When Destiny Takes a Turn for the Worse: William Henry Holmes and, Incidentally, Franz Boas in Chicago, 1892-97

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Introduction

William Henry Holmes (1846–1933) opened his twenty-volume autobiographical scrapbook, *Random Records of a Lifetime Devoted to Science and Art*, with the fond musing that he “was born on the same day with the [Smithsonian] Institution . . . and have come to regard myself as an original predestined member of the family.” Predestined or not, he was very nearly a permanent member of that family, spending fifty-eight years (1871–94, and 1897–1932) working in Washington. The only time Holmes was ever officially separated from the Smithsonian was a brief stint that began in 1894 at the end of the World’s Columbian Exposition, when he was hired as Curator in the Department of Anthropology at the newly established Field Columbian Museum in Chicago.

Venturing outside of Washington was a bold step for Holmes: for the first time in two dozen years he was not in the employ of one or the other of the various government-sponsored surveys, research bureaus, or museums housed under the broad administrative umbrella of the Smithsonian Institution. But just three years later he was back in Washington, having fled a future at Chicago in which he could only perceive “crudeness, struggle, and uncertainty.” Holmes retreated the wiser for having learned something of how anthropology was practiced outside the supportive confines of the Smithsonian, and scarred by the harsh reality of joining a new institution run by businessmen rather than scientists, and which was struggling to gain its feet while relying on patronage and the whims of an unpredictable attending public. Chicago gave Holmes a sour taste of what life was like where there were formidable institutional constraints on individual aspirations. He didn’t care for it at all: better to be in Washington, within the safe Smithsonian cocoon, even though one was occasionally buffeted by unpredictable Congressional winds.

Holmes’s experience in Chicago is, of course, of biographical interest, but on its face perhaps not much more. It is surely not an analytically
privileged case study in the struggles of the emerging professional class of anthropologists in the late nineteenth century, a time when positions were few (and almost entirely restricted to museums), and their occupants often vulnerable to any number of internal and external forces. In fact, Holmes's case may be less interesting (and more the exception) than most, in that unlike many of his peers he enjoyed secure employment in anthropology over his entire career, and was not as financially and institutionally vulnerable as they often were. Indeed, when the Chicago situation soured, it took only a few conversations and a brief flurry of letters before Holmes slid effortlessly back into a position as curator of Anthropology at the U.S. National Museum.

What makes his case more than an interesting biographical excursion is that none of it happened in isolation. In that small community of anthropologists it necessarily had an impact on and consequences for others. When Holmes secured the curatorship at the Field Museum after the Fair, it necessarily meant someone else would not. Indeed, Holmes's hiring displaced the individual temporarily filling the position: a young, poor, and desperately underemployed Franz Boas, who had been employed by Harvard University's Frederic Ward Putnam for the Exposition's own anthropology department, and who had been kept on afterward to help organize the collections for the new Museum. Boas was angling vigorously for the permanent curatorial position. And Putnam, who believed he had no small influence in the matter, was likewise lobbying hard on Boas's behalf. They both had been led to believe Boas would get the appointment. And both of them—but especially Boas—were bitterly disappointed to learn that Holmes (who, of course, already had a job), received the offer instead. It especially rankled Boas to learn this in back-halls gossip, and realize the negotiations and offer had been made right under his nose. Despite repeated assurances that Holmes had not been complicit in any scheming, the episode badly strained their relationship.

There were, of course, reasons Holmes was appointed and Boas was not—none of which, naturally, were acceptable to Boas. Nonetheless, they reveal not just the differences in their anthropological strengths, interests, experiences and alliances, but also something of the political and institutional landscape of late nineteenth century anthropology.

Both Holmes and Boas learned from their shared Chicago experience. But since they stood opposite one another they were very different lessons. Without putting too fine a point on it, Holmes learned how difficult it can be to navigate on a landscape which appeared familiar (museum-based anthropology), but which in the fine details proved very
different, placing him at a tactical disadvantage. Boas learned that the landscape itself needed to change if he were to achieve his personal, professional, and institutional goals for anthropology. They also shared a lesson: in Chicago they learned to dislike one another, and to the degree that Boas and Holmes became the central figures in the institutional evolution of anthropology across the turn of the century, the antipathy born in Chicago would reverberate across the discipline over the next several decades (Stocking 1968:281).

My aim, then, is to explore Holmes’s experience in Chicago—why he went there, how he got there, what he did there, and why he stayed so briefly—with one eye on Boas throughout.

The Great Paleolithic War, in Which Holmes Is Noticed by One of Chicago’s Scientific Elite

Holmes’s biography and intellectual history are discussed elsewhere, and need not be repeated here (e.g., Hinsley 1981; Hough 1933; Mark 1980; Meltzer and Dunnell 1992; Meltzer 1999; Nelson 1980; Swanton 1937). Instead, I pick up the thread of the story in fall 1889 when Holmes, a longtime employee of the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) and the Smithsonian’s U.S. National Museum, was shifted over to J. W. Powell’s Bureau of Ethnology (BAE). His work at the BAE over the next several years brought him great acclaim in scientific circles and powerful friends, the most important of whom in terms of this narrative was the University of Chicago’s Thomas C. Chamberlin. Although one was an archaeologist and the other a geologist, they became allies in the “Great Paleolithic War,” and the bonds forged there would be ones that Chamberlin—who had a sharp eye for scientific talent and was keen to bolster Chicago’s place in American science—would soon seek to make permanent.

And Holmes had talent. He’d brought with him to the BAE extraordinary artistic ability, honed in nearly two decades of illustrating USGS and Bureau reports (Swanton 1937:226–227). But he was more than a human camera lucida: he’d developed an obvious talent for analyzing artifacts and material culture. He attributed his skill to having “learned how to think as the Indian thinks,” although in point of fact he had “singularly few contacts with the living Indians” (Swanton 1937:236; Mark 1980:157). More likely, that talent derived from carefully reading ethnographic accounts of others, studying archaeological collections at the Smithsonian and elsewhere with the skilled eyes of an artist who could see and appreciate the nuances of style and design, and experimentally replicating ceramic and stone artifacts. Holmes, it was said, could make
Indian arrows out of “a beer-bottle, a piece of cannel coal, or anything that has a shell-like fracture” (Wilson 1890:979–980). As even a grudging Franz Boas would later admit, Holmes’s “natural gifts lead him to a thorough appreciation of visual objects”.

Those “gifts” enabled Holmes to probe the techniques by which prehistoric artisans fabricated their tools, and the dimensions of variability (whether technological, functional, or stylistic) in the products. He understood, as his contemporaries using a more strictly typological approach did not, that artifact form itself masked important and meaningful variability. He showed how two apparently distinct (and immutable) artifact types might actually be related to another, by virtue of their being different stages in the same chain of manufacture; and how the same forms could occur as both finished tools of one kind and as unfinished stages in the manufacture of other, more specialized tools (Meltzer and Dunnell 1992:xxxiii). This was a novel approach to material culture, for it appreciated that artifact form was merely the crystallized moment of an underlying dynamic of manufacture and use. At a time when “object lesson” was a phrase to be taken literally (Conn 1998, 2004), Holmes proved especially adept at making mute objects speak.

At the same time, Holmes embedded his understanding of and appreciation for material culture within Powell and Lewis Henry Morgan’s cultural evolutionary perspective, with its strong leitmotif of progress (Holmes 1888:196, 1890a:139; also Hinsley 1981:103–104; Meltzer and Dunnell 1992:xxvii–xxxii). Yet his was not the vulgar discipleship of a W. J. McGee (Hinsley 1981:238–247), but was more subtle, tempered by Holmes’s realization (based on his analysis of variability in artifacts) that evolutionary stages were analytical tools that worked best at a large scale, and were not precisely defined nuggets of empirical reality, nor facts of human history (Meltzer and Dunnell 1992:xxviii–xxix, xxxvi; Holmes 1892a:248–249). Holmes, in effect, let the data speak to him: McGee could hardly hear the data over his own theoretical din. Holmes used stage concepts (“savagery”) and terms like “culture grade” as handy didactic devices, but they carried none of the more detailed connotations they did for Morgan or Powell (or especially McGee), save the message of overall progress. And Holmes, who was very much a product of the Victorian progressivism of his own cultural background, believed fervently in that message (almost as fervently, to be sure, as Boas opposed it—on which more below).

Holmes was transferred into the Bureau to focus its archaeological attention on the American Paleolithic. His role in the debate over the Paleolithic has been examined in some detail elsewhere (Meltzer 1983,
1991, 1994), but warrants brief reiteration here since it provides the essential backstory for the subsequent unfolding of events in Chicago (as Holmes himself understood).²

In the fall of 1889, Holmes began fieldwork at a cobble-covered hillside flanking a creek on what were then the outskirts of the city of Washington. At Piney Branch, Holmes was able to reconstruct the processes by which prehistoric groups had fashioned stone tools from the quartzite cobbles eroding on the hill. He realized that stone tools passed through a series of stages from initial shaping, to final form, to use and ultimately to discard of exhausted specimens; but he also saw that not all specimens reached each stage in the process (Holmes 1890b, 1891). He then made the further critical observation that specimens jettisoned along the way—particularly unfinished forms broken or discarded early in the manufacturing process—were often morphologically similar to European Paleolithic artifacts. The ontogeny of stone tool production, it appeared, recapitulated the phylogeny of the evolution of stone tool making, as Holmes would elegantly explain at the Fair (Holmes 1894).

That being the case, how might one reliably distinguish tools that were ancient from ones that were merely unfinished? In the case of European Paleolithic artifacts their discovery in geologically-ancient deposits alongside Pleistocene fauna was proof of their antiquity. Matters were not so clear cut for the artifacts of the supposed American Paleolithic, the antiquity of which was based largely on their supposed similarity to European Paleolithic tools; there was rarely accompanying geological evidence to suggest any great antiquity. Even so, by early 1890 there was a large literature testifying to a deep human antiquity in America that reached back into Pleistocene times (e.g., Abbott 1889; Putnam 1888, 1889; Wright 1889; summarized in Meltzer 1983, 1991, 1994). Nonetheless, Holmes could see that the lessons learned at Piney Branch bore on the American Paleolithic (Holmes 1890b).

In August of 1892, Holmes attended the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), delivering his address as vice-president of Section H (Anthropology), and along the way two papers on the American Paleolithic—the latter prompting a pre-emptive outcry from Putnam who, when he learned what Holmes intended to speak on, accused him of “annihilating Paleolithic man.” Putnam had good reason to worry. In his first paper Holmes pronounced “a very large percentage” of paleolithic claims to be “defective or erroneous,” since in most cases it had not been demonstrated the alleged paleoliths were finished implements or found in secure glacial-aged contexts, nor had they been recovered by geologically competent individuals. He

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then went on to show as much in a subsequent paper on the Little Falls quartzes. His reanalysis of this Minnesota site, he reported, proved the artifacts—in reality not Paleolithic but merely “failures left by arrow-maker”—were not even in primary context (Holmes 1892a, 1892c).

If the American Paleolithic was having a bad time of it at Rochester, so was Oberlin College’s George Frederick Wright, one of its champions and a part-time glacial geologist. As he had on previous occasions, Wright argued at Rochester there had been but a single glacial advance during the Pleistocene, which had produced a well-marked terminal moraine, along with a distant scatter of glacial debris that he termed the “fringe,” but which he insisted was contemporary with (and merely an extension of) the terminal moraine. The report of the discussions that followed commented laconically that after Wright finished the University of Chicago’s “Professor R.D. Salisbury and Mr. WJ McGee [of the USGS] remarked upon the matter of the paper, challenging the observations and inferences of the author.” Well they might have, for they believed strongly that the “fringe” belonged to an entirely different and earlier glacial advance. How much earlier was uncertain: perhaps by an interval several times as long as the time that had elapsed since the end of the last glacial age.

In the opinion of Wright’s allies, the critics “came out second best at Rochester on the moraine question.” Salisbury thought otherwise, and was equally partisan about it. Regardless of who won that particular skirmish, however, the meeting marked the beginning of the escalation of conflict, for it was in Rochester that a conscious decision was reached to launch a coordinated attack on two fronts: against both the American Paleolithic and the so-called unity of the glacial period.3

Organizing the attack was the University of Chicago’s Thomas Chamberlin who had arrived at the AAAS meetings after Wright departed. Chamberlin, who was simultaneously chief of the Glacial Division of the United States Geological Survey, had briefly employed Wright at the Survey several years earlier, and came to regret it. He considered Wright incompetent, a myopic advocate of his own favored hypotheses, and a few years earlier had even taken the extraordinary step of introducing one of Wright’s USGS reports with a very public disavowal of its conclusions (Chamberlin 1890a; Wright 1890).4 They’d clashed privately as well, when Wright published Ice Age in North America in 1889, a book on glacial geology and human antiquity for the general public. Writing on these topics for the unscientific reader, Chamberlin sternly lectured Wright, was altogether premature: “leading and important truths” relating to glacial formations were not yet known, and there could not be
“even be a critical and specific statement of the problem” related to human antiquity in America until the ages of various glacial and non-glacial deposits were determined. The only justifiable publication, Chamberlin proclaimed, was one that “consists of a very careful, conscientious, critical and appreciative exposition of the varying view held by competent workers, together with a sharp discrimination between that which is demonstrative and that which is but believed.” And that sort of book could only be written by one with “determinate knowledge.” Chamberlin left it unsaid, but it didn’t matter: he obviously thought Wright incapable of such a book, making Ice Age in North America “premature and unfortunate both for science and for the public.” Their disagreements would soon explode on a much larger and more public stage.

