

The Surge – Collective Memory Project

Interviewee: Zalmay Khalilzad

U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, 2005- 2007

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[Begin Transcription]

O'SULLIVAN: Do a sound check, say hello, and we'll say that we're here.

KHALILZAD: OK. I'm Zalmay Khalilzad.

SAYLE: OK. This is Tim Sayle, from Southern Methodist University.

O'SULLIVAN: Meghan O'Sullivan from Harvard University.

BRANDS: Hal Brands from Duke University.

O'SULLIVAN: Great, so Zal, let's get started.

KHALILZAD: Please.

O'SULLIVAN: Thank you so much for joining us, and for participating in this project. We want to start by just asking you to kind of lay out again for viewers in future times what your responsibilities were as Ambassador to Iraq in 2006, in particular, that really important relationship with MNF-I [Multi National Force – Iraq], and how that relationship between the embassy and MNF-I was working in 2006.

KHALILZAD: Well the relationship between the military and the civilian, the diplomatic presence, was quite close. I had had the experience of working very closely with the military in Afghanistan before I went to Iraq. [00:01:00] And there, we had established that we will have a joint headquarters, that the military would be in the same building as the ambassador, and the military had moved the headquarters to the embassy as a matter of fact. So, we had decided that it was going to be about the mission, not about me or General Boehner, in that case. And I was happy when I got to Baghdad, that that same attitude, the same mentality, the same approach, was already in existence, between my predecessor,

Ambassador Negroponte, and the commander who was there at the time -- General Casey. So, we used to have morning meetings together, we had instituted, in Afghanistan, and we did the same thing that the military commander would come [00:02:00] to my office, the station chief, my deputy, and the head of the economic reconstruction group, and myself, would meet as to what we were going to do for the day, what were the big issues of the day, how could we help each other, and so it was a very well-integrated, coordinated, and physically close to each other in location, arrangement that worked quite well.

It doesn't mean we always agreed with each other, doesn't mean that there were not differences of view, or emphasis, but if there were, we both knew about them. And we knew where we differed, and we knew how different approaches, nevertheless, could [00:03:00] work to advance the mission, which was what was the most important. And it was always our motto, "one mission, one team," between the civilians and the military. And I believe that it was a close relationship.

O'SULLIVAN: Great, thank you. If we go to 2006, so when did you take your post as ambassador?

KHALILZAD: I took my post as ambassador in July of 2005.

O'SULLIVAN: Right, of course, how could I forget that? The constitution that came into existence in October, the elections, and then you had this enormous challenge of helping the Iraqis establish a government. So, we're in 2006. And many people

that we've talked to, we're asking a question about, you know, how were people feeling about our strategy at that point in time? And maybe you could share your thoughts around that [00:04:00] period? You know, where you're working so hard to help the Iraqis establish a government over that long period. How were you -- what were you feeling where the weaknesses or strengths of what we were doing at the time? And maybe how would you articulate our strategy at that time?

KHALILZAD: Right. Well, I went to Iraq with the initial mission of helping with the constitution. I had helped the Afghans with their constitution, so when I got there, I got a very pleasant message from Ayatollah Sistani, saying that, word for word, and he said it in Arabic, [Arabic phrase]. Word for word, "I want on Islam what you had negotiated in the Afghan constitution." And I sent him back a message, I said, "I appreciate that, I want word for word also 25 percent representation of women in the Iraqi parliament." And I got a message back from saying, "Deal." Because the Afghan [00:05:00] constitution had a particular formulation on the role of Islam, combined with a commitment to human rights with international commitments that Iraq had under its commitment to international law, including human rights conventions.

It was a difficult effort, because there was, essentially, a Shia-Kurd understanding on key elements of the constitution that had been preordained. My task that I had set out for myself before going was to get to a national compact, I called it, and to get the Sunni buy-in to the political process. I sometimes have

said that I was the lawyer for the Sunnis, in part because they were in a weak position, in terms of numbers, given the Kurdish-Shia dominance [00:06:00] of Parliament, because in the earlier election, the Sunnis had boycotted largely the election for Parliament, and so they were under-represented and the US encouragement formula was found to bring some more Sunnis into the process, but in fact, they were in a weak position.

The same was true of the cross-sectarian group, led by al-Allawi, which had had only 25 or so members in Parliament. He also felt in a weaker position, given the huge kind of bloc of Kurdish-Shia alliance. So, we did get ultimately an agreement on the constitution, but that wasn't sufficient to get the Sunni buy-in, because of the deadlines we had to meet, we couldn't negotiate everything to the satisfaction of the Sunnis. While we had submitted the constitution to Parliament for approval, I continued [00:07:00] to negotiate between Sunnis, and Shias, and Kurds, and got a side agreement that would allow the Sunnis to vote for -- or to say that voting should proceed on ratification, and that they -- with those amendments to be implemented later, they were OK with voting for it. So, the constitution passed, then we went to an election, and again, we worked hard with MNF-I, and with the other elements of US government to get the Sunnis to come into the political process, and vote for Parliament, and their representation went up from less than 20 to between 50 and 60, depending on who you count in, to 57.

Then we went into the formation of government. And there was the biggest bloc in the Parliament [00:08:00] that was elected after the constitution had been ratified, went to the Shia alliance. And they had therefore the right under the new constitution, which this election was under, the right to nominate, put forward, the prime minister. And there were two names that were competing with each other. One was the existing, or the sitting prime minister, Mr. Jaafari, and the other one was Adil Abdul Mahdi, of the Majlis, or this SCIRI [Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq], as it was called. And at the end of the day, Mr. Jaafari got one or two votes more than -- if I remember correctly, more than Adil Abdul Mahdi, and he was put forward as the prime minister. And there was [00:09:00] discomfort with his nomination, and him being the prime minister on the part of the Kurds, and also on the part of the Sunnis, who were now a bigger participant, because of the seats that they held, which was significantly higher than had been the case before. And while we were trying to bring Iraqis together - - and in fact, during the election period, we had to reach out to the Sunnis to bring them into the -- first through the constitutional side agreement, then through the election -- we came to know a lot of Sunni leaders in the process. And we urged them to participate and to urge those that they had influence with to lower the level of violence so that they could actually participate in the elections. Physically and practically, [00:10:00] and we had relative peace and security. There was hardly any violence on election day. So, this came as a positive signal to us that



the people we were dealing with had the relationship with those who controlled violence, because they were negotiating with us, and they delivered peace and quiet, I will not forget General Casey coming to my office in midday, saying there is nothing going on, we thought that this was a diffused, decentralized set of people who were involved in violence, but it seems they do coordinate, and the people that we were dealing with were in fact people who had a relationship with.

