Anthropology, Migration, and Comparative Consciousness
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For some time, scholars have written about the two opposing poles that characterize anthropological thought—the particularizing and the generalizing.\(^1\) James Peacock, a past president of the American Anthropological Association, has portrayed the particularizers exceedingly well. They are the ones who see the world through the lens of the population with whom they worked in their ethnographic field site, consistently taking exception by asserting that “my people don’t do it that way.” Particularizers reject comparison and place their emphasis on infinite cultural diversity and on differences. Their methods are those of description and interpretation. Generalizers, by contrast, recognize differences but also emphasize the similarities that can be found across both the breadth and depth of cultures around the world. Their goal reaches beyond description and interpretation to scientific explanation. This opposition between the particular and the general is central to a long-standing debate about the role of the comparative method in anthropological research.\(^2\)

Of course, for some of us, there is no debate about the centrality of comparison to the discipline of anthropology since the endeavor itself—one of cross-cultural translation—is by its very nature comparative.\(^3\) As Carol and Melvin Ember have observed, “Ethnography employs words, and words are always applicable to more than one instance. It is impossible to describe a particular culture (or anything else for that matter) without using words that have meanings for others.”\(^4\) Harold Scheffler, in an essay that otherwise addresses sexism and naturalism in the study of kinship, has written that “ethnographic inquiry begins and ends as a theory-laden act of comparison. In the course of it we try to detect in the speech and actions of another people concepts and practices that are analogous to those we know from our own social experience or from other ethnographic studies.”\(^5\) In a provocative book that tackles the uncanny similarities between the societies of the Amazon and those of Melanesia, Thomas Gregor and Donald Tuzin present an excellent example of the “inherentness” of comparison and its relationship to


words by observing that “when we speak of a society as having men’s
cults . . . we have in mind similar organizations in other societies.” Allen
Johnson offers a slightly different perspective, although again one
shared by many anthropologists, when he observes that it is “impossible
to undertake anthropological fieldwork in an unfamiliar culture and
not draw comparison between one’s own culture and the one being
studied.” He goes on to argue that any recognition of difference is a
comparative process. Thus, he asserts: “For all the emphasis on cultural
relativism and the uniqueness of particular cultures in anthropology,
ours is a pervasively comparative science.” Finally, Rena Lederman, in
an essay on the future of culture areas in anthropological research, writes
that rarely has anthropological area expertise “not been motivated by
comparativist projects of one sort or another: whether positivist projects
of typologizing for functional and developmental analysis (emphasizing
cross-cultural similarities) or interpretive projects, reflexive or otherwise
(emphasizing differences).”

Despite all these assertions about the centrality of comparison to
the anthropological project, each of these authors is cognizant of the
“troubled history” of the comparative method in anthropology. This
essay begins with a brief and broad-brushstroke review of this troubled
history in order to outline the various ways, from informal to formal,
that the comparative method has been engaged within one discipline. I
then turn to a discussion of the importance of a comparative conscious-
ness, to borrow a term from anthropologist Laura Nader, to the study of
migration, a topic I have engaged throughout my professional career.
I argue that comparisons are essential if we are to avoid both national
and temporal exceptionalism in our understanding of the causes and
consequences of migration. I move therefore from a theoretical and
methodological approach formulated within a single discipline to its
application in addressing an important problem in human experience
that concerns scholars across a range of disciplines.

Debating the Comparative Method in Anthropology:
A Brief Dip in Troubled Waters

In anthropology, the comparative method has its roots in nineteenth-
century evolutionary anthropology and particularly the work of Sir
Edward Tylor. The explanatory models of Tylor and others were built
on an assumption of survivals—that is, the customs and habits of so-
called primitive peoples living in the present represented earlier stages
of human society and cultural development through which all people
had passed on the progressive march from “savagery” to “civilization.”
This paradigm, equally present in the work of contemporaries of Tylor such as James Frazer and A. Lane-Fox Pitt Rivers in Europe and Lewis Henry Morgan in the United States, prevailed in the field until it was challenged and disrupted by Franz Boas, founder of the Department of Anthropology at Columbia University.

Under Boas, anthropology, and especially U.S. anthropology, took a dramatic theoretical turn toward what is now labeled historical particularism. Boas was suspicious of evolutionary frameworks and, by extension, generalization, which he argued should only proceed after exhaustive historical and ethnographic research of individual cases. In what is repeatedly cited as one of his most important and “classic” essays, “The Limitations of the Comparative Method of Anthropology,” Boas argued that the comparative method had been misleading in its assumptions of “connections wherever similarities of culture were found. The comparative method,” he asserted, “has been remarkably barren of definite results, and I believe it will not become fruitful until we renounce the vain endeavor to construct a uniform systematic history of the evolution of culture, and until we begin to make our comparisons on the broader and sounder basis . . . [emerging from] historical researches which are devoted to laying clear the complex relations of each individual culture.”

Although Boas acknowledged in this essay that following extensive historical and ethnographic research it might be possible to discover “certain laws [that] exist which govern growth of human culture” and that “it is our endeavor to discover those laws,” it is commonly agreed that his approach dealt a severe blow to comparison within anthropology. Anthropologist Marvin Harris has suggested that “ludicrous errors were committed by the Boasians in their attempt to discredit the comparative method,” citing several examples of what he labeled as “imaginative and ridiculous associations of cultural traits.” However, in relation to this paradigmatic shift from cultural evolution to historical particularism, two different approaches to comparison emerged, one rooted in the statistical comparison of a large number of cases and the other in careful, contextualized, and controlled comparisons of a limited number of cases.