At the time of the Rochester meeting, Chamberlin was in the midst of hand-picking faculty to fill his Department of Geology at the newly created University of Chicago. Molded in his own image, the department was to be the harbinger of training in the “new geology” and, through its Journal of Geology (which Chamberlin was also simultaneously launching), sought to influence the field nationwide. He sat quietly through the AAAS meeting, but not for want of something to say. He was plotting. As he listened to the papers in the Geology and Anthropology sections, it occurred to him these were ready-made for the inaugural issues of the Journal of Geology. As he explained it a few weeks later to his close friend and colleague Salisbury:

I have been thinking it that it would be a fine idea for you and Whitson to prepare a special paper for our January number of the Journal on the Trenton gravels. Then Holmes a paper, on his search for implements. Then perhaps a note from you on the geology of the [other] localities Holmes discusses & then I will discuss the general conditions of the time & their bearing on the subject, much as I talked to Holmes & you at Rochester. If you are ready, we could make a strong combination. It was with a view to something of the kind that should bring out the full strength of our side with everybodies [sic] work in its proper place & [alongside] the others, that I did not discuss the subject [publicly] at Rochester.

Ultimately, when the first two numbers of the Journal of Geology appeared in January of 1893, they looked very much as Chamberlin had envisioned them the summer before.

Chamberlin and Holmes did not meet for the first time in Rochester; they already knew each other, presumably from their shared em-
ploy at Powell’s USGS. They likely came into close contact in the early 1890s, when Holmes began teasing apart the geological context of Paleolithic sites and sought expertise in glacial geology (in 1892, Holmes still had not been in the field with Chamberlin, but had worked on supposed Paleolithic sites in Ohio and New Jersey with Chamberlin’s close colleagues Frank Leverett and Rollin Salisbury). The Rochester AAAS meeting marks the beginning of a tightening bond between them. Earlier, Chamberlin had broached the idea of affiliating Holmes with the University of Chicago.7 A week after the AAAS meeting, he returned to Chicago and arranged for Holmes to be appointed Non-resident Professor of Archaeologic Geology at Chicago.8 Holmes was soon listed in the “Programme of Courses in Geology,” as the instructor in “Anthropic geology,” a course of special lectures on the “critical relations of Geology to Archaeology, with collateral readings,” and for a course on “Graphic Geology.”9

That fall of 1892 Wright’s latest book, *Man and the glacial period*, also appeared (Wright 1892c). By Wright’s own admission, it covered much of the same ground as his earlier *Ice Age in North America* (Wright 1889), but was offered to the general reading public as a condensed, better balanced, and more international version, incorporating new geological material from his recent field excursions on both sides of the Atlantic, and a few of the latest Paleolithic discoveries from here and abroad. For the most part it was familiar and, Wright thought, safe and secure ground. What he had not anticipated, however, was that Chamberlin was still seething over Wright’s presumptiveness in publishing for the general public, and this time was determined to punish him for his impertinence.

With the enthusiastic cooperation of McGee and Salisbury, Chamberlin orchestrated a campaign to destroy Wright’s credibility as a glacial geologist, an archaeologist, and especially as a public spokesman for science. Between them, the critics published eight reviews of the book (Chamberlin 1892; McGee 1892, 1893a, 1893b; Salisbury 1892a, 1892b, 1892c, 1893), which were unprecedented in number and savagery. Particularly infamous was one by McGee which appeared in the *American Anthropologist*, and labeled Wright’s book superficial and warped, distorted and misleading, “absurdly fallacious,” unscientific, and an “offense to the nostrils,” then dismissed its author as “a betinseled charlatan whose potions are poison” (McGee 1893c).

The reviews appalled Wright’s colleagues (and even many who hardly knew him or his work), and triggered a firestorm that spread across archaeological and geological circles. That both issues from both disci-
pilines were in play likely did not appreciably change the content of the debate, but it almost certainly increased its intensity, as it expanded the field of controversy and brought more (and more powerful) players into the arena, which in turn raised the stakes and the volume, making the controversy more visible and almost assuredly more acrimonious than it might have otherwise been. They also added another dimension to this multilayered controversy (Meltzer 1991), for as archaeologists and geologists aligned themselves on these issues—for or against the Paleolithic, or single versus multiple glacial epochs—it was perfectly obvious that one side was comprised largely of BAE and USGS scientists, and the other side was not.

The “Great Paleolithic War” began as a relatively straightforward substantive question about whether there was evidence of people in the Americas in Pleistocene times. In the end, it escalated well beyond that, boiling over into a wide-ranging and highly polemical proprietary dispute over the nature and practice of science, exacerbated by the porosity of the boundary separating amateur and professional science (Hinsley 1976), and made all the worse by having tapped a vein of deep seated resentment toward government science.

To Wright’s defenders, the near-simultaneous appearance of the reviews attacking him and his book, and their “sameness of tone,” clearly bespoke a “sameness of origin.” It all smacked of a conspiracy, and there seemed little doubt who was behind it: “the whole lot have . . . been hatched in the Geological Survey, and Chamberlin has been the incubator.”10 The conspirators’ intent seemed self-evident: this was no less than an attempt by sanctioned government science to advance itself at the expense of university and local practitioners. The attack on Wright symbolized the arrogance and abusiveness of heavy-handed government scientists. It was undeniable proof “that our ‘official’ geologists will brook no criticism of their work.”11 (Winchell to Wright, January 9, 1893, GFW/OCA). This was more than a defense of one man as a scholar and scientist: this was a defense of a common cause—that of all the “non-official” geologists of the country, and their right to fully participate in American science without fear of reprisal or censure from “official science” (Claypole to Wright, December 4, 1892, GFW/OCA).12

Holmes participated in the mugging of Wright, though his review of Man and the glacial period was critical but not malicious (Holmes 1893d). Even so, Holmes did real damage to the Paleolithic cause, for over the winter of 1892–93, he also produced a series of landmark papers that established the linkage between his Piney Branch quarry work and the artifacts of the American Paleolithic: most alleged American

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paleoliths, he argued, were merely manufacturing failures of relatively recent age (Holmes 1892b). He systematically poked, probed and ultimately rejected each of the major Paleolithic claims—including those from the Tidewater region, the Loveland, Madisonville, and Newcomerstown, Ohio, finds (the latter championed by Wright), the Little Falls, Minnesota, paleoliths, as well as the Paleolithic bellwether, Charles Abbott’s Trenton gravels site (Holmes 1893a, 1893b, 1893f, 1893g). There was no American Paleolithic comparable in antiquity to that of Europe, let alone of late Pleistocene age.

Throughout the winter of 1892, and into the spring of 1893, the “Great Paleolithic War” raged in heated, rapid-fire exchanges in Science, Popular Science Monthly, and the American Geologist (e.g. Abbott 1892a, 1892b, 1893a, 1893b; Brinton 1892a, 1892b, 1892c; Chamberlin 1893a, 1893b, 1893c, 1893d; Claypole 1893a, 1893b, 1893c; Haynes 1893a, 1893b, 1893c, 1893d, 1893e; Holmes 1893c, 1893e; Winchell 1893a, 1893b, 1893c, 1893d, 1893e; Wright 1892b, 1892d, 1892e, 1893a, 1893b, 1893c, 1893d, 1893e, 1893f). Matters came to a head in August of 1893 at the annual meeting of the AAAS in Madison, Wisconsin. There, for the first time since the explosion over Man and the Glacial Period the previous fall, Paleolithic proponents and critics assembled and it proved to be a volatile mix. It was “like a border warfare, in which neither geologists nor archaeologists are quite sure as to what belongs to them” (Peet 1893:311). Matters grew bitter and personal when “one of the disputants lost self-control and allowed himself to employ unparlimentary language.” W. J. McGee had struck again, and it was apparently so harsh an outburst that an old friend who witnessed it became alarmed about McGee’s mental and physical well-being, and urged him to please “let up.”13 “We were all relieved,” Warren Moorehead admitted, “when [the meeting] came to an end” (Moorehead 1893:171).

Although he was absent, Holmes had a paper read for him by McGee, and was very much there in spirit, his work being invoked, or challenged, by virtually all the participants. There were no clear “winners” at Madison, however keen some of the commentators were to declare them (cf. Anonymous 1893a, 1893c; McGee 1893a). Yet visible by meeting’s end was a none-too-subtle shift in the debate’s center of gravity. It was now admitted—at least by the more dispassionate among them—that the American Paleolithic case had not been proven, and could not be accepted at face value. For that, Holmes could take a lion’s share of the credit.

The American Paleolithic dispute occupied much of Holmes’s archaeological attention in 1892–93, yet it had consequences beyond mere-
ly serving as a distraction from his preparation of the exhibits for the World’s Columbian Exposition. First, although Holmes already had a solid reputation within the field, the American Paleolithic dispute thrust him onto center stage in anthropology, and made him a highly visible figure—even to those watching from a distance and unfamiliar with the discipline. Holmes proclaimed “the five year period, 1889–1894, [as] one of the most important periods of his labors in the field of science, [but also] one of the most important in the history of American archaeological research.” A bit immodest, perhaps, but there was a nugget of truth to it. Holmes was not only the most prominent (and best behaved) of the American Paleolithic critics, he was advocating a new and scientific approach to archaeology, one that would bring order and coherence to the mass of archaeological data, and allow the objects to tell the story. Partisanship aside, his was an appealing message and method in late nineteenth century science and society (Conn 2004; Weibe 1967).

Second, out of the controversy emerged an important professional relationship. Holmes and Chamberlin bonded in that battle, forging a relationship on a foundation of their shared disdain for Wright and American Paleolithic proponents, enhanced by their ability to invoke the other’s expertise and aid. Thus, Chamberlin lectured Wright on the results of Holmes “epoch-marking investigations,” which so far as Chamberlin was concerned “practically demonstrated” that paleoliths were merely “flakings, failures, and rejects.” Chamberlin put Holmes on the editorial board of the Journal of Geology soliciting from him (as earlier noted) a piercing critique of Abbott’s Trenton gravels site—the centerpiece of the American Paleolithic—for his inaugural issue. In turn, Holmes summoned the authority of Chamberlin, the “foremost” geologist of the country (Holmes 1892b) to butress his views of the geological failings of Paleolithic claims.

They were not dissimilar, these two: Chamberlin and Holmes were both moralistic, self-righteous, extremely hard-working, indisputably talented, and for the most part utterly humorless. Neither was particularly modest, and each was convinced of the inerrancy of his views. Holmes’s writings—like Chamberlin’s—had all the starched demeanor of the arrogantly self-righteous. Ultimately, they came to respect and rely on each other’s judgment and abilities, and would naturally seek to ally themselves if the opportunity arose.

Finally, close on the heels of the Great Paleolithic War came economic hard times for the country. By 1892 the national economy was taking a turn for the worse: the first deficit in two decades was projected, and the Panic of 1893 was looming on the horizon. Congress went hunting
for expenditures to cut. All government agencies and research bureaus were suddenly vulnerable to a bloodletting, but among the most visible targets—all one had to do was follow the trail of critics howling over the attack on Wright—was the USGS, with its bloated budget (which had risen at dizzying rates, reaching a high of nearly $800,000 in the late 1880s), and a director who possessed more sweeping powers and access to greater financial resources than virtually any of his contemporaries (scientist or otherwise) in the nation. Resentment toward Powell had been building for years, not least because he received the Survey appropriation as a lump sum, which enabled him to elude congressional oversight, and have complete discretionary control—critics called it secretive and cavalier—over its use (Goetzmann 1966:594–595; Rabbitt 1980:57; Stegner 1954:249, 251, 273).

At this moment in its history, the Survey badly needed friends, not enemies. The Great Paleolithic War had made them enemies. William Youmans, editor of Popular Science Monthly, thundered from his editorial pulpit that the attack on Wright was but an ill-disguised witch hunt, aimed at discrediting the work of individuals “which the Survey did not approve.” “Of all the arrogant things in the world official science is perhaps the most arrogant,” he intoned, “and of all the obstructive things official science is perhaps the most obstructive” (Youmans 1893b:841). How much, he asked,

> does the country really want of this kind of thing? In granting an appropriation for the Survey did [Congress] mean to endow a Holy Inquisition or a Sacred Congregation of the Index? We think not. (Youmans 1893b:842)

But Youmans—and the Survey’s many other critics—would not be satisfied with just budget cuts or a restructuring of the Survey. They wanted blood, and called for McGee’s head (Baldwin 1893; Youmans 1893a:413). And because of the seamless administrative web linking the USGS and the BAE, any changes in the one would surely have repercussions for the other.