So, as I said, we were trying to bring people together. The idea of a national unity government was in the air, as the way to precede formation of the government. There is Jaafari nominated, but not broadly accepted, [00:11:00] and then comes the attack on the shrine, the 11th Imam of the Shia, Askari, and as a result of which, sectarian violence which was part of the broader violence that existed, led by former Ba'athists who were unhappy, various Islamic groups, al Qaida in Iraq, which wanted to have a sectarian war. Their attack on this shrine led to a huge sectarian polarization on top of what existed, and led to unleashing of Shia militias, several of which existed, and some of which had infiltrated Iraqi security institutions during the first [00:12:00] Jaafari government, both militias that were inside the security forces, and militias that were outside the security forces were unleashed, and as a result of which, the number of Iraqis killed, based largely on sectarian violence, increased dramatically. And that also in turn undermined prospects for Mr. Jaafari to be broadly accepted as the prime minister. So it's in this context of success in bringing the various ethnic and sectarian groups



together in an election that was participated much more broadly than the previous -- the first election, and a discussion of a unity government that those who didn't want this process to succeed strike [00:13:00] a religiously important symbol, and that leads to polarization and increase in violence.

O'SULLIVAN: And you've described very well the political priorities at the time, and the role that you played in really broadening the political space for people, different communities. But in that time period you were talking about, so after the bombing of the mosque in Samarra, you're still working on bringing together a national unity government. I think you've articulated very clearly what the political strategy was. How did that fit with our military strategy at the time. And to what extent -- we've heard from other people, you know, that there was a sense of politics comes before military, or vice versa.

KHALILZAD: Sure.

O'SULLIVAN: And did you think this was a moment for reevaluating the strategy, or was it just another wakeup call that it's urgent, you know, to get [00:14:00] this government in place, and then we can move forward with the implementation of the existing strategy.

KHALILZAD: Right. Well I had been unhappy with the military strategy from the start. When I went, I did a red cell. Which, you know, many books have kind of documented it to a degree. Which I thought we ought to go for a population protection-centric approach. If we couldn't secure the road from the airport to the

center of the city, where we had to go by helicopter, what message are we sending about securing Iraq? And I did send this red cell, which both General Casey and I signed its evaluation, which proposed adjusting from kind of going after the bad guys, killing insurgents, arresting insurgents, to adding securing population centers in a --

O'SULLIVAN: And when was this?

KHALILZAD: This was in [00:15:00] --

O'SULLIVAN: I remember the red cell. I don't remember the date.

KHALILZAD: The report was sent in I think November, October, November of 2005. And in fact, Prime Minister Blair reacted to it and raised it with President Bush, saying that your team in Baghdad has come up with a critique of the military approach that we are following, and that you need to read it to adjust to it, because we had a joint National Security Council meeting at this stage, after Askari, before the formation of the government.

O'SULLIVAN: You mean with Maliki, and President Bush coming over?

KHALILZAD: No, I mean with Blair and Bush --

O'SULLIVAN: Yeah no, those happened, yeah.

KHALILZAD: Well in my experience as ambassador, when I participated in it, it happened once, and it was in this timeframe that occurred. But in any case, this was that [00:16:00] -- the concept that was proposed was called oil blot strategy, in this red cell. Which was, you secure one population center at an area, you secure it, not

only in terms of security, but the services that you can deliver, so you can do it in a sustainable way, so that you buy or get the confidence of the local population with you. And then, you move to an adjacent area, connect it to this, and therefore you expand the oil blot.

General Casey signed to it, but I think he thought, his strategy was to build up Iraqi security forces, and transfer responsibility to the Iraqi forces, but you also tried to go after the bad guy to weaken them, and help not only by training the Iraqi security forces and arming them, but also by weakening [00:17:00] the enemy by going after them. And that it was -- it's going to be the Iraqis who would ultimately do the strategy that I outlined. I sent a copy of it to Steve Hadley, who was the NSC advisor at that time. And I called Steve saying, the President in these NSC meetings asks me how the politics is going, how am I doing on the constitution, why is this, you need two more days to get this thing agreed to. How about then de-Ba'athification, how about the oil law, but that when it came to security, you should be asking questions: which area are you going to secure next, and what is your strategy for securing Baghdad to the airport road? Why is Zal taking helicopters when he goes to the airport constantly? Why can't he go by road? Why is he not asking questions like this, that we get asked of me on politics, [00:18:00] very specific? When is the oil law, Zal, is going to be agreed to? Don't they see the benefits of this? And that, what about the red cell report? Are you going to act on that?

Steve told me that the only way that this could be done would be if it comes through the military chain. That if General Casey is supporting of the red cell, then he should send it to the chairman, and the chairman should give it to SECDEF, and then they should send it to the NSC. I told them that this was really not likely to happen, that this had happened as a result of an agreement between the two teams at the lower level, which we had some of the people then from that team then went to work with General Petraeus, when he went to the War College [00:19:00] -- who had worked in the red cell. And that the most I can do, given that this is outside my lane, I'm the political guy, the diplomatic guy, I'm getting involved in the military lane, it'll be hard for me, unless I leak it, which, I said, you don't want me to do, because it's a critique, and I'm not going to leak a document. I cannot get the attention of the management of the military, because they think they have the strategy, and their strategy is, which approved by the President, is to -- as we stand up, as the Iraqis stand up, we stand down, is our approach. And this adjusts that, that says part of this standing up and standing down is securing population centers.

O'SULLIVAN: Yeah. Sure, can I just follow on this?

KHALILZAD: Yeah.

O'SULLIVAN: But, so as you said, we're hoping we'll have the chance [00:20:00] to interview General Casey. But as you said, the strategy that he was articulating at the time was very much train up the Iraqis, have them take responsibility, they're



going to be the ones that are going to be able to secure Iraq. Was this a point of difficulty in your relationship, or between the Embassy and MNF-I?