The first approach was best represented by the work of George Peter Murdock in the 1940s and the development of the Cross Cultural Survey at Yale University’s Institute of Human Relations, which eventually became the Human Relations Area Files (HRAF). Murdock compiled data from ethnographic reports for more than three hundred societies and organized them according to more than seven hundred categories. The goal was to draw on this sample to discover statistical correlations among different cultural features. The research that HRAF has generated is, as Ember and Ember point out, systematic, and focused on testing hypotheses about the “incidence, distribution and causes of cultural
variation." A good example of this work is Jack Goody’s comparison of patterns of inheritance in Africa and Eurasia. Goody linked what he called diverging devolution in Eurasia (basically, bilateral inheritance) to the prevalence of dowry rather than bridewealth, and monogamy rather than polygamy, as well as to a range of other cultural practices such as adoption, late marriage, and high rates of permanent celibacy.

While some still find merit in this particular body of research by Goody, as well as that of other scholars who have drawn on the wealth of ethnographic data contained in the Human Relations Area Files, many anthropologists consider the HRAF approach sterile and fault it for taking elements of culture out of context and hence overgeneralizing. As Susan Gillespie has observed, in a broader critical analysis of categories and typologies in the study of social organization, “Too much detail was being lost in reducing cross-cultural comparisons to their lowest common sociological denominator.” Joseph Tobin rightly points out that by 1970 the HRAF had become “the embodiment of anthropology as science, in contradistinction to the thickly descriptive, anthropology-as-interpretive-art approach exemplified by Clifford Geertz.” For many, he suggests, it was “taxonomic imperialism.” Criticism of HRAF became criticism of the comparative method, although it represented only one way in which anthropologists engaged this method.

The second approach to comparison that prevailed between 1940 and 1960 was associated with British structural functionalism. With concerns about the equivalence of units of comparison being primary, those who pursued this approach emphasized a limited number of cases within a tightly defined region such that variation could be controlled. Max Gluckman, and others who were affiliated with what came to be known as the Rhodes-Livingstone/Manchester Research Program, were strong proponents of this method. Bruce Kapferer has observed that in Gluckman’s view comparison should not involve the consideration of examples taken at random or out of context and engaged merely to illustrate preformulated ideas...that were not thoroughly questioned through the ethnography itself. Rather, comparison should initially develop systematically, attending to variations in practice across a region in which there are broad similarities in historical circumstance, institutions, language, and customs between people. Only after this has been done (and a relatively secure basis for ideas established) should the method be extended farther afield, and here the comparative method should be thoroughly alive in contextual and value divergences, testing the extent to which such differences permit the confirmation (or not) of larger generalizations that are built through comparison.

A good example of this controlled comparison approach is Siegfried Frederick Nadel’s analysis of witchcraft in four African societies. Nadel’s
richly layered discussion, which can only be briefly summarized here, is built on a comparison of two pairs of ethnic groups, the neighboring Nupe and the Gwari of Nigeria and the neighboring Korongo and Mesakin of central Sudan. Each pair showed linguistic and cultural similarities but diverged in their witchcraft beliefs. Among the Nupe, women are generally accused of being witches, women who often hold a good deal of economic power that contradicted the ideology of male dominance. This results in sexual tensions that are manifested in witchcraft accusations. By contrast, among the Gwari there is very little sexual antagonism or tension in daily life, and men and women are equally accused of witchcraft. In his analysis of the Korongo/Mesakin pair, Nadel identified a different source of tension. Mesakin men pass through three age grades while aging, while Korongo men pass through six—that is, a more gradual process. Witchcraft beliefs are absent among the Korongo while the Mesakin were obsessed by fears of witchcraft. To pass from one age grade to the next, Mesakin men had to give up the privileges of the group they were leaving. Suspicions and accusations were extensive between the young men and those in the middle grade who were reluctant to move into old age and relinquish sexual activities and other privileges they had enjoyed. It was between these two groups that witchcraft accusations were strongest. Nadel drew upon the frustration-aggression hypothesis—when one’s interests are frustrated, aggressive behaviors may erupt—to explain these differences in witchcraft beliefs and accusations. The emphasis in Nadel’s work, and that of others in both Europe and America, for example Fred Eggan, was on identifying functionally significant relationships among traits within different societies.20

By the 1960s, and particularly after 1970, both generalizing and comparison began to lose their footing within anthropology as more idiographic (as opposed to nomothetic) approaches entered the field.21 Richard Fox and André Gingrich suggest that the distancing from the comparative method was a result of a field that had matured enough to be concerned about its complicity with European imperialism and more aware of the shortcomings of assumptions about self-contained, stable, and integrated cultures in the face of a capitalist world system of great historical depth.22 One should add to this a growing concern with the application of Euro-American models to the rest of the world.