In the midst of all of this, William Henry Holmes went to the Chicago Fair.

**Anthropology at the World’s Columbian Exposition**

Anthropology—at least of the scholarly sort—had two primary venues at the Fair: as part of the federal government’s displays, and in the Exposition’s own sponsored department of anthropology (for more on an-
thropology at the fair, see, e.g., Brown 1994; Cole 1985; Conn 1998; Dexter 1966; Hinsley 1991; Jenkins 1994; Muccigrosso 1993; Rydell 1984: ch. 2; Rydell 1993; Schelereth 1991; de Wit 1993). The government’s anthropological displays were deliberately planned to avoid even the appearance of overlap with the Fair’s Department of Anthropology (Mason 1894a:211; Rydell 1984:57), which had been conceived by Frederick Ward Putnam, and had largely materialized under the direction of Franz Boas, his ablest assistant. During the World’s Columbian Exposition itself there were few clashes between Putnam and Boas on the one hand, and the government anthropologists on the other.16 Partly this was a reflection of location and proximity: the Fair’s Anthropology Department was located in a “mean-looking building” on the periphery of the Exposition grounds, constructed at the 11th hour to house overflow from the Manufactures and Liberal Arts Building, and which opened on July 4, 1893, nine weeks late (Truman 1893:255; also Cole 1895:126, 1999:154; Dall 1893:225; Dexter 1966:323).

In contrast, the government exhibits were billeted with those of the Smithsonian Institution, within the more centrally located Government Building. They were under the overall direction of G. Brown Goode, the Assistant Secretary of the Smithsonian and Director of the U.S. National Museum and a prime organizing force behind the Fair (see Goode 1892; also Conn 1998:20–22; Rydell 1984:44). More immediately, government anthropology was under the charge of Otis Mason, curator of Ethnology at the U.S. National Museum (USNM). It was decided early on to combine the efforts of the USNM’s departments of ethnology and prehistoric anthropology (the latter under American Paleolithic proponent Thomas Wilson), with those of the BAE, which at least initially fell to the curatorial charge of Henry W. Henshaw. Only later, when Henshaw was unable to attend to the duty, did Holmes become more actively involved (Goode 1895:127).

That organizational structure meant, of course, that the government anthropology displays were combined with other, non-anthropological exhibits of the Smithsonian (primarily on the institution’s history) and the USNM (with a focus on the natural resources of the United States). And because those exhibits were housed together in the Government Building (Goode 1895:126; Mason 1894b:605–606), the Smithsonian exhibits had to fit into a structure that by Exposition standards was not large: at 147,771 square feet, the Government Building was dwarfed by the 1,327,669-square foot Manufacturers and Liberal Arts Building that loomed next door (Applebaum 1980). No fairgoer could mistake the relative importance of the government versus free market capitalism in the White City.
Moreover, the Smithsonian had to share space with, among other federal agencies, the Departments of Agriculture, Interior, Justice, State, Treasury, and War; the Census Office, Post Office, Patent Office, and Land Office; and several of the scientific bureaus, including the Coast and Geodetic Survey, the Signal Bureau, the Fish Commission and the Geological Survey. Government anthropology was competing for the attention of visitors with a very large trunk of a California redwood (atop which sat the “Big Tree Restaurant”); carrier pigeons (which amazed visitors by traveling up to two hundred miles from the fairgrounds); a working post office, complete with a very popular dead letter office featuring packages of snakes, stuffed elephants, roller skates, and circular saws; and an eye-catching miscellany of American history and technology, including a fragment of Plymouth Rock, Benedict Arnold’s fife, Paul Revere bronzes, Navy warship models, new coins from the mint, and the like (Bolotin and Laing 1992:97–98; for a contemporary, detailed illustrated description, see Bancroft 1895). Not to mention the competing attraction of exhibitions, anthropological and otherwise, throughout the White City, and the lewd pleasures and tawdry allure of the racist faux ethnology on display on the Midway Plaisance, amidst wild-animal acts, joyrides, and other side shows (Cole 1985:127–128; Hinsley 1991:348, 352–353; Rydell 1984:65, 1993:166; Schlereth 1991:173).

Worse, because of Congressional dawdling over—and ultimately cutting of—the proposed budget, it was not possible to get a building at the size originally requested, or have it constructed in a timely manner (Goode 1895:109; also Truman 1893:399). In the end, the Smithsonian found itself with just 15,375 square feet of usable space, although they had asked Congress three years earlier for that much room for the Bureau of Ethnology alone, and another 60,000 square feet for the National Museum (Langley, in Rhees 1901:1504; Goode 1895:109 plate 56). Mason, in charge of the government’s anthropological exhibits, grumbled,

It is much to be regretted that the contracted space allowed in the Government building at Chicago prevented the curator from giving to the idea [of displaying groups from each linguistic family of lay figures dressed in “proper costume and engaged in typical occupations”] its fullest expression. (Mason, in Goode 1895:129)

No matter. Mason found a solution that would fit the physical space and the intellectual theme of the Exposition, which was “to show the history of our continent since its European occupation and its influence upon the history of the world . . . to expound, as far as may be, the steps
of the progress of civilization and its arts in successive centuries, and in all lands up to the present time and their present condition; to be, in fact, *an illustrated encyclopedia of civilization,* as well as highlight “the crowning result of ethnological labors on our continent during fifty years” (Goode 1892:654). Using as an organizational device the linguistic map of North America just published by Powell and the Bureau (of which Mason had for display a 16 x 12–foot version), he proposed to “bring into sharp comparison the concepts of race, speech, and activities among the aborigines” (Goode 1895:127; Mason 1894a:211).

For his part, Thomas Wilson put together a display of archaeological material arranged chronologically and by function, starting with the earliest Paleolithic material from Europe. He couldn’t help but add a few “ Implements similar in form, style, and manufacture to those of the Paleolithic Age of European countries,” but which were found in this country. These were artifacts that Wilson was confident “would undoubtedly be accepted as paleolithic,” were they found in Europe, though he admitted that archaeologists here in North America were hardly “unanimous concerning to the conclusions to be drawn from them” (Wilson in Goode 1895:133). A good thing, too, for Holmes had set up nearby an exhibit on his Piney Branch quarry explorations, which included “life groups” of mannequins that showed prehistoric peoples fashioning stone tools—and not a few “turtle-backs” which looked a great deal like supposed American paleoliths—in their “natural” setting (Brown 1994; Hinsley 1981:108–109, Goode 1895:54; Mason 1894b:606).

These life-size human forms were a novel exhibit form in America in 1893. Under Holmes’s creative direction (and Frank Cushing’s firsthand anthropological oversight) the Smithsonian exhibits included several such life-sized Native figures, including a Comanche family (with horse) and a Comanche Chief (modeled by Cushing) flanking the entryway to the National Museum’s displays (Brown 1994:50–51; Cole 1985:135; Goode 1895:54; Hinsley 1981:108). In these displays, the government anthropologists “reproduced [in plaster] these chiefs exact in stature, features, complexion, dress. It is a work of the utmost value, the true records of a dying race of men” (Truman 1893:404).

Of course, very live members of those same “dying races” were seen performing daily in front of sell-out crowds just outside the fairgrounds in Buffalo Bill Cody’s Wild West Show and Congress of Rough Riders of the World (Muccigrosso 1993:150; see also Dexter 1966:324–325).

At the other end of the evolutionary spectrum, and quite literally at the other end of the Government Building from the “dying races” was the U.S. Patent Office, which put on display just a few of its best
patent models (out of 225,000 inventions to choose from). The result: “Object lessons in progress to be had nowhere else on earth” (Truman 1893:405). “Object-based epistemology,” Conn calls it, in an age in which the “combination and selection [of objects in museums] presented the meta-narrative of evolutionary progress. A trip through the galleries followed a trajectory from simple to complex, from savage to civilized, from ancient to modern” (Conn 1998:5). So it was in Chicago.

Holmes Goes to the Fair

Holmes was assigned to work on Fair related duties in mid-1892, and his efforts continued throughout nearly all of 1893. He worked primarily in Washington preparing his Piney Branch exhibit, but also giving “life and pictorial expression” to the figures modeled and costumed by Museum exhibitors, and advising them on arranging the groups in their natural habitats.18 The Fair itself opened on May 1, 1893, but Holmes and his wife only arrived in Chicago on Independence Day. They checked in with Cushing at the BAE exhibit, then spent the remainder of the day and much of the evening strolling about fairgrounds that “looked like the fly plaster in a restaurant at fly time—black with people.”19

Holmes stayed in Chicago for several weeks, attending to the government exhibits and viewing others, earning his “Diploma of Honorable Mention” from the Board of Lady Managers of the Exposition, then leaving July 22 to return to Washington.20 A month later, Holmes returned to Chicago, this time staying through mid-September. Once again, he worked on exhibits, took in the sights, “piloted” a visiting Major Powell around for four days, and otherwise enjoyed the vantage provided by the central location of the Government Building.21

Among the exhibits he visited, naturally, were those in Putnam’s Anthropology Building, and there in August he spoke with Franz Boas, asking him—apparently at Powell’s behest—whether Boas would be inclined to accept a position at the Bureau of Ethnology. At the time, Boas was keeping his options open, and merely expressed his “general plans and prospects.”22

In late August, Holmes and many of the anthropologists at the Fair participated in the International Congress of Anthropology, one of 139 conferences sparked by Exposition on topics from education to labor to religion, and many points in between (Schlereth 1991:171–172; late-nineteenth-century America was passionate about founding societies and holding conferences “apropos of everything and apropos of nothing”—much to the amusement of the Fair’s foreign visitors). With nearly
250 attendees, the Congress of Anthropology convened on August 28 with an address by Daniel Brinton, and continued through September 2, 1893, closing with a festive dinner on the Midway for the delegates (Anonymous 1893b; Wake 1894:vii). Papers in physical anthropology, archaeology, ethnology, folklore, religion, and linguistics were delivered, and duly assembled for publication a year later (Wake 1894:viii). For his part, Holmes presented his elegant, if flawed, understanding (but who knew?) of the ontogeny and phylogeny of stone tools (Holmes 1894).

Holmes was charged with assessing the conference for the *American Anthropologist*, and admitted that while it was a “decided success,” the meeting did not “rise fully to the dignity expected of an international congress.” There had been too little notice, too many other duties at the Fair to tend to, and too much of the meeting was centered about who was present and what was on display at Chicago (Holmes 1893h:423, 434). Yet that was not what truly mattered:

> The importance of the outcome of the whole group of anthropologic features connected with the fair depends largely on the action of Chicago with respect to the opportunity of a century in museum making. (Holmes 1893h:434)

And that was what Holmes and everyone else were curious about. Would Chicago take the anthropological collections and momentum there assembled and make something of it—as had already been rumored might happen? But if Holmes was merely curious, Boas and Putnam were growing anxious. Putnam especially: he had advocated a museum from the very start of planning for the Exposition three years earlier and had pressed the issue just the previous month (Dexter 1970:21, 24; also Cole 1999:157; Conn 1998:77–78; McVicker 1999:38).

**Pay No Attention to That Man behind the Curtain**

Although no records exist, one can safely assume that during his time in Chicago in the summer of 1893, Holmes visited Thomas Chamberlin at the University of Chicago. After all, he was a member of Chamberlin’s faculty, albeit a nonresident one. Chamberlin was not satisfied with so distant and provisional an arrangement, whereby Holmes was available to teach only on those occasions when he happened to be in town. Chamberlin wanted the relationship to become more permanent. And once Chamberlin committed to a plan of action, he was very adept at getting what he wanted. But then he’d had considerable experience in such matters.
Chamberlin had come to Chicago following a five-year stint as president of the University of Wisconsin, a position he held while simultaneously serving as Chief of the Glacial Division of the United States Geological Survey (as noted, he continued his USGS appointment through most of his Chicago years, and even afterwards unofficially presided over glacial studies in America). Before the Wisconsin Presidency, Chamberlin had been Wisconsin State Geologist for half a dozen years (Fisher 1963; Schultz 1976). He was—if for no other reason than by dint of long years of experience dealing with state legislators, university governing boards, and congressional committees—a master at politics.

Chamberlin was also a scientific imperialist. In early 1893, before the first issue of his Journal of Geology had even appeared, Chamberlin mounted a takeover bid of his only rival with national pretensions, the American Geologist. Privately, he considered the American Geologist a second-rate journal. His bid called for the American Geologist to be completely absorbed by his Journal and cease to publish; its assets would be split by its owners and the University of Chicago. The newly enlarged Journal (here was the intellectual bottom line) would be subsumed under the full editorial control of the Geological Faculty of the University of Chicago—of which Chamberlin was Chair. A few of the editors from the American Geologist might be asked to serve on the editorial board of the Journal, but that was entirely at the discretion of the Chicago faculty. All of this was part of Chamberlin’s vision of his Journal as a vehicle to elevate the scientific standards of geology nationwide—at least as he defined those standards.23

Characteristic of his starchy arrogance, Chamberlin seemed mildly surprised when the proprietors of the American Geologist declined his proposition. What he hadn’t realized, or deigned to recognize, was the considerable resentment toward the USGS in the hinterlands, and the swelling pride “unofficial” geologists took in their independence from the Survey—which Chamberlin so clearly represented.24

Chamberlin would try a similarly heavy-handed grab less than a year later, when it appeared it would be possible to build a permanent museum after the Columbian Exposition (McVicker 1999:39). He would be more successful in that round.

