

Curriculum Vitae
Eric Christian Barnes
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Department of Philosophy
Southern Methodist University
Dallas, TX 75275
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Education

1982 B.A. Grinnell College
1989 M.A. Indiana University (Philosophy)
1990 Ph.D. Indiana University (History and Philosophy of Science)

Professional Appointments

2008-present Professor, Philosophy, Southern Methodist University
2007 – 10, 2011-2017, 2023-27 Chair, Philosophy Department, Southern Methodist University
2000-2008 Associate Professor, Philosophy, Southern Methodist University
1994-2000 Easterwood Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Southern Methodist University
1990-1994 Visiting Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Denison University
1987-1988 Visiting Lecturer in History and Philosophy of Science, ITM/MUCIA (Indiana University) in Malaysia
1986 Visiting Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Redlands
1983-1986 Assistant Instructor, History and Philosophy of Science, Indiana University

Honors and Awards

1982-1983 Indiana University Graduate Fellowship
1983-1984,
1984-1985,
1985-1986 Indiana University Graduate Assistantships
1991 NEH Summer Seminar Stipend (“Explanation, Causation, and Empiricism,” with Paul Humphreys at the University of Virginia)
1994 NEH Summer Seminar Stipend (“Concepts of Evidence,” with Larry Laudan at the University of Hawaii)
2009 Godbey Lecture Series Author’s Award, *The Paradox of Predictivism*

Publications

Book:

The Paradox of Predictivism, Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Articles:

1990 “The Language Dependence of Accuracy”, *Synthese* 84, 54-95.

1991 “Beyond Verisimilitude: A Linguistically Invariant Basis for Scientific Progress”, *Synthese* 88, 309-339.

1991 “The Causal History of Computational Activity: Maudlin and Olympia”, *Journal of Philosophy* 88, 304-316.

1992 “Explanatory Unification and Scientific Understanding”, in Hull, D., Forbes M., and Okruhlik, K. (eds.), *PSA 1992 Vol. 1*, pp. 1-12.

1992 “Explanatory Unification and the Problem of Asymmetry”, *Philosophy of Science* 59, 558-571.

1994 “Why P Rather Than Q? The Curiosities of Fact and Foil”, *Philosophical Studies* 73, 35-53.

1994 “Explaining Brute Facts”, in Hull, D., Forbes, M. and Buridan, R.M. (Eds.) *PSA 1994, Vol. 1*, 61-68.

1995 “Truthlikeness, Translation, and Approximate Causal Explanation”, *Philosophy of Science* 62, 215-226.

1995 “Inference to the Loveliest Explanation”, *Synthese* 103, 251-277.

1996 “Discussion: Thoughts on Maher’s Predictivism”, *Philosophy of Science* 63, 401-410.

1996 “Social Predictivism”, *Erkenntnis* 45, 69-89.

1998 “Probabilities and Epistemic Pluralism”, *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 49, 31-37.

1999 “The Quantitative Problem of Old Evidence”, *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 50, 249-264.

2000 “Ockham’s Razor and the Anti-Superfluity Principle”, *Erkenntnis* 53, No. 3, 353-374.

2002 “Neither Truth nor Empirical Adequacy Explain Novel Success”, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 80, No. 4, 418-431.

2002 “The Miraculous Choice Argument for Realism”, *Philosophical Studies* 111, No. 2, 97-120.

2005 “Predictivism for Pluralists”, *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, 56, 421-450.

2005 “On Mendeleev’s Predictions: Comment on Scerri and Worrall”, *Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science*, 36, 801-812.

2008 “Evidence and Leverage: Comment on Roush”, *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, 59 (3): 549-557.

2014 “The Roots of Predictivism” *Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science Part A*, 45 (1): 46-53.

2015 “Freedom, Creativity, and Manipulation”, *Nous* 49: 3, 560-588.

2015 “Historical Moral Responsibility: Is the Infinite Regress Problem Fatal?”, *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 96 (4).

2016 “Character Control and Historical Moral Responsibility”, *Philosophical Studies*, 173: 9, pp 2311–2331.

2018 "Prediction versus Accommodation", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = [<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/prediction-accommodation/>](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/prediction-accommodation/).

2019, “An Argument for the Law of Desire”, *Theoria* 85 (4):289-311.

2022, “Motivational Determinism” *Analytic Philosophy* 00: 1-17.

2024 “Good Predictions and Bad Accommodations”, in Lasonen-Aaarnio, Maria and Clayton Littlejohn (eds.) *The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Evidence*, Routledge, London and New York.

(Forthcoming) Why Moral Competence Cannot be Purely Cognitive, *Theoria*

Papers Presented

“The Subjectivity of Truthlikeness”, Department of History and Philosophy of Science Colloquium, Indiana University, April 1985

“Explanatory Unification and the Problem of Asymmetry”, Center for the Philosophy of Science Colloquium, University of Pittsburgh, October 1991

“Kitcher’s Theory of Explanatory Unification”, Central Division APA Meetings, Louisville, KY, April 1992

“Explanatory Unification and Scientific Understanding”, 1992 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association, October 1992

“The Problem of Translation in Scientific Progress”, Center for the Philosophy of Science Colloquium, University of Pittsburgh, November 1992

“Contrastive Why Questions”, Central Division APA Meetings, Kansas City, MO, April 1994

“Explaining Brute Facts”, 1994 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association, New Orleans, LA, October 1994

“Commentary on Stuart Glennan’s “Is There a Probable Cause to Believe in Probable Cause?””, Central Division APA Meetings, Chicago, IL, April 1995

“Exploring Maher’s Predictivism”, Central Division APA Meetings, Chicago, IL, April 1996

“Truthlikeness and Scientific Progress”, University of Minnesota (Minneapolis), Oct. 1997

“The Logic of Prediction”, SMU Physics Colloquium, Nov. 1997

“On Anti-Realist Explanations of Novel Success”, Pacific Division APA Meetings, Albuquerque, NM, April 2000

“Neither Truth nor Empirical Adequacy Explain Novel Success”, North Texas Philosophical Association Meeting, April 2001

“Commentary on Jay Newhard’s “A Critique of Russell’s Theory of Definite Descriptions””, North Texas Philosophical Association Meeting, April 2002

“Comments on Sherri Rousch’s “Testability and the Unity of Science””, Eastern Division APA Meetings, Philadelphia, PA, December 2002

“Comments on Gerald Doppelt’s “Realism Unrealized: Psillos Defense of Realism as the Best Explanation of the Success of Science”, Central Division APA Meetings, Chicago IL, April 2004

“Comments on Sherri Roush’s *Tracking Truth*”, Pacific Division APA Meetings, Portland, OR, March 2006

“Autonomy and Creative Responsibility”, Pacific Division APA Meetings, San Francisco, CA, April 2010

Symposium: Author Meets Critics, *The Paradox of Predictivism*, PSA 2010, Montreal, Canada, November 2010 (Responded to critics Sherilynn Roush, P.D. Magnus, and Clark Glymour)

“The Roots of Predictivism”, presented at Heinrich-Heine University of Dusseldorf, Conference on Novel Predictions, March 2011

“Drunk Drivers, Evil Characters, and Historical Moral Responsibility”, presented at SMU Free Will Workshop, February 2013

“Character Control and Historical Moral Responsibility”, presented at SMU Free Will Workshop, March 2016