KHALILZAD: No, we --

O'SULLIVAN: Because it seems the inkblot, red cell, is very different than the approach --

KHALILZAD: It was different. He said that it was going to follow, based -- we understood that correctly, what we had agreed to, because we had a joint military, political-military strategy for the mission. So he assigned -- was going to secure, focus on securing, I forget the number of cities, I think it was 12 or 14 cities. I told them that I thought that was highly ambitious, that we needed to start with something smaller, and build on it. Because based on my experience, again, on Afghanistan, General Barno had a [00:21:00] counter-insurgency strategy in the south of Afghanistan, in the earlier phase. And the demands of securing an area completely, given the standard that we were subscribing to, was very demanding. So, I was saying 14 means it's too many. We need to cut back and strategize over time; that initially, we're going to secure a district of a city, because this security means comprehensive security, in a sense. And we -- I think we arrived with an understanding that this was the right approach, but my sense is the military's heart was not in it to -- I have a high regard for General Casey, he was a great [00:22:00] person to diplomacy with, so to speak, as a partner. But, he had a fundamentally different approach, which is that since the problem, especially when it became more sectarian, especially, it was -- always had a dimension of sectarianism in it,



from the very beginning, but I think with Askari mosque, or shrine, attack, it became largely sectarian, while other elements were still there, but they were of a lesser importance, in my view. This became the dominant factor, and therefore, he thought -- and it was, I think, a respectable theory, which is that America isn't going to solve this problem, Iraqis would have to solve this problem. [00:23:00] And that therefore, the faster we train more Iraqis, the more we transfer the responsibility to them, the better.

I had another view on this too, which -- and I used to argue and debate about, that for Iraqis to deal with it, even assuming we don't want to play a bigger role, to deal with it in a physical military sense now, was that the security institutions of Iraq had to be not only capable in terms of numbers and equipment, but it had to be trusted by all the institutions that -- and therefore, while the numbers looked good, we needed to look at the reforms also to make sure they are lead in a non-sectarian way. And that gets us into the government formation, where a lot of the time was spent trying to get everyone to agree, and I put a great deal of public and private pressure on them, that the minister of [00:24:00] interior, the minister of defense, had to be acceptable to everyone, all communities, and be people without militias. So that the reform that the institution needed to be acceptable by all communities of Iraq could be done by someone who doesn't have a militia, but someone who had a militia, like the minister in the first year, where the Badr Brigade and some other militias

infiltrated the security apparatus, it was going to be -- we weren't going to have the security institution to solve the problem in the way American values would demand for it to be solved.

I used to often tell the Iraqis we didn't come here to settle tribal scores, that isn't what America is about. And I have a fiduciary responsibility, I would argue, we are spending billions of dollars and hundreds of lives, it's not because we came to install Shia sectarianism [00:25:00] over Sunni sectarianism, or bring Sunni sectarians, or people nostalgic about Saddam, back. And sometimes, it caused problems in my interactions with them, when I was emphasizing this quite forcefully. But I think we got that agreement in a unity government to have both the ministry of defense and interior non-sectarian, or at least not from groups that had their own militias.

O'SULLIVAN: Yeah. Hal, you wanted to --

BRANDS: At the risk of taking us backwards just a tad, I wonder, did your red cell exercise, and your critique of the military strategy, did that intersect at all with other State Department rethinking of the US strategy in Iraq in late 2005?

KHALILZAD: Yes, there was -- Condi, when she was Secretary of State, Dr. Rice, when she was Secretary of State, she had a colleague, a historian from University of Virginia -

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O'SULLIVAN: Phil Zelikow.

KHALILZAD: Phil Zelikow, yes, Dr. Zelikow. He came, and he said that he had been given a task to think about [00:26:00] the strategy. That was after the red cell. I think he came in 2006 maybe, if not late 2005. Maybe you'll have to check the dates with him, but my recollection is that he did come. And I think that as a result of his discussions and visits and deliberations in Washington, that I wasn't a participant in -- and like the Surge, where there was a broad number of people brought in to give their views, including us from Baghdad, and the -- what was it, liberate, hold, and --

O'SULLIVAN: Clear, hold, and build.

KHALILZAD: Clear, hold, and build, yes. Clear, hold, and build was a product of that activity, and you know, we came a number of times and we -- obviously the embassy helped and facilitated, and I think the military was there. Dr. Rice was not [00:27:00] perhaps happy with the strategy as she understood it, and came with the articulation of that. And I remember the military reaction was, we were doing, that's what we are doing. Which is typically, when you are responsible for something, when there is a question being raised -- having been, a couple of times, a member of planning staffs -- and planners need to think about, you know, alternatives, you know, whether something is working or not, you tend to try to critique existing policy and propose alternatives, a typical response usually is, We're already doing this. So I think the reaction was that we're already doing this, it's just some new words being added to a strategy that we're already following.

O'SULLIVAN: Great. So, taking us to -- you've helped bring the Iraqis together, there's a prime minister, Prime Minister Maliki, you said, so we're in June 2006, and President Bush comes out, meets with Prime Minister Maliki, they have [00:28:00] this joint session. And then, we're into the summer of 2006. And I wanted to see if you would describe how you felt the dynamics were between Washington and Baghdad. Did you have a feeling, or an expectation or a hope, that once the government was in place, we -- the US was going to be able to execute the strategy that was in place? Or did you have a feeling that a new strategy was still required? Were you still thinking about the red cell, and the population security perspective?

KHALILZAD: Well, once the government was formed, we took a while, because while Prime Minister Jaafari was not necessarily the most effective prime minister in terms of executing, deciding and executing, he was quite resilient in resisting the will of Parliament, that he was not going to have the votes [00:29:00] to be confirmed. It took a long time to get him convinced that he was not like the President of the United States, which he was elected directly by the people, and maybe electoral college, which I had to explain to him repeatedly what its role was, that he operated in a parliamentary system. That the biggest bloc had the right to nominate, but that they didn't have the majority, the biggest bloc. He had to go and win the majority vote in Parliament, that he needed to lobby if he wanted to stay as prime minister, he needed to go talk to the Kurds. He needed to go talk to the Sunnis. And I was actually telling him that my information is that he's losing



ground even in the Shia bloc. If there was a vote, some of the Shia were not going to vote for him anymore.