One of the strongest voices for this last concern was that of David Schneider who redirected the study of kinship, a key subject of research in anthropology since the nineteenth century, from functional and structural analysis toward meaning-centered symbolic analysis.23 While Schneider was not against comparison, he was leery of the bases on which anthropologists were making them. He argued that comparative studies of kinship either had to find a more solid foundation or be abandoned. He wrote: “The first step, prerequisite to all others in comparative work,
is to establish the particular categories or units which each particular culture itself marks off; that is to say, the symbols and meanings of a particular culture. Once this is done, without being prejudiced by theories about functional prerequisites to social life or assumptions about universal activities, then comparison can begin and analytic procedures and tools can perhaps be developed.\textsuperscript{24}

There are those who argue that Schneider’s culturalist critique of kinship and his emphasis on local meanings impeded “the classic anthropological project of comparison and contrast.”\textsuperscript{25} To some extent the debate was recast at this time as one between comparativists and relativists. Anthropologists David Kaplan and Robert Manners wrote: “The relativist tells us that a culture must be examined as a totality and only in terms of itself; while the comparativist says that an institution, process, complex, or item must be removed from its larger cultural matrix so that it can be compared with institutions, processes, complexes or items in other sociocultural contexts.”\textsuperscript{26} While I would challenge their emphasis on removing something from its cultural context (many of those who continued to adhere to the value of generalizing and comparison understood full well how important context was/is), it is safe to say that Kaplan and Manners recognized the shortcomings of what they thought were the excesses of relativism which made scientific inquiry difficult and theory building virtually impossible. Theirs was a heroic defense of the value of comparison to the development of culture theory, but by the mid-1980s postmodernism—with its challenges to concepts of ethnographic authority and its promotion of ethnographies as texts—assumed supremacy.\textsuperscript{27} Postmodernists, together with poststructuralists, became just the latest to weigh in on critiques of the role of comparison in the anthropological enterprise. Comparison, in the words of Victor de Munck, assumed a “refugee status.”\textsuperscript{28}

While postmodern thought has many roots, within anthropology its beginnings can be found not only in the symbolic approach of David Schneider but also in the interpretivist approach of Clifford Geertz. Geertz argued that the analysis of culture is “not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning.”\textsuperscript{29} He steered anthropology away from generalizing across ethnographic cases (that is, comparison) toward the in-depth analysis of a single case. The rejection of generalization is certainly key to the postmodern approach, which Nigel Rapport and Joanna Overing describe as reactive to “things and thingness . . . to conceptions of reason and rationality, objectivity and truth, scientific method and the progress of history and knowledge.”\textsuperscript{30} As developed by scholars such as George Marcus, Michael Fischer, and James Clifford, postmodernism became concerned about the presumptuousness of ethnographic authority, critical of anthropo-
logical imperialism, and doubtful about the goal of a science of culture. John Borneman and Abdellah Hammoudi have recently encapsulated the postmodern assessment of anthropological practice as follows: “Ethnographers, primarily members of Euro-American societies engaged in the pursuit of science, were accused of fixing other people in totalizing cultures and representing them as radically distinct from their Western selves in time and space.”

Anthropological postmodernists not only echoed Geertz’s call for a focus on meaning rather than causality, but also emphasized multivocality, relativism, and the analysis of ethnographies as texts. They asserted the need for anthropology to abandon positivism and, as Patricia Greenfield has bluntly stated, considered generalization “oppressive.” Perhaps one of the best and most successful examples can be found in Lila Abu-Lughod’s *Writing Women’s Worlds*, a book that adopts “many of the techniques of humanistic writing” in order to give the Bedouin women she has worked with their own voice. Abu-Lughod explicitly writes against culture and generalization. “Anthropologists . . . have two reasons to be especially wary of generalization. The first is that as part of a professional discourse of objectivity and expertise, it is inevitably a language of power . . . . the second and more serious problem with generalization is that by producing the effects of homogeneity, coherence, and timelessness, it contributes to the creation of ‘cultures.’ . . . The effort to produce general ethnographic descriptions of people’s beliefs or actions risks smoothing over contradictions, conflicts of interest, doubts, and arguments, not to mention changing motivations and historical circumstances.”

The debate over scientific versus humanistic approaches in anthropology, as well as between objectivity and subjectivity and generalizing and particularizing, became pervasive (if not sometimes bitter), ultimately resulting by the late 1990s in books that attempted to reclaim a scientific anthropology. Doyens of anthropology, such as Roy D’Andrade, argued that objective approaches in anthropology were not necessarily dehumanizing and that science “works not because it produces unbiased accounts but because its accounts are objective enough to be proved or disproved no matter what anyone wants to be true.” After 2000, the criticisms of postmodernism became even more vocal and were often strongest among those writing about the place of comparison in anthropology. Taking a somewhat ironic swipe, Gregor and Tuzin wrote: “If cultures are islands unto themselves or texts composed in the imaginations of pseudo-observers, if all classification and generalization are nothing but the exercise of Western hegemony and arrogance, if, in short, all is vanity, then comparison would be at best impossible and at worst immoral.”

In an early effort to thoughtfully and perhaps less antagonistically resurrect comparison within anthropology, Laura Nader observed that
postmodernism had contributed to our understanding of the “rhetoric of science and the limitations of positivist science in anthropology,” as well as to our understanding of the limitations of nonscientist humanists “who also arrogantly conceive of understanding as possible from unidimensional frames.”