Like any good academic imperialist, when Chamberlin saw individuals whose talents he coveted, he pursued them relentlessly and effectively. In the early years at Chicago he stocked his Department with a galaxy of geological stars (Fisher 1963:6), most of whom were or would become members of the National Academy of Sciences. One of those he wanted was Holmes.

Although the historical records do not reveal who initiated the con-
conversation, circumstantial evidence suggests that in late November 1893, long after Holmes had returned to Washington, but just a few weeks after Marshall Field made the first and most substantial pledge to support the creation of a permanent museum, Chamberlin inquired of Holmes whether he might consider a move to the Field Museum. Chamberlin was likely not acting strictly on his own recognizance. The University of Chicago’s president, William Harper, was anxious to have some influence over the new Museum—to help dampen any threat to his University—and having individuals such as Holmes with joint appointments would provide a measure of that (Cole 1999:145). Ironically, in 1892 Harper had stocked his nascent Chicago faculty with many of the disgruntled faculty from Clark University, but Franz Boas—who was certainly among Clark’s most disgruntled—was not among them (Frederick Starr was the anthropologist appointed at Chicago, and that effectively precluded Boas’s employment there for the foreseeable future [Cole 1999:164; Hinsley and Holm 1976:311; Stocking 1968:281]).

Holmes’s reply to Chamberlin has not been found, but he evidently gave a “full and frank statement” of his situation, and apparently sent a signal of his strong interest. Chamberlin took that reply as marching orders, writing to Holmes:

I will endeavor to do what I can to foster your interests both by way of protection and promotion. It would very greatly delight us if an arrangement could be made which would bring you here.25

And with that, any chance Boas had for a position at the Field Museum instantly evaporated.

Putnam, of course, was ostensibly in a position to effect such matters—or so he believed—and would later that same month urge Edward Ayer (the new president of the Field Museum) to appoint Boas on an interim basis, en route to making the position permanent (Putnam to Ayer, December 21, 1893, in Cole 1985:134, McVicker 1999:42). Yet, Putnam was no match for Chamberlin’s power and influence—certainly not regarding affairs in Chicago.

The Plot Unfolds

The fall and winter of 1893, Boas—kept on after the Fair to complete the transition to the new Museum—was keeping an eye on his long-term employment prospects. In October he wrote Holmes to find out just what Powell had had in mind about a position at the Bureau, the
possibility Holmes had broached with Boas when they talked at the Fair several months earlier. Would this be an anthropometric position entirely? If not, how much time would be devoted to such work? And what would be the salary?26 When Boas visited Washington the next month he put the Bureau discussions on hold, since he was entertaining a “definite offer” from the University of Pennsylvania (being shepherded by Sara Stevenson [Hinsley and Holm 1976:311–312]). That offer, however, soon vanished owing to the Philadelphians’ apparent fear of Boas’s very ambitious (and costly) plans for anthropological work. He re-opened discussions with the Bureau.

Throughout this period, Boas showed relatively little anxiety over his employment prospects, apparently sensing from all the activity that he would surely have some employment once his duties in Chicago were over. Notably, the one employment option he was not counting on was an offer from the Field Museum:

I have not had any intimation that I am wanted in that quarter which naturally has a considerable attraction for me as I have invested so much time and labor in the work. I cannot consider the probability of an offer from that institution in my plans for the immediate future.27

Across town the very day Boas wrote that letter, Chamberlin was writing to Holmes that he was about to move on his behalf. Even if Boas had known what Chamberlin was about to do, he may not have particularly cared. Matters at the Field Museum were moving so slowly (the trustees hadn’t been elected, nor had a director been selected) there seemed little reason to expect any appointments at the curatorial level in the near term. From Boas’s vantage, it was better to get a position nailed down elsewhere than wait for the Field Museum—which of course likely did not want him anyway. Two months later, when no other employment had materialized, Boas would feel very differently—and much more apprehensive—about the matter.

Over the next month, Chamberlin quietly worked the levers, his leverage amplified, as McVicker (1999) argues, by his serving as the University of Chicago’s liaison to the Field Museum (also Cole 1999:161). In January, Chamberlin wrote Holmes to say “I have seen Mr. [Frederick] Skiff [Director of the Museum] and Mr. Ayer since my return, and they seem very cordially in favor of the plans I have suggested, and the matter will go to Mr. Field, from whom I hope to hear favorably soon.” Holmes, meanwhile, sent Chamberlin a statement of his ideas on the classification of museum material for Chamberlin to share with museum
It must have worked, for two weeks later Chamberlin wrote Holmes again, triumphant:

My private information regarding the organization of the Museum staff is to the effect that “the plan proposed by Chamberlin will be adopted.” I hope this may prove true but it is best for the band not to play until they are out of the woods.

Just a few days later, the band was not only out of the woods, it was headed to Washington. Chamberlin alerted Holmes that Skiff was en route, assuring Holmes that he (Chamberlin) had “endeavored to get matters into the best shape possible for you,” by arranging a joint appointment with the University of Chicago, and leeway to work on Bureau matters as the need arose. Chamberlin could not help bragging just a bit: “I may say to you that the matter takes shape now almost wholly through my influence.”

Yet Skiff wasn’t coming to see Holmes alone. Chamberlin had grander visions. He also wanted to poach USGS paleontologist Charles D. Walcott—another of Chamberlin’s nonresident faculty at the University—who, owing to Powell’s ill-health, had recently become acting director of the Geological Survey. As Chamberlin envisioned it,

I have set my heart on having the great museum under the scientific directorship of yourself and Professor Walcott. You will make a glorious team, and no similar opportunity has ever presented itself in this country. It is doubtful it ever will again.

But Chamberlin raised a warning flag for both of them. He told Walcott that he and Holmes could speak between themselves about the Field Museum, but “On account of the relations of the Museum and anthropological collection to Putnam and Boaz [sic], the negotiation with Professor Holmes should be closely confidential for awhile.”

Skiff’s mission was only partly successful: within the week, Holmes wrote Chamberlin to say he had accepted the offer. Skiff was pleased, Chamberlin rejoiced—but still kept everything confidential. But Walcott chose to stay in Washington, and within a matter of months was named Powell’s permanent successor at the USGS. That Walcott stayed behind would later prove an auspicious decision, so far as Holmes was concerned.

Loose Lips

Boas, meanwhile, continued working diligently on the installation of the anthropological exhibits at the Field Museum with Putnam, from a dis-
When Destiny Takes a Turn for the Worse

tance, helping organize their arrangement. As 1893 turned to 1894, no job prospects materialized for Boas, and with the completion of his Museum work on the horizon, he was becoming increasingly anxious about his future, his general state of unease worsened by the sad death of an infant child that January (Cole 1999:159; Hinsley and Holm 1976:311).

Soon thereafter, Boas learned of Skiff’s visit to Washington, and began hearing rumors about his purpose there. On Wednesday, February 14, the day after Skiff returned to Chicago, Boas confronted him: “I told him . . . that I wanted to have my relation to the Museum settled without delay. He prevaricated and I went about to get the information which I could not get from him in other ways.” Two days later, he had all he wanted: he learned that Holmes had apparently been offered the position and that he—Boas—was to be put in charge of ethnology, but only as Holmes’s subordinate. That prompted Boas to write a letter to Skiff “requesting an immediate settlement of my relation to the Museum.”

Boas stewed through the weekend.

On Saturday, he wrote both Holmes and McGee to learn what they knew about a “Washington Ethnologist” being hired, letting each know it would be an “unsurpassed insult” to himself. On Sunday he wrote a long letter to Putnam, angrily laying out all that he knew and surmised, declaring he would confront Skiff first thing Monday morning and demand to know his status. The next morning, Boas delivered his ultimatum to Skiff:

I have learned from an authoritative source that it is practically settled that Mr. W. Holmes will be appointed Director of the Anthropological Department of the Columbian Museum. In consequence of this information I desire your assurance that since I have had temporary charge of the Anthropological Department, nobody besides myself has been or is being considered in connection with the position of Director of the Department of Anthropology.

That same day, he got Skiff’s cold reply:

I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your inquiry of this date, and to say that I am not in a position to give you the assurance you request, either one way or the other.

Unfortunately (from a tactical perspective), Boas had done his job well, with the result that the permanent exhibits he was installing were too far along to provide him much negotiating leverage. If he walked out then, it would slow but not otherwise wreck the Museum’s timetable. Boas took the only action he saw as honorable:
As you cannot give me the assurance that since I have had temporary charge of the Anthropological Department nobody besides myself has been or is being considered in connection with the position of Director of Anthropology, I decline to work for the Museum any longer under the present terms.40

Yet, deeply distressed and humiliated though he was, Boas did not leave. He could not leave. He needed the job, he needed the money. And so he agreed to stay on at the Museum through May to finalize the installation of the exhibits (Hinsley and Holm 1976:311). Beyond that, Boas refused to accept further temporary employment. And that was a tactical error, Cole (1999:163–164) suggests, since it made it that much easier for Skiff ultimately to dismiss him.

A few days later, Boas heard back from both McGee and Holmes, each of whom assured Boas that no one had taken “any stand inimical to you.”41 Holmes insisted, in fact, that he understood an “entirely new position” had been created for Boas, and tried to assure him he had no idea his (Holmes’s) hiring would have such consequences:

As to your official relations with the Field Columbian Museum I know nothing and it is perhaps unfortunate that you did not let me know more of the situation. That you are installing the anthropologic collections brought together by your department at the Fair I have of course been informed, but this was the limit of my knowledge.42

Boas wasn’t mollified. Holmes evidently felt bad, if not somewhat guilty, and tried to make amends: “As for myself I have the highest respect for you personally and for your position in science and should be exceedingly sorry to have any other than the most cordial relations with you.”43 Skiff, to whom Holmes had quietly forwarded Boas’s letters, did not particularly care. He knew he had Boas cornered: “I was aware of the knowledge which the Doctor [Boas] had obtained, and now that it has all transpired do not regret in the least that he knows what he does. With a full knowledge that he will not continue in charge of the Department I have arranged with him to complete the installation. I prefer, however, that you should consider this confidential.”44

Boas continued on in Chicago through the spring. From Washington, McGee tried to smooth things over, and confidently assured Boas that “Prof. Holmes was in no way knowingly a party to any arrangement prejudicial to you.” Indeed, McGee went on to explain,

[Holmes] hesitated, as I know from personal conversation at the time (in which he was trammeled by the confidential nature of
the tender), on several accounts, prominent among which was uncertainty as to how you would be affected should he accept; and I judge from his expressions both then and subsequently (though again the confidential nature of the arrangement renders my information indefinite), that he did not finally accept until he had made the provisional condition that you should, if you desired, be retained in the museum in an important capacity—my best information being that you were not only to be retained, at an advance of present salary from the museum, but were to be permitted to carry forward field work, not only in collecting but in other directions in the northern part of the continent. I mention these matters to show you how far Prof. Holmes was from engaging in any arrangement which might be deemed injurious to you. It may be added that he had no knowledge whatsoever of any contract under which you were to be kept in charge of the anthropological department of the museum; moreover, that he then supposed you had an offer from Philadelphia which not only rendered you measurably independent of the [Field Columbian] museum, but as he feared, might draw you away from that institution, unless a liberal arrangement were made for continuing you.45

McGee’s words fell on deaf ears. No matter how honorable Holmes’s intent, he’d taken a job that Boas by then was desperate to have, and Boas felt betrayed.46

Although Boas’s take on the events that spring in Chicago (and for that matter, McGee’s) would change over his lifetime, at the time he placed the blame for all that transpired squarely—and not unreasonably—on Thomas Chamberlin, who “proved to be a most shrewd politician” (cf. Boas to Jacobi, September 2, 1909, in Stocking 1974:303–306; Kroeber 1943:133; Stocking 1968:281). Chamberlin was certainly that.