O'SULLIVAN: Yeah. This takes -- you know, all the way out until June, [overlapping dialogue; inaudible].

KHALILZAD: It took a very, very long time. And it -- which was a problem [00:30:00] in terms of getting things executed. And yet, violence keeps a steady pace. We were trying to bring people together outside the government, political leaders, to urge restraint, and urge Shia leaders, who were very unhappy with what had happened in Askari mosque, who believed that relying on the security forces to protect them had not produced -- that they needed to allow populations, or militias, in this case people, to be armed, those who are not armed, to protect themselves. And I had pushed very hard against that, saying that was going to be creating the infrastructure of a protracted war. The Sunnis will have their various forces who are fighting, now you're going to have a bunch of yours, [00:31:00] no national forces, you're going to -- this is going to lead to a protracted conflict that it was going to be hard to come to grips with -- so that to reach, build up the national institution --

But then in any case, what happened with the mosque, they said we've heard enough of this relying on national institutions. We needed to let the militias protect us. So, we were trying to get the groups to urge their followers not to fall into the trap set by the extremists, because if al Qaida in Iraq did the mosque, they

are the ones who want a war, as I used to call it, within Islam, that they want this huge sectarian war, that's their call to victory, and that you are now following their script by unleashing militias against Sunni neighborhoods. And so, a lot of time spent to not have an all-out [00:32:00] civil war. It was bad, but I still felt as long as the national institutions were holding, that the sectarian conflict was not tearing the institutions that we were investing in apart, that there was a potential path to go forward.

We were also talking about increasing American forces, not as a surge, but some limited American forces that I remember General Casey saying that he had the ability to call in some additional forces that he was going to call in a few more. But then we had the Iraqis also thinking about themselves, about what to do, in terms of responding to this, and if you remember, we then went to Amman, where the President had a subsequent meeting with Maliki and his team. And the Iraqis presented their security plan for whatever it's worth, and [00:33:00] so there was a lot of churning at that time, of whether what we were doing was enough, or should we be doing this more, but certainly the security environment was not, shall we say, encouraging, to put it mildly.

O'SULLIVAN: Right, right. No, and you're referencing a number of important moments over the course of 2006. Do you remember in 2006, the summer, there was a video conference with Steve Hadley, with you and General Casey, and Steve provided a whole series of questions about the strategy, and that type of thing. Do you



remember, first, that meeting and, two, what did you take away from that meeting?

KHALILZAD: There are two things that happened that summer that I had remembered, this -- yeah.

O'SULLIVAN: And just for our memory, the meeting was July 22nd, 2006.

KHALILZAD: Right, thank you. But I remember two things. Steve also came for a visit.

O'SULLIVAN: Right. That was in October of 2006. [00:34:00]

KHALILZAD: Right. Yeah, I mean those things, I remember those two events. And then, I also remember, of course, a number of video conferences, the President becoming increasingly, shall we say, tougher in his questioning of the military strategy over time.

O'SULLIVAN: And you remember Operation Together Forward One and Two, which happened in the summer.

KHALILZAD: Exactly, which was supposed to deliver greater security, and did not live up to the expectations that the commanders even had. So, well, I think beginning in the summer of 2006, I felt that the President was beginning to lose confidence in the military strategy by his body language -- because, you know, I'd become very familiar with his --

O'SULLIVAN: Every week.

KHALILZAD: -- [00:35:00] style by then. And with the kind of questions that he was asking, and that he was feeling a level of discomfort, you occasionally saw, earlier,



on some meetings, that “we’re not fighting for a tie, we’re fighting to win, and prevail.” Perhaps sensing that the military wasn’t making all the effort that needed to be made for success. And General Casey was also feeling a level of discomfort from the -- not only the language, but the noise, so to speak. And so, it was clear from the questions that Steve asked, not only on the military front but on the political front, too, because again, the questioning was, [00:36:00] is sort of working, the kind of vision that at least I felt was our vision for Iraq, of a national compact, sects and communities, ethnic groups, working together, to -- perhaps should we look at some alternative formulas, which later on came in some cables to ideas to be considered. If you remember the 80% solution --

O’SULLIVAN: That’s one of the options.

KHALILZAD: One of the options to go for kind of a Shia-Kurdish victory, sort of speak.

And I felt myself, and I continued to argue, in terms of my lane, that that original vision of a national compact bringing the communities together was the right thing for America to [00:37:00] be, and that the alternative arrangements of, you know, let’s say the 80% solution, would not be -- it would not work ultimately, and it will increase our problems, or Iraq’s problems. But on the military strategy, I welcomed, although I didn’t want to, as a -- being a partner with General Casey, the great respect and admiration for the dedication that he had for the time he had given to Iraq, he’d been there longer, he had been already there for more than a

year when I got there, and then he stayed throughout with me. And we needed to have a lot of daily interaction.

Well, I didn't want to necessarily cause an internal problem between us, I was all in favor of [00:38:00] -- but it wasn't until sometime, I think, in -- it may have been after the visit where, you know, his memo got leaked, that Steve Hadley's -- when I came to Washington where I had a clear discussion with Condi Rice and Steve Hadley at the Watergate Hotel as to what the issues were, and where did I stand on some of them. And about the future, including my own, to discuss with them. And that's when I got the most detailed accounting of what the range of options were, and where did I stand on them, and would I weigh in on those issues by sending a cable, that those were the issues, and I needed to weigh in on them, and I should go back and send a cable on them.

O'SULLIVAN: And that was after Steve's trip to Iraq?

KHALILZAD: After Steve's trip.

O'SULLIVAN: So that would have been sometime in November? [00:39:00]

KHALILZAD: November, I think. Yeah, I agree.

O'SULLIVAN: Yeah, yeah.

KHALILZAD: Yes.

O'SULLIVAN: And were you -- so, you'll remember the strategy review that J.D. led, and had different agencies put forward different options, strategic options for Iraq. So, they varied, OK, the 80% solution was one that came from the Vice President's



office. And the State Department had a very distinct option that they put forward in this context, which really, by that point, said that essentially, that Iraq had deteriorated so much that we could no longer expect to be able to maintain these national institutions, and to provide security, and that we'd be better off pulling back and letting -- and Hal, maybe you're better at describing this, but letting --

KHALILZAD: One side win.