But Nader also argued that debunking comparison eliminates any possibility to explore aspects of the human experience that are shared. Nader concluded by challenging the field to develop a comparative approach that could address questions of process and hegemony, an “area in between, a place which holds the possibility of a comparative consciousness that illuminates connections—between local and global, between past and present, between anthropologists and those they study, between uses of comparison and implications of its uses.” She called for a comparative consciousness, broad in its “methodological scope and intellectual style.”

This opened the door for further measured and collective considerations—for example, a special issue of the journal Ethnology published in 2000 and a volume edited by André Gingrich and Richard G. Fox (Anthropology, By Comparison), where several authors argue for the future of comparison in anthropology, not only for purposes of cross-cultural analysis and understanding, but also as a public responsibility. In trying to unify the voices in their edited collection, Fox and Gingrich call for a “rich plurality of qualitative comparative methodologies” that are sensitive to context, and able to encompass scalar (local, regional, transnational) differences and temporal transformations. It is precisely this kind of approach that has proved fruitful in the study of migration. An anthropology of migration addresses the way in which a global process manifests itself locally, whether in sending or receiving societies. A comparative consciousness can help to illuminate the links between the global and the local, as well as illustrate how these are mediated by difference at the national scale.

Comparative Approaches to the Study of International Migration

Ernest George Ravenstein (1834–1913), a contemporary of Sir Edward Tylor (1832–1917), delivered a famous paper about migration to the Royal Statistical Society of London in 1885. In this paper, Ravenstein formulated a series of laws of migration to describe patterns of both internal and cross-border population movement. Ravenstein not only compared data from one decade to the next, but also compared counties of “dispersal” with those of “absorption” as well as male migration with female migration. His findings that “females are more migratory
than males and that their movements are generally shorter distance (internal) when compared with those of men are often cited in the
more recent and by now extensive literature on gender and migration,
a topic left underresearched until the last three decades of the twentieth
century. Ravenstein’s work reminds us of the fundamental contribu-
tion of the comparative method to an understanding of migration as a
social process as well as to how similarly or differently it is experienced
in different locations and by different populations by gender, national
origin, age, and the like.

Theory building in migration studies often begins with the particulari-
ties of an individual case—one group, one receiving society, one urban
context, one historical period. But it must not end there, because the
ultimate goal is to understand patterns in the causes and consequences
of migration, how these might occur repeatedly or distinctively across
the range of sending and receiving societies or ethnic groups, and how
they might change over time. To delineate these patterns and processes,
comparisons are essential. In the study of migration, comparison can
proceed at several levels or scales of analysis. It can be global in scope,
cross-national, intranational, or regional. It can draw upon large second-
ary data sets or primary and generally more qualitative data generated
from field research in one or more sites (either by the same researcher
or more than one researcher) that are often presented as case studies. It
can be diachronic or synchronic—that is, tracing change over time in a
single or a few places or differences across space at similar points in time.
Here I focus on a few examples of comparative approaches in migration
studies, drawing on my own work and that of others who engage the
qualitative and more informal comparative methods identified by Fox
and Gingrich. While a good deal of theorizing about migration focuses
on the causes of migration, my emphasis is on how comparative projects
that are rooted in a case study method, and that are sensitive not only
to local context but also to national and transnational scalar influences,
can illuminate some of the consequences of migration and assist in the
development of more systematic models of immigrant incorporation. Like
Harlan Koff (who refers to integration, a term used more commonly by
European scholars), I consider incorporation to involve a set of simul-
taneous processes—economic, political, social, and cultural.

Thirty years ago, I moved from conducting research on Portuguese
immigrants in U.S. and Canadian contexts to a study of Portuguese im-
migrants in France. As a result of this transition, I was confronted head
on by the limitations of our theories about the settlement patterns of first-
generation immigrants in cities, and was forced to search for meaningful
explanations of the differences that I saw on the ground. At the time,
the prevailing theoretical model explaining how immigrants settled in cities derived from the Chicago School of Sociology and described first-generation immigrant enclaves that were located in city centers where cheap housing and jobs were plentiful. As the second generation grew to maturity, they moved out of these inner city “ghettos” into the suburbs. By the third generation, their assimilation and their transformation into “white ethnics” was complete. This was a model based on the analysis of American cities and the American immigrant experience. The comparison with a European city and a European national context revealed something quite different, thereby necessitating the identification of a range of factors that should be considered in order to understand and theorize more broadly processes of immigration incorporation.

What I found in the Parisian urban landscape of the mid-1970s was a foreign-born population that was fairly evenly scattered throughout the urban fabric with a slightly higher concentration in the second and third arrondissements. There was certainly no Portuguese enclave like the one I had found in central Toronto. To some extent, this was associated with the housing to which Portuguese immigrants had access, which itself was in many instances related to the jobs that Portuguese women held as building caretakers (concierges) and private domestics. In a vertically stratified Paris, in contrast to a horizontally stratified Toronto, Portuguese families were found either in first-floor apartments or in sixth-floor maids’ rooms. The other locus for the settlement of Portuguese and other early post-War immigrants to Paris was in the Parisian suburbs, generally in the public apartment housing, habitation à loyer modéré (HLMs), which was being constructed around the city in all directions and connected to the city by new networks of urban transportation. At the time, the policy was that the dispersal of immigrants of various nationalities in these housing projects would avoid the “ghettos à l’américaine,” supposedly, at least from a French perspective, the source of all of America’s urban problems, and particularly its problems with race.