Boas wasn’t going down alone, either: he dragged Putnam down with him, telling him of rumors being spread that “delays in the completion of the Anthropological building were used to best advantage against you and your administrative ability was assailed in every way.”47 It worked. Putnam, who rightly felt credit was due him for the central idea of the Museum, and the large and instantly legitimate anthropological collection and exhibits it would inherit as a result of his efforts on behalf of the Exposition, could easily commiserate with Boas: “Such ingratitude I have never heard of before and I am very much disappointed.”48

Adding insult to injury, Putnam was called to task for collections he’d
taken with him back to the Peabody Museum—Skiff assumed there was no intent to return them, and wanted some measure of their monetary value. An insulted Putnam assured Skiff that the specimens were in Cambridge solely for the purpose of being illustrated for his final report to the Director General of the Fair.\(^49\) In the end, Putnam was “disgusted” at his treatment and the duplicity of it all:

When Mr. Skiff was appointed he came to me and said that he should ask my advice and should follow it, and that I could be sure that he would do those things that I wished to have done. This has turned out to be all talk and humbuggery on his part, for he has not asked a single bit of advice, nor has he done what he knew I would like to have done, on the contrary he has done the reverse.\(^50\)

As far as Putnam was concerned, he had been used not just by Skiff, whom he considered a mere puppet, but also by Chamberlin, and the remainder of the Chicago crowd. Notably, and unlike Boas, the one player in this drama Putnam apparently did not blame (at least directly) was Holmes. He supposed that Holmes too had been maneuvered by others (Boas likewise believed that Holmes was being manipulated, at least early on in the process [Cole 1999:164]).

Cole observes that, in the end, Putnam should have been more observant and less surprised: “never popular with the dominant forces of the exposition’s administration and no more so with their successors in the Columbian Museum, [Putnam] found his influence thin and his advice ignored” (Cole 1985:134; see also the discussion in McVicker 1999:40–41). But he’d missed those signals, and in the end wanted no more to do with the Chicago enterprise:

I have wiped my hands of the whole Columbian Museum business, which has been a dirty piece of work on the part of many, and I am glad that I got out of it before Chamberlin began his intriguing and Skiff began playing his double game. We know that such things cannot succeed in the end, but unfortunately science must suffer in the mean time. I did hope that the Columbian Museum would start on a good honorable scientific basis, but I suppose that was too much to expect.\(^51\)

Putnam’s bitterness notwithstanding, more dispassionate observers took Holmes’s appointment as evidence there could be “some genuine scientific work there,” and not the “big show” that was the common danger of Chicago.\(^52\)
Putnam retreated to New York. It would be two years before his relations with the Field Museum were even slightly repaired. Boas, of course, had no place to go—Philadelphia was no longer an option, and the financial situation in Washington that summer of 1894, coupled with Powell’s movement from the Geological Survey to the Bureau (discussed below), made it clear he could not count on support from that quarter.

(There was nothing to do except to finish his stint in Chicago, and grow embittered and make matters uncomfortable for Holmes, which he did (Holmes to Skiff, March 30, 1894, quoted in McVicker 1999:45). Boas must have felt Holmes deserved to be discomfited: after all, Holmes had taken the position at Chicago even though he already had a job. Which raises the obvious question.

Why Did Holmes Take the Job?

Or, more appropriately, why did Holmes take this particular job? In early 1894, he was being actively pursued not just by Chicago, but also by the American Museum of Natural History (AMNH) in New York. Morris K. Jesup, President of the AMNH, considered Holmes “the rising man in his department in this country, and perhaps in the world,” and had already decided he “must secure” him for the American Museum. A proposal of sorts (its exact form is not known), was put to Holmes in January by the American Museum, which Holmes duly relayed to Chamberlin. Chamberlin hardly needed the additional incentive, telling Holmes “I hope and intend that it shall be but a compliment.” The American Museum continued to pursue Holmes, but by the time of the next contact, an effort to lure Holmes to New York on the pretext of adjudicating a museum dispute over cataloguing, Holmes had already accepted the offer from Chicago.

Why Holmes accepted the Field Museum offer—as opposed to seeing what might materialize at the American Museum—is clear enough. The attraction of two Chicago positions—the Field Museum and Chamberlin’s department at the University—simply “proved the stronger.” But why leave Washington for an upstart Museum in the Midwest? Partly it was the “glowing picture” painted by Skiff, in which Holmes saw the possibility of having “free and untrammeled control of the Department to carry out my ideals of what such a Department should be.” Holmes was not without ambition in such matters.

Almost certainly, the money was also attractive. Chicago promised a salary of $5,000 per year, which was substantially greater than what he was then making (on the order of $3,000–3,500 per year). Chicago’s
offer was attractive, particularly at a time when six hundred banks and fifteen thousand business had failed, the consequences of the Panic of 1893, which continued into 1894. Perhaps, like Henry Adams, Holmes found himself “suspended . . . over the edge of bankruptcy, without knowing how he got there” and panicked (Adams 1918:337). Of course, financial straits or not, Holmes would have found such a large salary increase highly attractive. Besides, there were other reasons to flee Washington for a place that, on its face, appeared to have money to support anthropology.

Nearly two years earlier, in the face of an already deteriorating national economy, the Fifty-second Congress had made deep cuts in the federal budget. The Sundry Civil Expenses bill had $13 million less than the previous year, and the bloated budget of the USGS, which was funded under that appropriation, was a prime target for absorbing those cuts. Old and new enemies of the Geological Survey (the scars from the Paleolithic War and the Wright business were still open wounds) took the opportunity to reignite broad opposition to its seemingly unending and increasingly expensive topographic mapping program; its dearth of practical and economically valuable results; its wasteful expenditures on “abstract” and seemingly useless sciences like paleontology; and especially Powell’s virtually unassailable discretionary power over the USGS budget. The Survey appropriation had already been slashed in half—to $376,000—in the summer of 1892 (the actions surrounding the 1892–93 Sundry Civil Expenses bill and its effects on the Survey are detailed in Manning 1967:204–214, and Rabbitt 1980:203–214).

Powell, badly shaken by the Congressional action, and nursing considerable pain from his Civil War wound (an amputated arm), was absent from Washington for much of the fall of 1892, but returned that winter to publish a vigorous defense of the Survey (Powell 1893b), and watched with some satisfaction as another Congressional attack in early 1893 fizzled (Manning 1967:212; Rabbitt 1980: 213–215). Still, a sacrificial offer had to be made to atone for the Survey’s sins. On June 30, 1893, with McGee’s “betinseled charlatan” review still sparking controversy, and within just a few days of Youmans’s editorial calling for his head, McGee resigned from the USGS and moved over to the Bureau of Ethnology. At the time, there was no admission from Washington that his resignation was in any way linked to his American Anthropologist review (no surprise, given that Powell [1893a] had refused to censure McGee), nor on McGee’s having focused such an unfavorable light on the Survey.61 Yet, regardless of the official spin put on the move, the fact remained that it disrupted the Bureau of Ethnology’s budget and person-

Removing McGee may have served to deflect some of the criticism of the Survey, but critics continued to fire at other targets—Powell included. Ultimately, he too would resign from the Survey—exactly a year to the day after McGee (Rabbitt 1980:238), thus burdening the Bureau with one more hefty salary (Powell’s received $4,500 annually at the time [Hinsley and Holm 1976:311]), and creating another destabilizing shock to its budget.

Holmes, of course, was witness to all this, and after watching it unfold would almost certainly foresee grim times ahead in Washington. One round of Congressional bloodletting had already occurred, Powell’s power and influence on Capitol Hill had been emasculated, and the future looked bleak. In December 1893 a chastened Powell requested only $40,000 for the Bureau appropriation, $10,000 less than the previous year (Rhees 1901:1675–1676). By mid-1894, Bureau staffers were facing a 15 percent salary cut; Holmes’s salary for 1893–94 was to be just $2,600.62

Distant Chicago, with its newly-minted wealth, must have appeared to Holmes as an oasis promising a far more secure financial future, or at least one more manageable and generous, and not dependent on a teeming rabble of unruly and hostile congressmen who had far less of an investment in his enterprise. Appearances, of course, can be deceiving.

Boas later claimed, and others have echoed (such as Cole 1999:162; McVicker 1999:47), that the Chicago position was a necessary outlet for Holmes, whose position in Washington was directly threatened by the transfers of McGee and Powell back to the Bureau. As Boas put it, “some one had to get out of the Bureau to make room for Powell” (Boas to Jacobi, September 2, 1909, in Stocking 1974:305). Perhaps. Yet while it is certain those transfers impacted the Bureau’s budget (it was impossible they would not), it is difficult to see that they directly threatened Holmes’s employment. By 1894 he had far too many friends at the Bureau, and at the Smithsonian and the National Museum for that to happen, and those friends—Samuel Langley (secretary of the Smithsonian) and G. B. Goode, among them—had the resources to easily absorb Holmes’s salary (see also Hinsley and Holm 1976:315 n.4).

Finally, of course, there was Chamberlin himself. When Holmes later described this episode, he wrote of being “induced” to accept the position. It was Chamberlin who had doggedly pushed Holmes’s candidacy, and once the offer was made gently pressured him to take it.63 Money matters aside, there is something to be said for the persuasive power of a strongly-twisted arm.

When Destiny Takes a Turn for the Worse
Why Holmes and Not Boas?

Chamberlin was a persuasive advocate, and the obvious and immediate answer to why Holmes received the Chicago offer and not Boas is that Chamberlin pushed Holmes’s candidacy. Vigorously. But such an explanation is historically insufficient, and unfair to both Holmes and Boas, implying as it does that their experience and abilities did not matter. They did, and given the nature of museums in the early 1890s, there was only one clear favorite.

The Smithsonian’s G. Brown Goode, to whom the citizens of Chicago turned for help when they secured congressional approval to host the 1893 Exposition, had outlined not just the essential vision and organization of the Fair, he had also spoken clearly about the method to bring it about. A veteran of virtually every exposition put on in America or abroad over the preceding decade (Rydell 1984:43–44), Goode was an extraordinarily adept museum administrator. He knew what worked and what did not. Effectively presenting a theme, attracting visitors to the Fair and into the exhibits, and doing so repeatedly, Goode argued, required a new and very different approach than had been used in museums’ and expositions’ past. Gone were the days when one could assemble “barrels as big as houses, temples of cigar boxes, or armorial trophies of picks and shovels.” Unmeaning and pretentious, Goode thought them, and no more than cheap decoration. No, a museum or an exposition was to be:

> an exhibition of ideas rather than of objects, and nothing will be deemed worthy of admission to its halls which has not some living, inspiring thought behind it, and which is not capable of teaching some valuable lesson (Goode 1892:656, emphasis in original)

Although one could not put ideas on exhibit, one could put on exhibit the objects—carefully selected, arranged, and displayed—that could convey an idea. These were “object lessons,” literally (Rydell 1984:44–45). But those objects had to be collected, arranged, and displayed with careful thought for their educational contribution, for the goal of the Exposition was education. “Education ran riot at Chicago,” Henry Adams growled with more than his usual cynicism (Adams 1918:342). And what better way to educate the great masses of people about the triumph of human progress than to display those objects historically and cross-culturally: “A lesson taught by an object could be especially clear if that object were compared to one or more other objects produced by a different culture” (de Wit 1993:62).
Holmes was extremely comfortable expressing ideas in Goode’s object-oriented language (which, perhaps, is why Goode came to rely on Holmes’s work for many of the other Smithsonian exhibits). After all, his critique of the American Paleolithic was nothing if not a powerful demonstration of the use of simple objects—Piney Branch quarry debris—to pierce the veil of the mist-shrouded static past, and reveal behind it the dynamic life-history of a stone tool and the technology of manufacture. It was, without question, an object lesson of just the sort Goode envisioned for a modern museum. Moreover, as Hinsley argues, Holmes’s exhibits at the Fair touched a deep and responsive chord in brassy Victorian America, where material objects of the human past served as symbols of the primordial technological depths from which we as a species had climbed, vivid testimony of human progress, powerfully expressed (Hinsley 1981:116–117).

The way Adams saw it, “Chicago asked in 1893 for the first time the question whether the American people knew where they were driving. Adams answered, for one, that he did not know” (Adams 1918:343). But Holmes knew. Human history was, in a demonstrable way, a sequence from simple to complex, from bad to good. The humble record of archaeology forecast a rosy future for humanity.

That Boas was also skilled at Museum work there can be no doubt (Hinsley and Holm 1976), but it was from a very different perspective, and carried a far different message—that civilization, as he’d insisted to Mason a few years earlier, “is not something absolute, but that it is relative, and that our ideas and conceptions are true only so far as our civilization goes” (Boas 1887:589). Such a notion was hardly palatable within contemporary anthropological circles, let alone to an American public for whom living “primitive” peoples served as metaphor and metonym for humanity’s past evolutionary stages, their life ways pitiable testimony of the consequences of failed progress, and the degree to which civilization leaves behind those who remain bound to old habits (de Wit 1993:61).

This was a public that, closer to home, was unable to understand or cope with its own racial divides, and was grappling (badly) with a flood of new immigrants of ever more varied race and ethnicity. One telling example: Chicago’s African-American population was excluded from the Fair’s construction crew and staff, and invited in to eat watermelon on “Darkies Day” at the Fair (Rydell 1984:53). Anthropological displays of the sort which, say, Holmes and Mason (but not Boas) excelled, provided a comforting context and a structure (hierarchical) for perceiving human differences, even if only to reinforce existing prejudices and
stereotypes (Hinsley 1981:112, 271; Rydell 1984; Schlereth 1991:8–9, 172–173). In an age which celebrated and deified the object as object, and the object as a beacon of progress, Boas did not and would not participate (Stocking 1968).