O'SULLIVAN: Letting one side win. And that we try to protect a much more minimal footprint, [inaudible].

KHALILZAD: Right, I remember that.

O'SULLIVAN: And so, [inaudible].

KHALILZAD: [00:40:00] I was vehemently against that. And I told Condi that. Yeah no, I mean I just called in, oh, and I saw that, besides sending my views generally, to say that I thought --

O'SULLIVAN: You weren't shy.

KHALILZAD: No, that much is true, for whatever it's worth. That -- no, I felt that the national institutions were holding. They weren't fragmenting. And that their idea could be relevant for consideration in my judgment, if we saw the disintegration of the national security institutions. I saw civil war as -- and a lot of people described that Iraq was in a full civil war mode, and there was that -- that, I would, I mean it's a matter of definition, and everyone had their own definition, and somewhat politically motivated, some definition to go after the administration, and that yes,

[00:41:00] there was a substantial amount of sectarian violence, communities, innocent people were getting killed. But, the national institutions were holding. The national government was holding, no Sunni senior minister resigned over that the government is falling apart. Although some argued that the Sunnis were more victims of that violence, and in some places they were, in some places, they weren't. Because I was there, I had a much more fine grained appreciation of which neighborhood what was happening in, and we were getting involved in neighborhoods in Baghdad to mediate, to observe, to report, to find points of leverage, or points -- to what we needed to influence. But that was kind of going with the media story, reacting to [00:42:00] a media accounting of what was going on in Iraq. This was a strategy appropriate to respond to the media articulation, or description of the problem, not to the real situation. It was bad, yes, but it wasn't what they had described the situation. And she actually did not disagree with me, at least my recollection is on the telephone.

O'SULLIVAN: Did you want to jump in here before I --

BRANDS: Just building on Megan's last question, why do you think the State Department position changed so much from late 2005 to 2006? In late 2005, there was a lot of thinking, along the lines of clear, hold, and build, and Phillip Zelikow's work, that a redoubling of efforts was needed. In late 2006, it was almost the opposite. Was it simply a reflection of the increased violence over the course of 2006? What do you think was (inaudible)?

KHALILZAD: My judgment is that it had to do with two things. One, that there were -- the institution of the State Department never bought into the Iraq project. They [00:43:00] thought this was wrong-headed to begin with, one shouldn't have gone in, and the building of democracy in the Middle East was a kind of oxymoron. They favored Sunni rule as the kind of good Arab nationalists they were. And they felt that -- I mean, this was a kind of an inherent Middle East experts of the State Department. Although there were differences, I mean I worked with some of the great ones, like Ryan Crocker, among others. So I'm not negative overall with them. But the increased violence provided, in the struggle between those who thought we have to, you know, whatever you think of whether we should have gone in or not, now we're in, we need to do the best we can to [00:44:00] make Iraq work for the Iraqis, for us, for the world. Because, you know, a lot was at stake there. I think the increased violence gave their argument greater credibility.

And I'm sorry to say that those who -- the more geopolitical and strategic perspective, kind of were put in a bit of a defensive, given the reality on the ground. And I suspect that the internal deliberation of the State Department, as always in policy making, not everyone comes to the same view immediately. There is a difference of view, deliberation, argument, and people never gave up completely on what the original position was, though that position did not prevail at that time, it's kind of a permanent struggle, policy making, where people who lost [00:45:00] at one time see the circumstances change, and strike again so to



speaking, because they lost in the last round, and I believe that they saw the increased violence to a bit of triumphalism that they had said from the beginning that we shouldn't do that. Not everyone, but I think there was a strong school of thought that felt that way. And they were settling in part scores, which is part of human nature. And partially seeing an opportunity to say, I told you so, and you know, here it is.

O'SULLIVAN: So, you're describing how your -- you know, from your vantage point, you could see the institutions are holding. And that that meant you were not in accord with the State Department prescription of pulling back, and having a modest footprint there.

KHALILZAD: Right.

O'SULLIVAN: Were you advocating any change to the strategy [00:46:00] at the time? Or --

KHALILZAD: On a political strategy, I was advocating we're on the right tack. We need to, you know, continue to build that relations with the Sunnis, bring them in, and we were making --

O'SULLIVAN: And you felt the prospects --

KHALILZAD: Well, we were making progress. We made an agreement with the tribes around Abu Ghraib in the middle of this conflict, that don't attack us, we won't attack you, kind of approach. We were reaching out to others across the Sunni tribe. Because one other thing that happened, in the middle of this negative story,

which it is, and that it -- that al Qaida in Iraq, we were having success with, in two regard. One, we killed --

O'SULLIVAN: Zarqawi.

KHALILZAD: Zarqawi. Which was hugely positive, in my view, symbolically. And second, that Zarqawi and al Qaida in Iraq [00:47:00] was behaving extremely badly towards the population that -- where they controlled al-Haditha, or other areas of Iraq where they went, they were working -- they were behaving as Taliban, that I had seen this brand in Afghanistan. Extremely backwards, extremely totalitarian, and increasingly violent and oppressive. And the Sunni population was beginning to react negatively to this. And here, they also had at the same time the United States of America, where they felt a common, an anti-Sunni agenda. That's what their storyline was. When I went there, it's very interesting, I won't forget, when I visited some Sunni leaders, they would say "You came to Iraq as a revenge for 9/11." And I would say, "As a revenge? No, but 9/11 had affected our decisions, because we couldn't --" [00:48:00]

O'SULLIVAN: Tolerate.

