"The Spatial Content of Experience," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2010): 146-84.
"Senses for Senses," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2009): 99-117.
"The Inverted Spectrum," in The Oxford Companion to Consciousness, eds. T. Bayne, A. Cleeremans, and P. Wilken (Oxford University Press, 2009).
"Representationalism and the Argument from Hallucination," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2008): 384-412.
"Representationalism and the Conceivability of Inverted Spectra," Synthese 160 (2008): 203-13.
"Shoemaker on Phenomenal Content," Philosophical Studies 135 (2007): 307-34.
"Colour Constancy and Russellian Representationalism," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2006): 75-94.
PHIL 3375: Topics in Moral Philosophy: Ethics of Pleasure and Pain
PHIL 3318: Colors, Sounds, and Other Appearances
PHIL 3315: Philosophy of Mind
PHIL 1318: Contemporary Moral Problems
PHIL 1305: Introduction to Philosophy