Finally, and perhaps most important, in 1893–94, Holmes was being widely hailed, even by his critics, as one of the foremost anthropologists of the age, and an intellectual force to be reckoned with: Putnam thought him “first rate” (Cole 1999:164). Boas was not yet the formidable figure in anthropology he would soon become. He was merely one of Putnam’s assistants—highly capable, extremely hardworking, and very well organized to be sure—but an assistant all the same. Not that he saw himself as a mere assistant. In a parting shot at Skiff, Boas announced that he was “here and abroad, one of the first in my field and that in about two years I will be uncontestably [sic] the first” (quoted in Cole 1999:167).

True enough, if off by a few years: Boas was elected to the National Academy of Sciences in 1900—at the remarkably young age of 42—the first anthropologist elected since Putnam in 1885. Holmes would follow Boas in to the Academy five years later, but at the age of 59. His abilities notwithstanding, in 1894 Boas was still stuck outside the “network of personal and institutional loyalties that largely controlled entrance and advancement in anthropology” (Hinsley and Holm 1976:311). Putnam was his only entrée, and Putnam had trouble enough of his own with the Chicago crowd.

Indeed, Putnam—an entrepreneurial genius in his own right—was caught flat-footed on this one. He could easily see why Chicago would want a ready-made, world-class museum collection but, curiously, could not appreciate their desire to have as its curator an anthropologist with the stature to give the Museum instant scientific credibility as well (see also McVicker 1999:43, who neatly frames this in the context of the cultural and scientific competition between Chicago and New York).

Was anti-Semitism toward Boas a factor? Kehoe (1999:21) asserts as much, claiming Chicago’s captains of industry “were not about to accept the insult Putnam offered by telling them to hire an obscure Jew as curator of the legacy of their World Columbian Exposition.” She offers no evidence to support this assertion, save for an appallingly ugly anti-Semitic outburst by Holmes in the heated and jingoistic days of the Boas censure in 1919. Of course, those were the angry words of an old man (then 73), who had become alienated from the field and its participants (Stocking 1968).

Assume for a moment, however, Holmes carried that bigotry twenty-six years earlier; did anti-Semitism lead him to discriminate against
Boas? His contemporary actions belie the accusation. Holmes offered to split the Field Museum position in order to have Boas hired permanently, with Boas taking charge of the anthropological work of “all the great northern reaches of the globe” (Holmes to Skiff, March 31, 1894, in McVicker 1990:6; also Cole 1999:163). Moreover, Holmes had a golden opportunity to torpedo Boas’s later chances for employment at the AMNH (see below), and could have done so quietly and without leaving any fingerprints: surely an opening for a bigot. But he did not take it.

Consider, too, an even lesser known fact. In 1903, both Boas and Holmes (along with eight other “judges”) were asked by James McKeen Cattell to rank the contributions of their fellow anthropologists, in order to determine the “stars” among them—the list to be published in the forthcoming American Men of Science (Cattell 1906). In the end, Boas came in first, and Holmes third (Meltzer 2002). What is of greater interest, however, is where each of them ranked the other: Otis Mason was at the top of both their ballots, while each chose the other second. Was Mason really that important in 1903? Not to Boas, who had launched his critique of evolutionary theory, and his advocacy of the importance of understanding history, context, and cultures, using Mason as a whipping post. And likely not to Holmes, for whom Mason was a kindly, avuncular figure, but hardly the brightest star in the anthropology sky. By 1903, having suffered a stroke five years earlier and been effectively out of anthropology ever since, Mason’s influence was well on the wane (Hinsley 1981:100, 113).

The fact that Mason was top-ranked on both Boas’s and Holmes’s lists—but only their two lists—says more about the politics of compromise than about Mason’s contributions. For while Boas and Holmes recognized the other’s considerable contributions, their views and interests were so utterly incompatible, and their personal and professional relations so badly strained, that they were unable to give the other the top rank. They each independently selected Mason, numerically insuring Mason finished second in the overall ranking, and Holmes third (this is not to suggest Holmes would have come in second had Boas only ranked him more highly; Holmes was low-balled by Alice Fletcher, who ranked him thirteenth). Holmes’s later anti-Semitism notwithstanding, in 1903 he recognized and acknowledged Boas contributions to the field, even though he couldn’t bring himself to rank him first. Just so, Boas’s anti-Holmes feelings notwithstanding, he also acknowledged Holmes’s contributions to the field. They would even each write for each other’s fest-schrift volumes (Boas 1916; Holmes 2010[1906]).

All this, of course, is important to understanding their admittedly
complex and changing relationship over the years, but Kehoe’s assertion begs the obvious question: did it really matter if Holmes was anti-Semitic? Hardly. Holmes was not doing the hiring at Chicago: Skiff, Ayer, and Chamberlin (working unofficially and behind the scenes) were. Were they anti-Semitic? Probably so. These were times in which institutional anti-Semitism was rampant in academia and society, and was almost certainly present among Chicago’s financial and academic leaders. Did that have anything to do with Boas not getting the job? Probably not. In fact, Boas himself didn’t think so: as Cole observes, prickly as Boas was about his Jewishness (which, ironically, was largely forsaken [Glick 1982]), and hostile as he was to anti-Semitism (with the dueling scars to prove it), Boas never attributed any of his early career disappointments to anti-Semitism (Cole 1999:281).

Again, there is an obvious reason why Holmes was hired: he had the reputation, the experience, and was on the face of it a perfect fit for the position. Boas was not necessarily the better candidate—at least not in 1893. One can easily see why Chicago’s captains of industry, having paid tens of millions of dollars to bring the Exposition to Chicago (Rydell 1984:42), and then create from it a permanent museum, would want to have more than a mere “assistant” at the helm of any department, however well qualified that assistant might be. Besides, Chamberlin wanted Holmes, and was very adept at getting what he wanted. Finally, given that not hiring Boas was as much a snub of Putnam—himself a descendant of old Protestant New England stock—it is hard to see any merit in the charge of anti-Semitism (see also Cole 1999:162; McVicker 1999:46).

Boas in New York

Failing in its efforts to hire Holmes, the American Museum in New York almost immediately began discussions with Putnam, whom they hired in April of 1894 as part-time curator (Dexter 1976:303), and Putnam, in turn, began pushing for an appointment, jointly with Columbia University if possible, for Boas. A part-time slot was found for Boas at the American Museum the summer of 1894, and he picked up piece work at the U.S. National Museum, and on behalf of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, but all of these were temporary positions (Cole 1985:134–139; Freed et al. 1988:9).

Putnam doggedly kept pushing Boas’s name forward, and not just for altruistic reasons (though he had those), but because—as he later told Boas—“I’ll show Chicago that I can go them one better” (Dexter 1976:306). Putnam began to make headway by the spring of 1895,
assuring Boas he was “getting considerable hold on the people in New York.” While it may have appeared to Boas as though Putnam was the only one working on his behalf, Holmes surfaces to play a minor, though not insignificant, role. Putnam had extolled Boas’s Chicago museum experience to the administration at the AMNH, and despite Boas’s having worked there, there must have lingered some suspicions about his qualifications—or at least Putnam’s version thereof. Justin Winser (secretary of the Museum) discreetly wrote Holmes on Jesup’s behalf with a question:

Who installed the material in your department [at the Field Museum]? I inferred that it had been done under your regime, but it has been hinted very strongly [presumably by Putnam] that it was done by another person [Boas].

That conversations about Boas’s employment continued without interruption and to a successful conclusion for Boas, indicates Holmes gave Jesup the assurances he was seeking.

Even while Putnam was simultaneously working the levers on Boas’s behalf at Columbia University (through its president, Seth Low) and the AMNH, he and Boas were both in conversation with the powers in Washington. Putnam talked to Goode about arranging a joint appointment for Boas that would be split between Washington (the BAE and USNM), and New York (Columbia and the AMNH). Nothing materialized right away, but McGee was able to engineer a low-level position at the Bureau that had the effect of spurring movement in New York. By the summer of 1895 Putnam was cheerfully optimistic: “I think you have the [New York] reins decidedly in your own hands.” He counseled Boas to decline the “sure thing” (the offer from the BAE) in hopes of gaining the better, long term position almost assuredly awaiting him in New York. Good advice it was, for five months later (in December 1895) Boas received a curatorial appointment at the AMNH at an annual salary of $3,000, which in the coming year became a shared appointment with Columbia University (Dexter 1976:306).

Holmes in Chicago

In the meantime, Holmes had resigned from the Bureau (officially on June 1, 1894), which was preceded by a warm farewell banquet at the Willard Hotel, attended by nearly seventy of official Washington’s scientific elite, many of whom praised Holmes in speeches and presented him with a silver loving cup. At the end of the evening, Holmes confessed
he’d been feeling “very desolate” at the prospect of breaking his ties to Washington, but after “the pleasure of [that] evening, he would even be willing to go to a worse place than Chicago.” Unfortunately for Holmes, Chicago would turn out to be that worse place.

Hints of the future came early. Even before he moved to Chicago, Holmes was visited by David Day (chief of the Mineral Resources Division at the USGS, and a friend of both Skiff and Holmes), on a “mission with respect to my appointment”:

[Day] suggested that I had better hold on to my old place in Washington tentatively, accepting the position for a year on trial. I at once realized that Mr. Skiff was using Dr. Day as a tool to work out his own ends. A few days later I arrived in Chicago to find my suspicions of change of attitude and unfriendliness well-founded, and passed through a period of anxiety and humiliation. Skiff, acting consistently with his innate cunning—the outstanding feature of his character, wished to keep me on the ragged edge of uncertainty.

That was written, however, in hindsight, filtered through the refracting lens of unhappy memory. How much anxiety and humiliation he experienced at the time is uncertain, though it is known that when he finally received a contract that fall of 1893, the salary was just $4,000 per year. It was more than he’d been receiving in Washington, but far less than he had been promised. Holmes later appended to a copy of that contract a footnote that this was “Skiff preparation for treachery.”

Were that not enough, more scheming was afoot. In a meeting with Skiff and Harlow Higinbotham (chairman of the Museum’s Executive Committee) soon after he arrived, Holmes was told his appointment was only for one year, which he interpreted as a strategy on their part “to forestall any unfavorable action that they might wish to take in the future.” Or so Holmes described that meeting years later. At the time, there were no stated limits on his tenure in his contract letter. Its only stipulation was that if he was dismissed or chose to leave, three months notice was required.

In fact, his salary disappointment notwithstanding, matters seemed to go very well for Holmes in the early months. He had “hardly gotten settled” when he and the newly-hired botanist of the Museum (Charles Millspaugh) were asked by Allison V. Armour to join an exploring expedition to the Mexican states of Yucatan, Chiapas, and Oaxaca, traveling from Florida to the Yucatan Peninsula and Mexico proper (via Cuba) aboard Armour’s yacht Ituna, and thence overland via horse, mule-drawn wagon, and dugout canoe.
The excursion began in the latter part of December 1894, lasted through the first few months of 1895, and included collecting visits, sketching, and surveying (but little if any actual excavation) at major Maya sites including Palenque, Tulum, Uxmal, Merida, and Chichen-Itza, but also sites such as Monte Albán and Teotihuacan, several of which were in areas previously untouched archaeologically. During his time on the Ituna and on land, Holmes regularly penned monthly letter-reports to Skiff at the Museum.78

These were full of news and accomplishments on behalf of the Museum, and written in a tone which suggests that, if Holmes had passed through a period of “anxiety and humiliation” with Skiff, it was well over. Indeed, after spending several days at Palenque in February, and come away awestruck by the ruin, Holmes forgot about his bouts of seasickness, the miserable traveling conditions they often found in the remote parts of the Yucatan, and his worries about his wife and children facing a cold winter alone in unfamiliar Chicago: Holmes could not help but thank Skiff “again for the opportunity of a lifetime.”79

Holmes was seeing wonderful things, but because of Mexico’s patrimony laws preventing the export of antiquities and the “exaggerated” publicity surrounding their expedition (which meant everyone was watching in case they tried to make off with any antiquities), he would not be able to ship home anything of importance, save “such small articles as can be gotten in our luggage.”80 No matter. As he later explained, he had

laid the lines for securing for the Museum in good time as valuable collections of Mexican archaeologic and ethnologic materials as there are in the world. We shall not bring a great deal with us but we shall have a string to no end of stuff which will be drawn in in good time if your strong helping hand is on our side.81

The helping hand was there, the string was pulled, and material did come in later, largely from Edward Thompson (the ex-United States Consul at Merida). Thompson was busy excavating at Chichen-Itza, recently purchased by he and Armour, and which Holmes deemed “one of the richest [ruins] in this country.”82

After returning to Chicago in the spring of 1895, the remainder of the year and much of 1896 was “very fully taken up” with the preparation of the reports on the trip, ultimately comprising a pair of large descriptive monographs (nearly 350 pages in all) on the ancient ruins of Yucatan and Central America, which formed the inaugural volumes of the
Field Museum’s *Anthropological Series* (Holmes 1895, 1897). So pressing was the work on these books that Holmes, who normally published 6–10 papers per year, published only four other works in 1895–97, and two of those had been written prior to his leaving the Bureau.83

The Field Museum volumes are typical of Holmes: an artist’s eye for textual description which primarily focused on architectural details (not surprisingly, given he was limited by time and logistics to observing the large, above-ground structures), combined with plan maps, superb illustrations of architecture, decorative, artifacts, and several of his superb trademark landscape panoramas, embedded within his readily-applied theoretical frame of reference. As he put it, “All the sculptor’s work is crude as compared with civilized art, but it is virile and, to my mind, full of promise of higher achievement” (Holmes 1895:53). There was little in the way of synthesis of Maya or prehistoric Mexican civilization, save the promise of a “final chapter on the origin and development of ancient Mexican architecture,” which would assuredly be modeled along the lines of his earlier works on ceramics, shell, textiles and, of course, stone (Holmes 1883, 1886, 1888, 1890a, 1894). But such was too large for inclusion in the first two volumes and a separate publication was planned (Holmes 1897:150). It never appeared.