KHALILZAD: "Tolerate potentially WMD falling into terrorists' hands." And Saddam, we believed genuinely had WMD. And the risk of a WMD in the hands of terrorists was regarded as very serious. They said "No, no, we don't believe that. We believe you came on an anti-Sunni agenda." Why? I think most Americans don't know at that time, I said, the difference between Shia and Sunni. What are you talking

about? I'm perhaps one of the few who knows the roots of your problem with each other. And he said, "You know why we believe that you've come on anti-Sunni agenda? Because all the hijackers of 9/11 were Sunni. And you stood back and decided how do we take revenge from these Sunnis who did 9/11 to us? Where it is that the Sunnis are dominant, but yet they are a minority? So we take it and give it to the Shia, so that they will then take revenge for us. [00:49:00] Two revenge. One, you took it, and then you unleash the Shia." So, I told him, this is the way you think. This was your projecting on that. But I think by that time, some were beginning to think no. Because we were working so hard to reach out to them. We were, as I said, being their lawyer, we were going to the minister of interior with them --

O'SULLIVAN: So you're getting a positive --

KHALILZAD: -- positive signals from them, I mean they were coming to the embassy in droves. The military was meeting with them. And so, I think part of the success of the Surge had to do with this change that also was happening, Sunnis being more receptive I think is one of the factors that -- in the ultimate success of surge, and what happened to Iraq, I think was that. There were obviously a couple of other factors too, but I think that was also happening. In the middle of this negative turmoil that you --



O'SULLIVAN: Right. You mentioned [00:50:00] that you came back to DC, maybe sometime in November, and Dr. Rice and Steve Hadley gave you kind of a clearer picture [inaudible].

KHALILZAD: Right, of what was going on, yes.

O'SULLIVAN: Yeah. And did they, at that point, did they ask you about --

KHALILZAD: The Surge. Specifically, said what do you think if we send more forces to do more population security, secure some areas? And I did -- well, finally, I said, I'm all for it, and I remember like today, Steve said, "Send a cable," and I said, "You will have it as soon as I arrive." Because I -- this is, frankly I was very surprised by it. Because I didn't think that frankly, given where we were, given what I heard from the State Department and the 80% solution and others, it didn't ever dawn on me that the President would make a decision like he did. And so therefore, although I could see it in his character [00:51:00] that he could, because of, you know, all the patterns of decision making that I saw from him, where he would always tell me, Zal, not to worry about politics in Washington, you focus on your mission, let me worry about politics, because you know, in places, in a war zone environment, you could lose your kind of morale, thinking well OK, I'm doing here with my team at risk, and here is what people are saying in Washington. He said, "Not to worry, no, I don't want you to think about that, or focus on it. I will do what is necessary to achieve the goals that we have here. You work your part." But I -- even to me, what that impression of the President, did not think this was something that he



was thinking about. And when Steve told me that that is one of the options that he's thinking about, and this is a serious consideration issue, and I said, you can send a cable, and I said, [00:52:00] as soon as I'm back.

SAYLE: Can you tell us a little about that cable? Just how that process worked? That's something that probably won't be declassified for a long time, so we just -- any insights you have.

KHALILZAD: Well of course, Megan knows it far better than I do, the process in Washington. I was a participant from --

O'SULLIVAN: Well just the cable itself.

KHALILZAD: Yeah, yeah, sure. Yeah.

O'SULLIVAN: -- and building on Tim's question, so how did you -- I remember, there was some concern about how more American troops might influence the Iraqi political dynamic. And I seem to recall General Casey reporting that he had raised the possibility with Prime Minister Maliki, and Maliki had rejected the idea. So, do you remember, were there complicated dynamics about whether or not the Iraqis were going to welcome this, whether this would be a positive thing. You know, were there any nuance considerations you had to take into account before you launched a cable saying, this is going to be a positive development?

KHALILZAD: Right. Well, I had [00:53:00] known Maliki by then relatively well. And I knew that he was a serious guy, in terms of security. He wanted to secure Iraq. This was -- he was confident of. In fact, he was criticizing us for how we used

force. He wanted us to be more forceful than we are. He would tease me at times that your -- “Let me explain to you,” he said, “what your decision making is like.” I said, “Are you eavesdropping on us, or have you got a spy in the embassy?” He said, “No, no, but I know America relatively well by now,” it was within three or four months of his government. “Some threat emerges that your intelligence picks up, and then, Casey and the intelligence community deliberate on it. And then, maybe they involve you too, that you get a sense of [00:54:00] what the threat is, and what we need to do about it. And then you send it to Washington, to decide whether you should move on that or not. And then, the decision is made. And then, you plan how to implement that decision. And by the time you actually decide to act, and the terrorist has gone to Kabul and beyond,” he was referencing my background, and having served in Afghanistan.

He said, “You give me the force,” his emphasis was, he didn’t think initially that we would do what we did. So he said to me, “I can use force the way it should be used. You have trained a lot of my forces, but you have control over them. Why? Why don’t you give them to me? These are Iraqi forces. Special Forces, Iraqi Special Forces, some highly trained Iraqi regular forces that are either single [00:55:00] American key, or dual key, that it needs an American OK too for that force to be released. Give me the force, so I can use it, because I know the Iraqi mentality of how you keep them secure. So I felt that Maliki wanted the force, and some of our people thought he wanted it for sectarian reasons. And obviously

there was elements of sectarianism in his complex mentality, mindset, and the circumstances, but I felt that since his background, one reason that he had a degree of appeal, was that he was serious about security, he had been dealing with security issues, and he wanted to take responsibility to do more himself. He was pushing, unlike Jaafari, would never ask for anything to [00:56:00] do himself more on security. Was always theoretical discussions of kind of what's what and what's not what, and here was a guy who was summoning Casey and I to ask for: When am I going to get more forces so I can act? You're saying we Iraqis are not acting, the security is getting worse, but you're controlling the force. So, give me the force.

When I reported some of this to the President, the President was very pleased that there is a leader that wants to act, and he wanted to enable him to act, but, to tell him how to act as a commander in chief. And he saw his video conferences as an opportunity for someone who had come from nowhere. I mean, his name was not even in the deliberations as a possible prime minister. He came from almost nowhere, that -- to make him grow, [00:57:00] as a leader, and our military folks were not appreciative of him demanding more capabilities that legitimately belonged to him, to be given to him, and to accelerate the training and the formation of more force. And wanted to use negatively on the command leadership role, he wanted to direct the fight by calling a colonel, saying, "Move there and do that," rather than going through the chain. And also, sometimes

politics being a factor that he wanted to protect some areas where some of our military folks were not happy, for example, the Sadr City, when we wanted to operate in it, he would object. But, you know, ultimately he's the one who moved not only into Basra, which we know it's a very famous story, but he also moved into Sadr City himself with Iraqi forces, to clear them. [00:58:00]

I used to argue with General Casey, that I can sell this to Maliki. You give him what he wants on the forces that he has, and if I tell him that even with that, that's not enough, that we can open him to doing more. But I think that Maliki was a significant improvement over Jaafari, in dealing with on security issues. I think the first several years of his term, he did many good things, and some not so good either. Many good things on the security situation. And in fact, part of the success of surge, if I had to put the Sunni militia, or groups changing sides slowly, was Maliki as leader, willing to use Iraqi forces decisively, as another factor [00:59:00] complementing the surge, enabling him to some extent to do that.