But we can take this comparison of different settlement patterns and their relation to urban and national context further by fast forwarding to the present. Today, in many metropolitan areas in the United States, and in the région parisiennne, we have suburbs in which first-generation immigrants have been settling soon after arrival.45 But if in American metropolitan areas suburbs have been diversified, spawning such analytical concepts as “ethnoburbs” or “melting pot suburbs,”46 the Parisian suburbs (which have also changed in the last thirty years) have been “burning” and the ghettos that policy makers of the 1970s wished to avoid have in fact emerged. The metaphors of melting pot and burning suburbs describe the different ways that immigrants of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have been claiming space and making place in the
global cities of immigration. By comparison with the ethnically diverse suburbs of many North American cities, which are represented as nodes of new development and employment where immigrant institutions can locate themselves and where ethnic festivals, soccer leagues, and cricket matches are promoted, many of the Parisian suburbs are described as areas of marginalization and unemployment where immigrants are segregated in concrete high-rise ghettos. These are places that Nicholas Sarkozy, the Minister of the Interior at the time of the fall 2005 riots in Parisian suburbs and now the president of France, wanted to sweep clean.47 Riva Kastoryano has emphasized that living in the suburbs in France is no longer a move of choice and that the spatial immobility of immigrants in these suburbs reflects their social immobility. In these suburbs, as Stephane Dufoix has noted, immigrant youth have claimed the night, and their discourse of claims making was violence. “Rage,” writes Kastoryano, “has settled in those spaces.”48

To cut to the chase, the relationship between suburbs and immigrants in France (spaces of immobility) and the United States (spaces of mobility) is distinctly different and well worth more serious comparative ethnographic treatment. What kinds of activities take place in the public sphere in these suburbs? Can they be read as texts for what they tell us about immigrants in cities, comparative processes of claims making and incorporation, the process of national identity construction, and the fundamental matter of how nations relate to immigrants? If we limit our consideration of this question to one national context, as I, with colleagues Audrey Singer and Susan Hardwick, have recently done in a book that compares suburban incorporation in nine twenty-first century U.S. gateway cities, we paint only a partial portrait of important processes of immigrant settlement because we narrate only one national history of suburbanization. As a result, our theories about immigrant incorporation are also limited.49

There are other comparative considerations beyond the question of different urban and suburban settlement patterns that struck me years ago and that still resonate in the present. For the Portuguese in the Paris of the 1970s, the church provided one locale for claiming urban space, but not in the same way that immigrants in America have claimed space through their religious institutions, including ethnic-based Catholic parishes. Because they were Roman Catholic, the Portuguese were quickly accommodated into the French Catholic churches of Paris, sometimes with a special mass in their own language. There were no strictly Portuguese parishes like the Irish or Italian parishes that emerged in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century America, or the Polish and Mexican parishes that exist in twenty-first-century American cities. The broader national differences regarding religion—whether it is religious
hegemony as opposed to religious diversity, or where a nation through its national policies situates itself on a continuum between the sacred and the secular in public life—are extremely important to deconstruct. Studying one national context does not give us the full range of experience upon which to build a theory about the role of religious institutions in the process of immigrant incorporation. Further, France’s/Paris’s immigration issues today are quite different from what they were several decades ago (hence, demonstrating the importance of a temporal as well as a spatial comparative consciousness). A large Muslim population raises new issues that were not there in relation to a similarly European and similarly Catholic Portuguese immigrant population. Who is asking to be included and incorporated matters!

Nancy Foner and Richard Alba have recently argued that religion in the United States has often been theorized as a bridge to inclusion, while in Europe it has become a barrier, “a marker of a fundamental social divide.” Using a case-study approach that draws on a broad range of evidence from four European countries (France, Germany, Britain, the Netherlands), these authors identify three important differences to explain the contrast with the United States: the religiosity of the native populations (Western Europeans are more secular than Americans); the religious backgrounds of immigrants in the United States and Western Europe (largely Christian in the United States and largely Muslim in Western Europe); and the historical relationship between the state and various religious groups. In many European countries religion is excluded from affairs of state, but at the same time European states often own and maintain Christian churches and often support religious schools “as long as they teach the national secular curriculum.” Foner and Alba describe a Europe marked by “cultural racism” and a United States “plagued by deeply rooted biological racism, which stigmatizes and disadvantages recent immigrants, who are overwhelmingly Asian, Latino, and Black and thus outside the pale of whiteness.” The comparison these authors draw between different national contexts clearly lays the ground for more subtle theory building regarding the ways in which immigrants are either included or excluded.

My own more limited comparative analysis of the settlement of Portuguese immigrants in one North American city and one European city revealed another important difference. At the time that I worked in France, the Portuguese had no associations that they had built for themselves—again startling to a North American trained scholar of immigration brought up on the idea of “institutional completeness” or an urban anthropologist well versed in the theoretical literature on the integrative role of voluntary associations that had emerged among African “tribesmen” who had become “townsmen.” In 1970s France,
foreign associations were severely controlled. Their creation required the authorization of the Minister of the Interior, and only a French citizen could be at their head. Further, there is an important difference between organizations that are grass roots, emerging from the immigrant community, and those that are formed by a paternalistic state to serve immigrants. The primary point here is that the comparative consciousness that I brought with me to France, one forged from training in my discipline, helped me to see things that were absent as well as those that were present, and to begin to ask questions about this absence as well as attempt to explain it. I was led into the realm of law and policy as I searched for answers.