Holmes later described his trip as an event of “exceptional importance in my career,” but it is hard to see it produced much more than that two-volume set.84 Holmes certainly never followed up on his fieldwork there, did not further publish in any significant way on Mayan or Mesoamerican archaeology, and did not develop any lasting relationship—financial or otherwise—with Allison Armour, although Armour remained a devoted patron of the Museum, providing funds and adding to the collections until his death in 1941. Armour along with Edward Ayer did, however, contribute financially to Holmes’s festschrift volume nearly twenty years later (Hodge 1916).

**Chicago Turns Sour**

While Holmes was devoting his days to producing those volumes, matters were not going well at the Museum. During those vulnerable first few years, the Museum was running a substantial budget deficit, and saw its overall attendance drop by one hundred thousand after its inaugural year (data from Skiff 1895, 1896, 1897, 1898). Skiff, the Museum’s director, was no doubt feeling pressure to increase Museum revenues. Whether Holmes was also feeling the financial pinch is not known. Of his relations with Skiff during that time there are few clues. As of
October of 1896, nearly two years into his tenure at the Field Museum, they appeared to be working well together. On a prolonged absence from the Museum, Skiff appointed Holmes acting director, a letter that Holmes duly saved in *Random Records*, with his annotation across the bottom: “Still on good? terms with Skiff.”

In just a few months’ time, however, matters took a turn for the worse. Problems had evidently been brewing at the Museum for over a year, and the scientific staff:

was gradually getting into a state of rebellion against Director Skiff as a result of his unappreciative and tyrannical attitude, but the attempt to dislodge him was frustrated by Mr. Higinbotham who, knowing nothing regarding the claims of the scientific staff on the consideration of the management, stood by his protégé.

Precisely how that “unappreciative and tyrannical attitude” was manifest is uncertain, nor is it clear whether Holmes’s particular grievances were shared by other rebels. It is of more than passing interest to note that none of the senior curators, save Holmes, ultimately left the Field Museum during this period. Perhaps that fact speaks more to Holmes’s employability and mobility than to the others’ satisfaction with matters in Chicago. Still, those very same senior curators were still in place at the Museum a decade later, making one wonder just how bad the circumstances were, and whether Holmes simply had a lower threshold of what he was willing to abide. It is not difficult to imagine the Smithsonian had spoiled him.

Boas passed through Chicago that spring of 1897 and stopped in at the Field Museum to visit his “favorite enemies.” The Museum looked miserable to Boas, and he could only thank “the noble gentleman who tossed me out” that he wasn’t sharing the misery (Cole 1999:193). Holmes was, of course, and though he and Boas met on that occasion, Holmes never let his feelings show—nor revealed that he was already planning his escape.

Perceiving a hopelessness of the Field Museum situation, and fearing a future of “crudeness, struggle, and uncertainty,” Holmes had for several months been making quiet inquiries in Washington—first of W. J. McGee, who by then had taken over the Bureau’s operations in all but title only, and then with Charles Walcott, who Holmes learned through the grapevine would soon be appointed director of the Smithsonian’s United States National Museum (the appointment was announced in *Science* the following week [Anonymous 1897]). As Holmes explained the situation to
Walcott, and this should be read with due allowance for the embellishments one would expect of a letter designed to elicit as much sympathy as possible from an old friend, particularly one who was in a position to help:

From the day of my arrival here, three years ago, there has been cause for discontent, and the conditions have recently become so aggravated that the entire scientific staff of the Museum has risen in rebellion. In this most unpleasant matter I had to take the initiative, and may be regarded as in a sense responsible for the results, and although the outcome has not quite realized our hopes, much ground has been gained and the way seems open for further improvement. The trouble developed out of the Chicago idea that only a business man, and a business man only, can conduct the business of an institution—museum or otherwise—which would have been well enough had the man chosen as director been qualified for the work. The director appointed did well enough in getting together and installing the vast exhibits brought together at the close of the World’s Fair, but when we came to settle down to scientific methods and work there was a total lack of appreciation and sympathy and we were hedged about with difficulties and embarrassments about which the outside world can have little conception.87

Holmes had other laments. Promises made of his department’s independence were broken, there were encroachments on his department’s budget, exhibit content, and responsibility, and (one can hear the echoes of Boas and Putnam in the background), Holmes felt his science was being sacrificed on the altar of business interests:

I was thus to be deprived of the very features of the work—the development of the features illustrating the various branches of human progress from the point of view of evolution—upon which I had labored for years and in which, of course, I take a special interest.88

His old ally Chamberlin might have been able to help, but Holmes had been so overwhelmed by his duties at the Museum, that he had “much neglected” his University activities and lecture course on archaeological geology—though he had managed to teach a course each spring from 1895–97.89 (Had he been more actively involved there, the University may have been able to provide an escape pod. As it was, he and the other rebellious members of the staff were on their own. Bypassing Skiff, they
took their grievances directly to the Museum’s Trustees. The Trustees, anxious to avert a scandal that might scare away donors and benefactors, made a few concessions to the rebels. But while that meant some improvements for the staff, Holmes considered them mostly face-saving actions, since their efforts to dislodge Skiff were unsuccessful.

Still, conditions at the Museum in late January 1897 were at least “bearable.” Yet Holmes wanted and perhaps expected more than that. As he looked back longingly at Washington, it must have seemed to him that being at the whim of an occasionally balky and unpredictable Congress was far more appealing than his present situation. At least the Smithsonian and Bureau funds, once allocated, could be spent with some discretionary freedom, were overseen by administrators with whom Holmes was comfortable, came into an institution that did not have to rely on a fickle and unpredictable admission-paying public, and which was not looking to be a business enterprise. Holmes assured Walcott that his thoughts turned frequently “homeward [Washington] and the picture of settled conditions, [and] congenial associations fully in sympathy with scientific work.” If an opening developed in Washington for the “display of his particular talents,” Holmes wondered, might he be considered for it?

**Homeward Bound**

Walcott, an old friend who would be quite happy to have Holmes back in Washington, was sympathetic. Nothing could be done immediately, but he counseled Holmes to be patient: in a month’s time, Congress would vote on the Smithsonian’s budget, and then they would know if they could resume the conversation. In the meantime, he (Walcott) would keep matters confidential. In late March, Walcott reported that the appropriation bills were going to pass the Senate and go to the President essentially intact, and thus it would be possible to carry out the plans they had discussed for the National Museum, and for returning Holmes to Washington. There was, however, a minor “Civil Service matter.” The law required that “some kind of examination must be held,” but Walcott urged Holmes not to worry:

> I shall recommend that it be mainly the presentation of evidence of ability, as shown by works published, and positions filled.

In the end, Holmes’s civil service exam was based on the “publications and positions held by the candidate.” Holmes was alerted to the questions in advance, and submitted his responses to an exam review com-
mittee consisting of Walcott, Powell, and a Civil Service Commissioner. It was judged the best performance ever recorded.97 No surprise there.

On June 17, 1897, Holmes was notified by Langley that he had been appointed head curator of the Division of Anthropology at the U.S. National Museum, at a salary of $3,500 a year. He took a cut in pay to return to Washington.98 Holmes hoped to close out his affairs in Chicago that summer, and be in Washington no later than the 1st of September.99 He was anxious to blow out of town.

In the End

On the eve of this departure from Chicago, there was no large, warm, well-attended dinner in his honor as there had been in Washington three years earlier—just a kindly letter from Edward Ayer, thanking him on behalf of the board and officers of the Museum for his “great industry and splendid knowledge,” and assuring him that “it is only with regret that any of them think of your leaving the Museum.”100 If Skiff sent a Holmes a letter, it does not survive among Holmes’s papers, and obviously did not warrant a place in Random Records.

The Chicago experience ended in disappointment for Holmes. He fled the city, took up his new position in Washington, and never again ventured far from there or the Smithsonian. Over the next several decades, he rose in prominence within anthropological and scientific circles, and was appointed Powell’s successor at the Bureau in 1902. He served in that capacity until 1910, then cut back to just his curatorial positions at the U.S. National Museum and the National Gallery of Art. He moved away from anthropology altogether in 1920, a move partly precipitated by his profound unhappiness, and increasing irrelevance, in the field (Meltzer and Dunnell 1992:xxv; Stocking 1968).

The only Chicago tie Holmes maintained after he left the city was his faculty appointment in Chamberlin’s department of Geology, which he kept for several more years, until he finally realized that keeping up the pretense of being on the faculty was pointless. It was unrealistic to suppose he’d ever be back in the city long enough to teach a course. He resigned in January 1900.101 Yet he still retained a close professional alliance with Chamberlin. The two joined forces in 1902–1903, to criticize claims that human skeletal remains found in Lansing, Kansas, were Pleistocene in age, and again in 1916–1918, over the similar claims from Vero, Florida—though by then their roles were largely secondary (Chamberlin 1902a, 1902b, 1917; Holmes 1902, 1918).

Those are the ties that bind, and when Holmes was appointed Pow-
ell's successor in 1902 and McGee—who'd been grooming himself for the job—declared open warfare on Langley, the Smithsonian and, soon enough, on Holmes himself (Hinsley 1981:248–250), Chamberlin's help was enlisted for the defense of his old friend and comrade-in-arms. Boas, who had his own many, complex, and (admittedly) self-serving reasons for wanting McGee and not Holmes as director of the Bureau, not least a lingering resentment over what had happened in Chicago nearly a decade earlier, readily joined the fight on McGee's side (Hinsley 1981:250–252). In the warm glow of Boas's memory, McGee had been the only one in the Bureau in those painful and humiliating days of early 1894 to stand by him and against Holmes.

For his part, McGee, in an utterly transparent disregard of his defense of Holmes on that earlier occasion, fed on the oxygen Boas provided: "You have no idea how bad things have become; you saw Holmes's cloven foot at Chicago, but I see both of them and the forked tail as well." But as happened before, Holmes got the job and there was no changing that fact. Only this time, it was an angry Boas who retreated to his position in New York in disgust, and McGee who was left unemployed (Hinsley 1981).

We cannot replay the tape of history, and see what have been had the roll of the dice come up another way. Even so, it is hard to resist speculating, if only briefly, on what might have been. What if, say, Chamberlin not been quite so persuasive—on Skiff and Ayer, and on Holmes—and Boas had been named curator of Anthropology at the Field Museum? One can conjure a number of scenarios, the consequences for virtually all of them being, as Stocking suggests, that "the regional relationships of American anthropology might have been quite different" (Stocking 1968:281). This assumes, of course, that Boas would have been able to stay at the Field Museum, and succeeded in establishing links to the University of Chicago. Yet, neither of those assumptions may be realistic, given Boas's demonstrated inability to work well within public museum settings for private benefactors—as his relatively brief and unhappy tenure at the American Museum of Natural History shows (Freed et al. 1988:21–22; Stocking 1968)—and his inability to connect with the University of Chicago.

Boas knew, in part because Chicago helped teach him, that the future of anthropology was not in museums (Hinsley 1991:363). By the second decade of the twentieth century, largely because of the deliberate course he charted and the considerable momentum he generated, anthropology was moving fast toward a new center within the burgeoning university system. It was soon dominated by Boas and his students, who were increasing yearly in number, appointments, and stature, and who
possessed the increasingly strict requirements of formal training for entry into anthropology’s newly created professional ranks. They shared Boas’s disdain for evolutionary schemes that embraced all of humankind in a single developmental formula, and envisioned anthropology as a discipline where language, thought, customs, and ideas were paramount, and where material objects—the focus of traditional museum anthropology, the focus of Holmes’s anthropology—played a far less significant role (Hinsley 1981:251; Meltzer 2002; Stocking 1968:281–282, 1974).

Holmes had been the right choice for Chicago in the winter of 1893–94. That he himself, innately comfortable in a museum setting, barely lasted three years, is perhaps testimony enough that Boas would not have lasted long at the Field Museum either.