O'SULLIVAN: And do you recall, you mentioned that there were concerns, particularly on our military side, about Maliki being a sectarian actor. And so, empowering him was one thing that people were nervous about with the surge.

KHALILZAD: Right, right.

O'SULLIVAN: Were you involved in trying to mitigate those concerns? And if so --

KHALILZAD: Absolutely. Absolutely. And I used to take --

O'SULLIVAN: And if you -- again, recognizing and remembering, you know, you're eight hours ahead.

KHALILZAD: Right, right, yeah.

O'SULLIVAN: Embroiled in a daily crisis. But do you remember the -- your efforts to work with Maliki, to take on Shia militia, do you remember that being connected to the Surge decision, or was that in any explicit way in your memory?

KHALILZAD: It's not in my memory in an explicit way, in our Surge decision, I thought was to bring enough security [01:00:00] to give the political process more of an opportunity to work, that the assessment was if security continues to be as bad or deteriorate, that even the gains that have been made could be lost. And maybe the security institutions, and the whole political process could fall apart and fragment, that the resisted -- the institutions that held, the forces were holding, but that maybe if things continue that way, or get worse, that that could be put at risk, and I don't know whether there was any domestic consideration to it, or not, that I was not a party. But as far as discussion with Maliki's concerned, definitely. We, you know, pushed him quite hard. What he on allowing us --

O'SULLIVAN: And didn't he make the statement before Parliament, before President Bush's speech?

KHALILZAD: Right.

O'SULLIVAN: Was that connected in any way?

KHALILZAD: Well it was connected, but by then, it was known. So, [01:01:00] we had interacted enough with them that he was in the picture of what was --

O'SULLIVAN: No, he was totally in the picture.

KHALILZAD: Yeah, what was going on. But before, before he became aware of what we were thinking, as we were helping him be a better prime minister, he had a view which I was familiar with also in Afghanistan with President Karzai, which is that you don't want your base, which, in the case of Karzai, were the Pashtun areas of Afghanistan, and in this case is the Shia, especially the southwest, if we had gone after Hakim's areas, he had no problem with that. And you can attack it as hard as you want.

But Sadrists were in collusion, or in cooperation with Dawa, so if we went after Muqtada's forces, he would say, "Look I have a political issue here, Zal, you understand. And you need to tell me what you're going to do, and you need to get my [01:02:00] approval on this. And -- or maybe I will find a different way of dealing with it, which I would hear from President Karzai, that he would say look, if you're going to operate in these areas, you have to negotiate a set of rules with me, that you're not going to go inside the house, blindfold men in front of their families, tie their hands behind their backs, put a hat or whatever, a cover on their head, this humiliates them, and they come to me saying what kind of a President are you, that you're allowing foreigners to come and treat our men, "our men," this way? So, it was very familiar with me when he said: "When you go to the Sadrists,

Zal, I have a problem with that. You need to explain what the strategy is, what the way you're going to do it, maybe I will do it. Maybe I'll explain that your information is wrong. [01:03:00] Maybe we can go together, you and I, talk to the - if you're going to go attack a mosque," which we, on occasion, we did. Which is, "Maybe you and I can call the mullah in, the leader of the mosque, and ask him what the heck is going on there."

So, he reacted very badly to the Sadrist area. We underappreciated the military security apparatus on our side, and the politics in which he was operating as we underestimated sometimes Mr. Karzai's ultimate unhappiness with the way we were conducting, because he thought we weren't taking into consideration his base, and he thought it would be much better if we enabled him to deal with those problems, rather than have us, U.S. forces doing it. So, that's why he was demanding for more and more.

O'SULLIVAN: And [01:04:00] that speech that Maliki gave in early January, you might remember he actually gave two. There was the first effort that didn't quite get over the hurdle, and then the second (inaudible).

KHALILZAD: Right. Then he had to do a second. And I remember asking him, he didn't go quite far enough, and he said, "Yeah, I will do it again." Yeah.

O'SULLIVAN: And so that was --

KHALILZAD: Because the President wanted a clear message.

O'SULLIVAN: Before he made the public commitment.

KHALILZAD: Before he -- yeah, absolutely, I remember that very well.

O'SULLIVAN: Yeah. So, excellent. What -- from your perspective, what was the role of Iran and Syria in instigating the violence in Iraq? Because you'll remember around this time, there was the Baker-Hamilton Report, you gave your testimony to them, and you'll remember that the report had a heavy focus on upping diplomatic engagement with Iraq's neighbors.

KHALILZAD: Right.

O'SULLIVAN: From your perspective, was that a big driver of the situation? Or not?

KHALILZAD: I think it was a significant [01:05:00] and important driver. Particularly Iran, and Syria because of a transit point for extremists, terrorists coming in. I frankly did not understand, and it was a source of frustration to me and I raised it with the President, because I couldn't get answers from Washington myself as to why I was allowed to talk with the Iranians when I was ambassador to Afghanistan, holding their feet to the fire, saying, you know, you guys are doing this in Herat and you are coming here talking to me, if you want to talk about cooperation, you need to stop Mr. Hassan Kazmi-[Kumi], who was the consul in Herat, who became ambassador -- I made a joke that he's following me around, he moved as Ambassador to Iraq -- as to why can't we talk to the Iranians to make sure they understand that we know what they are doing, [01:06:00] and to hold their feet to the fire, and I felt that we ought to tell them very clearly that we can play this game. And in fact, I would say that I personally, very skillful in causing a problem

because, you know, we did it for 10 years to the Soviets in Afghanistan. Very easy. It was a country that is as fragmented as Iran is, to create pressures that you are causing here to us, and that we were being a bit of a patsy to them in Iraq. Letting them kind of send weapons, direct attacks, and that our rhetoric, on the one hand, was very tough with them, that I didn't understand that we were -- you know, the President put them as part of the Axis of Evil, with Syria, threatening them, putting them on notice that we were angry with them. But yet, in practical terms, we weren't doing anything. [01:07:00]