Canadian immigration policy, rooted in a model of multiculturalism, can be contrasted with French immigration policy, which adheres to an assimilation model. As one reporter recently observed, in a reflection on the Muslim head scarves issue in France, France has been the European country most open to immigration but the most insistent on assimilation.\textsuperscript{53} Anthropologists Carolyn Sargent and Stephanie Larchanché-Kim have noted that since 1993, when the Pasqua laws of restrictive immigration were put in place and a goal of zero immigration was established ("\textit{la France ne veut plus être un pays d’immigration}" ["France no longer wants to be a country of immigration"]), anti-immigrant discourse has been strident, persistent, directed toward specific populations, and fundamental to French politics and policies.\textsuperscript{54} Robert Levine, offering further support to Foner and Alba’s formulation of cultural racism, bluntly observes that French culture has not changed “to allow any significant entry of Muslim elements.”\textsuperscript{55} What I identified as important differences in policy more than a quarter-century ago have only become more stark in the face of an immigrant population that is more different, and hence essential to explanatory models of immigrant incorporation.

My thoughts returned to the comparisons I had drawn between the Portuguese immigrants in Paris and those in Toronto a few years ago as I began to think in more theoretical terms about how the structure and nature of cities affect the immigrant experience. In my view, there are four important comparative dimensions to be considered.\textsuperscript{56} First, how do cities differ in their temporal and spatial dimensions: that is, what is the historical depth of immigration, has the city defined itself for some time as a city of immigrants, how is the city laid out geographically, and where is the oldest housing stock located? Second, what is the social context of the city: that is, how heterogenous is the urban population, how divided is it—does one ethnic group hold the reins of power and how are different ethnic groups interrelated—and when, where, and how do identity politics emerge? Here the comparative efforts of political scientist John Mollenkopf are particularly illustrative of both these dimensions.
Mollenkopf observes that New York and Los Angeles differ in the extent to which they have been able to contain native backlash toward immigrants. He explains this difference in relation to distinct ways in which the respective political systems in the two cities “create (or lack) incentives for dominant white elites to recognize, incorporate, or co-opt claims from subordinate groups (including new immigrant groups) and for leaders of subordinate groups to accommodate one another.” Mollenkopf suggests that while in New York all groups, including whites, have immigrant roots, and access to the political system, in Los Angeles “nativity pits groups against each other” and access to the political system has been more limited. He writes: “All groups must fight it out in one, highly partisan system in New York, while Los Angeles County has eighty-eight separate, nonpartisan jurisdictions.” Local political structures as well as local histories of immigration generate different outcomes of exclusion and inclusion and, ultimately, political participation. Without the systematic comparison that Mollenkopf draws between two metropolitan areas, we would not learn about the significant impact of these subtle differences in how local politics operate on the lives of immigrants.

A third dimension of cities that is important to consider in an effort to build a model for comparative processes of immigrant incorporation is the nature of the urban labor market: that is, how do differences in local economic structures result in diverging opportunity structures for both native and foreign born populations? Fourthly, it is important to address what I call the cultural ethos of a city: that is, how does a city look at and represent itself and the other? Here, Kevin Keogen’s delineation, based on a content analysis of The Los Angeles Times and The New York Times, of important differences in the symbolic construction of immigrants that affect their adaptation in these two metropolitan areas is illustrative. His analysis shows an exclusive “threat narrative” in Southern California and a more inclusive “immigrant as victim narrative” in New York. He explains these differences in relation to distinct material and symbolic contexts. “In the New York area, immigrants are understood in terms of an immigrant origin mythology, represented through salient landmarks and immigrant-ethnic celebrations that embody a specific positive narrative of immigrants and their historic place in the community. The Los Angeles metropolitan area is relatively void of popular, positive symbols of immigrants.” Keogan goes on to suggest that, as a result, immigrants in Southern California are more susceptible to exclusionary politics, especially during times of economic insecurity. Proposition 187 is one example. In Keogan’s view, there is an “immigrants as us” identity in New York City that can be contrasted with an “immigrant as other” emphasis in Los Angeles, a city with a long historical tradition of nativism. Keogan concludes by suggesting that “the social status accorded foreign-born
persons at the federal level may be either reinforced or renegotiated at the more local level through a process of symbolic association and narrative identity-politics. In turn, these more local interpretations influence federal immigration policy. He calls for more studies of the material and cultural factors influencing the politics of immigration, as well as more studies of local immigration politics in other urban spaces.