There is no small irony in the fact that Boas coveted a position he surely could not keep, while Holmes got a position he did not especially want, and would not keep.

In the end, the Chicago experience for Holmes was hardly more than a bump on the road of his career. It had no lasting impact on his research or scholarship; gained him no foothold in the world of private patronage; and mostly convinced him he really didn’t belong in a place such as this. It did, however, spark a lifetime of enmity from Franz Boas, which would be fueled by a series of collisions between them over the next two dozen years, and ultimately explode in late 1919, with Holmes operating behind the scenes to insure Boas’s censure by the American Anthropological Association.

Although in 1919 Holmes triumphed over Boas in battle (as he often had before), he had already lost the war. For by then Boas had crafted anthropology into a discipline that was profoundly different theoretically, methodologically, and institutionally from the one in which Holmes had thrived. That Holmes had not seen or influenced the future as clearly as Boas, meant that Holmes sailed into the twentieth century on a nineteenth century vessel.

Notes

I wrote this paper at the behest of Curtis Hinsley and David Wilcox, and would like to thank them for forcing me to take a look at a period in Holmes’s life that I’d previously largely ignored, or managed to skirt in less than a paragraph in previous works. It has been a useful learning experience for me, and I appreciate their comments on the manuscript. The two of them, as well as James Sneed and Nancy Parezo, also shared archival documents acquired at the Field Museum, the American Museum of Natural History, and other sources. These nicely complemented my own Boas, Chamberlin, and Holmes holdings, and I am grateful to them for their scholarly altruism.
Long after this paper was conceived and after an initial draft was written and delivered at the Chicago SAA meetings in 1999, I came across Donald McVicker’s 1999 publication, “Establishing Anthropology at Field Columbian Museum,” which covers much the same ground as my paper. I then realized, much to my chagrin, that I not only already possessed a 1989 manuscript version of McVicker’s paper in my files, I had even cited it in a previous work on Holmes (Meltzer and Dunnell 1992)! Such is the failing of memory which, sadly, is hardly improving with age (Holmes and I have something in common, it appears). While McVicker’s and my coverage necessarily overlaps, particularly at the juncture of the common historical documents on which we rely, I take a somewhat different perspective and approach than he does, so there is hope my paper is not altogether redundant. I would also be remiss were I not to acknowledge his careful work in the Field Museum archives, which filled in a critical gap in my own archival coverage.

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Throughout this chapter, I refer to archival sources by acronyms. The acronyms, and their referents, are as follows:

AR/AMNH Administrative Records, American Museum of Natural History
BAE/NAA Bureau of American Ethnology, National Anthropological Archives
FB/APS Franz Boas Papers, American Philosophical Society
FWP/FMA Frederick W. Putnam Papers, Field Museum Archives
GFW/OCA George Frederick Wright Papers, Oberlin College Archives
JCB/SU John C. Branner Papers, Stanford University
PP/HU Frederick W. Putnam Papers, Harvard University
RDS/UC Rollin D. Salisbury Papers, University of Chicago
RTSH/SMU Robert T. Hill Papers, Southern Methodist University
TCC/UC Thomas C. Chamberlin Papers, University of Chicago
WHH/FMA William H. Holmes Papers, Field Museum Archives
WHH/SIA William H. Holmes Papers, Smithsonian Institution Archives
WJM/LC William J. McGee Papers, Library of Congress

1. Although Boas appreciated that particular skill, he was also quick to add Holmes’s “interest in that part of anthropology which deals with ideas alone is slight” (Boas to Bell, August 7, 1903, FB/APS). In fairness, Holmes was not without a strong theoretical disposition; it just happened to be one anathema to Boas, and it tended to be more derivative than creative.

2. WHH/RR 7:16.

3. There was no particular reason to link the American Paleolithic (an archaeological issue) with the unity/diversity of the glacial period (a geological issue). Proving people were in America during glacial times did not require knowing how many glacial advances there were, although such knowledge could certainly help narrow the age of that occupation, if it were shown that artifacts were associated with the geological debris of a particular advance. Similarly, resolving the number and timing of glacial events was strictly a geological problem, and would not be settled by any archaeological evidence. Ultimately, most archaeologists and geologists had little intellectual capital invested in the internal debates of the others’ field—except for Wright, who was quite willing to put humans into the Pleis-
tocene, but only within the comfortable chronological confines that a single glacial period
allowed. And because Wright perceived these archaeological and geological issues as inex-
tricably linked, was vocal and very public in his pronouncements on the subjects, and (per-
haps not least important) because he had earned the bitter enmity of a few very powerful
individuals, his work served to spark battles on both fronts simultaneously.

4. There is good reason to suppose that Chamberlin’s classic paper on “Multiple work-
ing hypotheses” (Chamberlin 1890b) was inspired, however uncharitably, by Wright.

5. Chamberlin to Wright, January 24, 1889, emphasis his; Wright to Chamberlin, Janu-
ary 30, 1889, TCC/UC.

6. Chamberlin to Salisbury, September 21, 1892, RDS/UC.

7. Chamberlin to Salisbury, July 5, 1892, RDS/UC.

8. Goodspeed to Holmes, August 31, 1892; Holmes to Chamberlin, August 1892,
WHH/RR 7:19–21.

9. Holmes in WHH/RR 7:23. Holmes’s appointment to teach “Graphic Geology” is
self-explanatory, as even a cursory glance at his astonishing and geologically-true land-
scape panoramas will attest (Stegner 1954:189–191). His credentials as an “Anthropic”
geologist might seem less obvious, but in fact Holmes’s appreciation for the fine details of
stratigraphy, geological context, and questions of association and antiquity of archaeologi-
cal remains well qualified him on this score as well.

10. Youmans to Wright, January 11, 1893; Dana to Wright, March 22, 1893, both in
GFW/OCA; Baldwin to Wright, April 3, 1893, WHH/SIA. Winchell to Salisbury, Novem-
ber 25, 1892, RDS/UC.

11. Winchell to Wright, January 9, 1893, GFW/OCA.

12. Claypole to Wright, December 4, 1892, GFW/OCA.

13. Stevenson to McGee, October 5, 1893, WJM/LC.


15. See, for example, Chamberlin 1892:303–304; Chamberlin to Holmes, August 2,
1893, WHH/RR 7:14.

16. The only apparent point of contention came when the Smithsonian refused to loan
specimens to Putnam, but Smithsonian officials were frank about the matter:

It was perhaps regarded as a hardship by the officials in charge of the Anthropologi-
cal building that material should not have been sent from the Government collections
to swell the very interesting miscellaneous display of ethnological objects which were
gathered there, but setting aside the question of lack of legal authority, this building
was especially open to the objection of not being fireproof. Everything possible was
done, however, to avoid interference with this department, by refraining from exhib-
iting in the Government Building objects of a kind similar to those which we were in-
formed would be shown by the Exposition authorities. (Goode 1895:112–113)

17. Cody’s agent had tried unsuccessfully to procure space for his show within the Ex-
position grounds. Perhaps the governing board, though it had demonstrated little discern-
able ability to separate the trivial, the commercial, and the profound in the commodifi-
ated anthropological exhibits of the Midway could at last see draw a line in this instance (Hins-

18. Powell to Holmes, April 30, 1892, WHH/RR 7:4; Goode 1895:54, 127.


20. He carefully preserved the diploma in Random Records 2:134. Meredith to Hol-
mes, July 18, 1894, WHH/RR 7:39; Holmes’s travel dates from various sources, including
the Cushing Diaries.

Meltzer
22. Boas to Holmes, October 7, 1893, FB/APS.
23. Chamberlin to Editors and Proprietors of the American Geologist, January 16, 1893, RTH/SMU; Chamberlin to Branner, January 12 and 24, JCB/SU.
24. Chamberlin to Branner, February 27, 1893, and Winchell to Branner, February 3, 1893, JCB/SU. See Bain (1916:58) for the view from “unofficial” geology.
25. Chamberlin to Holmes, December 5, 1893, TCC/UC.
26. Boas to Holmes, October 7, 1893, FB/APS.
27. Boas to McGee, December 5, 1893, FB/APS.
28. Chamberlin to Holmes, January 6 and 13, 1894, TCC/UC.
29. Chamberlin to Holmes, January 23, 1894, TCC/UC.
32. Chamberlin to Walcott, January 27, 1894, TCC/UC.
34. Putnam to Boas, February 14, 1894, FB/APS.
35. Boas to Putnam, February 18, 1894, FB/APS.
36. Boas to McGee, February 17, 1894, BAE/NAA.
37. Boas to Putnam, February 18, 1894, FB/APS.
38. Boas to Skiff, February 19, 1894, FB/APS.
39. Skiff to Boas, February 19, 1894, FB/APS.
40. Boas to Skiff, February 19, 1894, FB/APS.
41. McGee to Boas, February 19, 1894, FB/APS.
42. Holmes to Boas, February 21, 1894, FB/APS.
43. Holmes to Boas, February 21, 1894, FB/APS.
44. Skiff to Holmes, February 27, 1894, WHH/RR.
45. McGee to Boas, March 21, 1894, FB/APS.
47. Boas to Putnam, February 18, 1894, FB/APS.
48. Putnam to Boas, March 7, 1894, FB/APS.
49. Putnam to Skiff, June 2, 1894, FWP/FMA.
50. Putnam to Boas, May 14, 1894, FB/APS.
51. Putnam to Boas, May 14, 1894, FB/APS.
52. Coultier to Holmes, April 23, 1894, WHH/RR 7:30.
53. Putnam to Skiff, February 15, 1896, FWP/FMA.
54. McGee to Boas, May 16, 1894, FB/APS.
55. Jesup to Rogers, January 13, 1894, Administrative Archives, AMNH.
56. Chamberlin to Holmes, January 13, 1894, TCC/UC.
57. Winser to Holmes, February 24, 1894, Administrative Archives, AMNH.
59. WHH/RR 7:32.
60. WHH/RR 1:56, 7:32.
61. Of course, everyone involved knew that it was, and a decade later J. C. Branner—himself not without sin in this controversy—admitted as much (Branner to White, December 15, 1902, WHH/RR; and Branner to Purdue, December 15, 1902, JCB/SU).
62. McGee to Langley, August 5, 1893, WJM/LC.
63. WHH/RR 6:75, 7:16.
64. The Turkish Village on the Midway shut down completely for two days on Yom
Kippur in September—apparently 80 percent of the inhabitants, including some of the dancing girls, were Jewish. That they observed Yom Kippur was not, itself, of great moment. After all, it was simultaneously being observed across town by Chicago’s Jews in their synagogues as well. What is of interest is that in a fascinating coalescence of racism and ethnocentrism, the Fair’s judges felt compelled to describe this observance on the Midway in a special report in the final volume on the Fair, as though its occurrence among this group was somehow exotic and unexpected (Lewi 1901).

65. Dexter 1976; Putnam to Boas, April 30, May 14, 1894, June 19, 1895, FB/APS.

66. Cole (1999:175–178) discusses the lengths to which Putnam went to help Boas—not just in terms of short-term loans, but also to find permanent employment—and the affection, awkwardness, and tension that created in their relationship.

67. Putnam to Boas, June 19, 1895, FB/APS.

68. Winser to Holmes, April 12, 1895, AR/AMNH.

69. Putnam to Boas, August 9, 1895, FB/APS.

70. The New York position was made possible in large part because Boas’s uncle, Abraham Jacobi (a wealthy New York physician), secretly guaranteed half of Boas’s salary (see Cole 1999:181–184).

71. WHH/RR 5:141–158.

72. WHH/RR 5:147.

73. WHH/RR 7:32.


75. Holmes in WHH/RR 5:142.

76. WHH/RR 7:33.


78. For example, Holmes to Skiff, December 21, 1894, January 25, February 11, March 2, 1895, WHH/FMA.

79. Holmes to Kate Holmes, March 1, 1895, WHH/RR 7:102; Holmes to Skiff, February 11, 1895, WHH/FMA.


81. Holmes to Skiff, March 2, 1895, WHH/FMA.

82. Holmes to Skiff, January 25, 1895, WHH/FMA; see Holmes to Skiff, January 10, 1896, Thompson to Skiff, November 16, 1896, both FMA.

83. WHH/RR, 6:75.

84. WHH/RR 1:37.


86. WHH/RR 7:148.


90. The changes were outlined in Skiff’s published Annual Report (1897:173–174) although naturally he did not explain in that venue the reasons behind them.

91. Holmes to Walcott, January 28, 1897, WHH/RR 7:150–151.


93. Walcott to Holmes, February 6, and February 10, 1897, WHH/SIA.

94. Walcott to Holmes, March 26, 1897, WHH/RR 7:157.

95. Walcott to Holmes, April 7, 1897, WHH/RR 7:159.

96. Walcott to Holmes, April 20, 1897, WHH/RR 7:161.
100. Ayer to Holmes, September 28, 1897, WHH/RR 7:156.
102. Branner to Chamberlin, December 15, 1902, JCB/SU.
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