Political sociologist Irene Bloemraad has recently responded to this call in her comparative case study of processes of political incorporation as structured mobilization among Vietnamese and Portuguese immigrants in Boston and Toronto. As I did years ago, Bloemraad pays particular attention to the multicultural and hands-on approach to the integration of immigrants in Canada. But she compares it with the more laissez-faire approach in the United States. She argues that in Canada, as a direct result of the differences in policy and approach, immigrants pursue citizenship and develop political skills with much greater alacrity and more extensively than in the United States. Although Bloemraad includes two different nationality groups in her research, her emphasis is primarily on different urban and particularly different national contexts in order to answer the question of whether it is worth embracing multiculturalism, a policy that several countries, including the United States and Australia, are backing away from because they view it as a path to fragmentation and the loss of national unity. Her extensive analysis of the role of government and community organizations as well as of the rates of naturalization and the meaning of citizenship lead her to the conclusion that,

in cases of citizenship acquisition, political participation, and electoral representation . . . on average Canada has been doing better than the United States, in part because multiculturalism provides the symbolic and material resources needed to take out and exercise political membership. Some of the dynamics that facilitate political incorporation in Canada—support of ethnic organizations and promotion of community leadership—find parallels in U.S. refugee resettlement policy. It is no coincidence that Cuban Americans are one of the most politically successful and vocal migrant groups in the United States.

Bloemraad puts her nuanced comparative analysis to good use (pace Laura Nader) by responding forthrightly to alarmists like Samuel Huntington, who pin what they identify as a crisis of political incorporation among immigrants on the recognition of difference rather than on the absence of public resources extended to immigrant communities.

I have been emphasizing the comparative analysis of cities as contexts as a useful approach for theory building regarding processes of immigrant settlement and incorporation, but the work of Bloemraad also directs our attention to intergroup differences. Such comparisons across
groups are in fact quite common among scholars of immigration who are interested in teasing out the relative impacts of structural as opposed to cultural factors as these influence the process by which immigrants are incorporated in receiving societies.

For example, Pyong Gap Min and Mehdi Bozorgmehr focus their attention on Korean and Iranian entrepreneurs in Los Angeles. They take on theoretical debates about both the causes and consequences of immigrant entrepreneurship. Their comparison reveals that while Korean immigrants draw more on ethnic resources to help them establish their businesses, Iranians draw on class resources. The result of this difference is that while Korean businesses are smaller, more spatially concentrated, and serve more low-income, minority, and coethnic customers, Iranian entrepreneurs are larger, more spatially dispersed, and serve more white customers. The result is that Iranians have escaped the conflicts to which Korean entrepreneurs have been subjected, most notably during the 1992 Los Angeles riots following the Rodney King trial. These authors conclude by arguing that this comparison refines current theory by suggesting that while all forms of immigrant/ethnic businesses can contribute to ethnic attachment, only middleman businesses lead to a strengthening of ethnic solidarity.

In an essay exploring similarities and differences in ideas about political and cultural belonging, and citizenship, I compare four different populations—Salvadorans, Indians, Vietnamese, and Nigerians—who have settled in the Dallas-Fort Worth metropolitan area. The data for this essay emerged from participant observation as well as interviews with one hundred individuals, both male and female, in each population. All respondents were first-generation immigrants. Salvadorans, Indians, Vietnamese, and Nigerians differ in their auspices of immigration, their level of education, their occupational profiles, and their rates of naturalization. The Vietnamese have come as refugees, while Salvadorans, Indians, and Nigerians are economic migrants. However, many Indians and Nigerians first enter the United States on student visas, and some Nigerians are in the United States as a result of winning the diversity lottery. Salvadorans have often entered without authorization although many are now on temporary protective-status visas. When individuals from each of these populations naturalize, it is often for different reasons. Indians emphasize family sponsorship and civic mindedness more than other groups. The Vietnamese, the group with the highest rate of naturalization, emphasize that they really have no alternative. While Indians mentioned the desire to vote, Nigerians emphasized this even more. Salvadorans, with the lowest rate of naturalization, indicated their ineligibility, lack of time, and, occasionally, the fear of an investigation into their past. Yet, despite these variations, a very pragmatic attitude toward citizenship,
particularly that it facilitates travel in this flat and global twenty-first-century world, is characteristic of individuals across all groups. Further, across all groups, individuals emphasized a distinction between political belonging and cultural belonging—that they could be both American and of their own national origin at the same time. In other words, while there are subtle differences across the four immigrant populations in reasons for naturalization and their understandings of what it means to be a citizen, they share the idea of operating with two or more identities and, by extension, of operating in transnational social fields. This transnationalism does not obviate the process of incorporation.

Conclusion

In a provocative and thoughtful essay, sociologist Adrian Favell recognizes the often empty call for cross-national comparativism in migration studies. He describes American international conferences that are not well attended by European scholars “who are too busy in their local struggles and commitments to take time out for a sabbatical year in the United States, and often do not publish much in English” as well as American scholars who “pop over to Europe during the summer recess or an occasional international conference who might try to build in a comparative agenda, but rarely stick around long enough to develop a plausible local knowledge.” Favell also points to the realization among U.S. immigration scholars that transatlantic comparative work “is going to necessitate thoroughly rethinking the theoretical assumptions and data reflexes on which the American canon is based.”67 Favell suggests that this realization has often deterred real and meaningful comparisons.

While Favell may be correct in broad disciplinary terms, it is safe to say that anthropologists who have been studying migration for some time have consistently operated within a comparative framework, particularly when their work has straddled more than one field site or when it has followed migrants from their home communities to their destination.68 The comparative approach of these anthropologists, particularly those interested in theorizing the process of migration, is not like that developed by those working with the Human Relations Area Files. Nor is it like the controlled comparison method of British structural functionalists who made assumptions about bounded social communities, assumptions that no longer hold in a globalized world and that are impractical in the study of a process, migration, that is by its very nature unbounded. Rather, it is a case study approach that can draw on both qualitative and quantitative methodologies and that is attentive to both scale and context.
In his book on the comparative imagination, historian George Frederickson suggests that comparison calls into question two risky assumptions, that of absolute uniqueness and that of uniform regularity. These two assumptions have characterized the poles of anthropological thought over the course of its first century, from the evolutionary paradigm to the postmodern paradigm. The comparative consciousness that Nader proposed a little more than a decade ago is precisely what the anthropological discipline requires and it is precisely what migration scholars, who must be both interdisciplinary and comparative in their approach, need to implement in order to avoid making any single migration context or migration stream exceptional. Without this consciousness, differences are made more unique than they should be and similarities can be overstated. Further, without it we are condemned to reinvention and to claims of newness about characteristics that in fact often have appeared elsewhere or at another time. In my early research on postwar Portuguese immigration to France, I identified an ideology of return that has many parallels to the transnational practices and transnational social fields that have been described in scholarship beginning in the 1990s; and more recently anthropologist Nancy Foner has rightly and pointedly asked “what is new about transnationalism?” Today there is a good deal of discussion about emigrant remittances that bolster the economy of Mexico, but similar remittances were bolstering the economy of Portugal in the 1960s and 1970s. Such behaviors are part of migration as a process no matter when or where it occurs. Finally, and as Nancy Foner has emphasized, “a comparative analysis can deepen our understanding of migration by raising new questions and research problems and help to evaluate, and in some cases modify, theoretical perspectives and formulate explanations that could not be made on the basis of one case—or one time period—alone.” By framing one case against another, we learn more about each and we refine our theories in the process—this is the ultimate importance of the comparative consciousness in the study of migration, in anthropology, and undoubtedly in scholarship in general. If there is something exceptional, we find it rather than assume it.

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NOTES

1 See for example Marvin Harris, The Rise of Anthropological Theory (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1968). It is worth noting that in the May 2009 issue of Anthropology News, the National Science Foundation Program Officer for Anthropology, Deborah Winslow, reported the following after two proposal review panels that had just occurred: “We have yet to bridge the gap between those who do “cases-and-interpretations” anthropology (as Renato Rosaldo once described the work of Clifford Geertz) and those who stay resolutely focused on grander theory designed to reveal the political and economic realities of


3 Further, many ethnographers have noted that the people they study themselves engage in comparisons. Mark Busse (“Wandering Hero Stories in the Southern Lowlands of New Guinea: Culture Areas, Comparison, and History,” *Cultural Anthropology* 20, no. 4 [2005]: 443–73) in fact argues for an approach in anthropology that acknowledges peoples’ own understandings of similarities and differences.


6 Thomas A. Gregor and Donald Tuzin, “Comparing Gender in Amazonia and Melanesia: A Theoretical Orientation,” in *Gender in Amazonia and Melanesia: An Exploration of the Comparative Method*, ed. Thomas A. Gregor and Donald Tuzin (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 2001), 2. Of course there are those who object to such terms as “men’s cults” suggesting instead that we use the emic terms—that is, those of the people themselves in their language.


10 Marvin Harris (*The Rise of Anthropological Theory*, 153), who locates the origins of the comparative method in the Enlightenment, points out that it “is closely related to the rise of scientific theory in many different disciplines.” He goes on to discuss its applications in the natural and linguistic sciences.


21 Idiographic approaches are focused on in depth description of single cases and rely heavily on qualitative methods. Nomothetic approaches are generalizing and generally use more quantitative methods.

22 Fox and Gingrich, introduction to Anthropology, by Comparison, 2.


24 Schneider, Critique of the Study of Kinship, 184.


40 Fox and Gingrich, “introduction” to Anthropology, by Comparison, 12.
43 Harlan Koff, Fortress Europe or a Europe of Fortresses? The Integration of Migrants in Western Europe (Brussels: P. I. E. Lang, 2008).
50 Nancy Foner and Richard Alba, “Immigrant Religion in the U.S. and Western Europe: Bridge or Barrier to Inclusion?” International Migration Review 42, no. 2 (2008): 382. In many European countries, state policies and institutional structures have explicit and direct involvement in what is and is not permissible—including whether it is permissible to wear Muslim dress. During the summer of 2008, a Moroccan woman applied for citizenship in France and was turned down because she chose to wear the niqab, a robe that covers her entire body and from which she looks out through a narrow slit in her facial veil.
52 Raymond Breton, “Institutional Completeness of Ethnic Communities and the Personal Relations of Immigrants,” American Journal of Sociology 70, no. 2 (1964): 193–205; Kenneth
58 Mollenkopf, “Urban Political Conflicts and Alliances,” 413.
60 Anthropologist Leo Chavez (*The Latino Threat: Constructing Immigrants, Citizens and the Nation* [Palo Alto, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 2008]) writes about a more pervasive nationwide Latino threat image in the United States but this does not obviate local differences such as those that Keogan describes.
61 Keogan, “Sense of Place,” 249.
66 Caroline B. Brettell, “Political Belonging and Cultural Belonging: Immigration Status, Citizenship, and Identity among Four Immigrant Populations in a Southwestern City,” *American Behavioral Scientist* 50, no. 1 (2006): 70–99. The research was supported by the National Science Foundation.


71  Foner, *In a New Land*, 3.