I was in favor of reassuring them, saying look, we're here, just Iraq, we had weapons of mass destruction issues, our objective is purely stabilizing Iraq, we have no plans, no ambitions about overthrowing the Iranian regime, or the Syrian regime, because I thought we were instigating them to make life difficult for us, in a sense, by preoccupying us with Iraq, because Afghanistan had gone relatively easy, they felt. Iraq had gone initially relatively easy. And I was getting intelligence when I arrived that both Syria and Iran felt, what is the American plan? Are they coming next to -- which one of us is going to be next? And we were talking as if we were, in fact, serious about doing something. But in fact, I knew that, you know, I was arguing, we say that these extremists come from airports [01:08:00] in Damascus. Isn't that right? So, why can't we say to them, if you don't stop this, that airport isn't going to be able to operate for very long. So, I mean there would have been -- if we were serious about sending this kind of

message. I felt that Iran and Syria were a problem, but that we didn't have a strategy of how to deal with it, and the President then said, "Go ahead and meet with them." And I got some pushback later on from somebody, other senior people around the table, as to why did I raise it directly with the President? We tried to arrange a meeting, and then even that was at the last minute canceled by some people around the President, saying don't hold it. While, you know, the Iraqis went out of their way, especially Aziz al-Hakim to go and see Khomeini personally, and to get Khomeini to bless a meeting with me, with the Americans. [01:09:00] And then, two days before the delegation arrived, we canceled it. Leaving the Iranians to think we were not serious about engaging with them on this issue, and then we started to arrest some of them at the local level, just to send a message that we were not going to be patsies anymore.

O'SULLIVAN: So this is my last question, Hal and Tim might have things and then we'll give you the opportunity –

KHALILZAD: No, no, that's fine.

O'SULLIVAN: -- if there's something we've missed.

KHALILZAD: Yeah.

O'SULLIVAN: But did you see a change in the region after the announcement of the Surge? Did you see that take the Iranians by surprise? You mentioned that we changed some of our strategy, taking on the Iranians more directly after the surge. Did you see that the announcement of this new strategy had a regional impact?

KHALILZAD: I think it did send a message that a lot of them had assumed we would [01:10:00] back down, we were defeated, we were in a quagmire, we didn't have a way out, that this was going for success, and it increased our credibility in the eyes of the regional players. I think they thought they had a good thing going, kind of having us be there, but not be effective. This was kind of giving them leverage over us in a sense. And this was showing a path, but I don't think by the time I left they had concluded their reassessment as to how to respond to it. They were still in the kind of reassessing. Because we had good read of their situation, of what they were thinking. I think that much, we were -- especially about Iran, less about Syria, in my view. So, this led them along with the arrest of [01:11:00] some of their operatives, to deliberate as to what was going on, what did this mean? Asking Iraqis about what we were up to, but fearful to come to Baghdad, some of their senior people, without our permission, President [Jalal] Talabani and others intervening on their behalf to get them permission to come to even for official visits. So that got their attention, but I left by the time they -- if they came to a judgment, and then based on that judgment, developed their own strategy.

O'SULLIVAN: OK. Thank you. Tim and Hal, do you have additional?

BRANDS: Go ahead Tim. I have a general one, but if you have something.

SAYLE: OK. I just want ask, a bit more specific -- You mentioned cooperation with both the British embassy in Baghdad, and then the broader cooperation between the two governments. Did that continue throughout 2006, and what influence did



your conversations or [01:12:00] relationships with the British Embassy have on your recommendations or views of how to move forward in Iraq?

KHALILZAD: Well, our relationship was very good with the Brits. Both at the embassy level, and the military level. I was not particularly pleased with their decision to leave Basra. And I said so to them, that Basra was very important, not only because of historic importance, oil, ports, but also because of location, that next to Iran, that this was going to create a vacuum that the Iranians would take advantage of, and that we would have to bear the burden of addressing that. But, other than that, I thought that both Prime Minister Blair and the British Embassy were extremely [01:13:00] helpful, good partners. We didn't necessarily agree on every decision, there was some disagreement on kind of Maliki, there was disagreements on how to deal with Jaafari, and so forth.

But I found joy talking to Prime Minister Blair when I went through London, because he kind of would talk like there were two analysts arguing about what the situation is, what's wrong, what's right. You know, with his shirtsleeve up, sitting at the very non-imperial desk, and arguing and thinking as to what the options and alternatives would be. I would never assume I could talk like that with our president, because, you know, there is an aura about the presidency that was not -- at least Blair didn't create that aura. [01:14:00]

SAYLE: Although they did withdraw, did they intellectually support the Surge? Did you have support for the Surge idea from the British diplomats and ambassador?

KHALILZAD: I don't remember that. I don't remember that, whether they were supportive of the Surge, or opposed to it. Or whether I consulted with them on the Surge, or -- I certainly do not -- I do not remember consulting with them on the Surge myself. If it was done, it was done out of Washington.

BRANDS: So, more generally, there's obviously been a ton written on the Surge. We've asked you lots of questions about the Surge. But based on your experience, is there a piece of the story of the Surge decision that is not as well understood as it should be? Is there something that we haven't asked you about that was a key part of the story?

KHALILZAD: Sure. Well, what I think, from where I sat, which is, remember, I wasn't in Washington advising the President, and in the -- a lot of meetings in which Baghdad wasn't participating [01:15:00] in that must have occurred, inevitably. That when we talk about a story of the Surge, necessarily we put the emphasis on ourselves, on what the big decision that the President made, the contribution that the troops made, to send that many more troops, not an easy decision, especially given the political environment in which the decision was made. It's one thing to write theoretically about decision making, to be inside the politics and the circumstances in which decisions are made. And in that, it was a hugely difficult decision to make. And it took a lot of courage in my judgment, political courage, to make that decision in that environment.



But, having said that, I do not believe the Surge would have had the success that it did [01:16:00] without three other things. Which we -- when we describe the Surge, we do not put enough emphasis on. That as a whole, made it achieve the success it did. Without the others, we may not have achieved what we did. One was, I already referred to it, which was the bad behavior by al Qaida. That worked to our advantage. And the shift in that part of our engagement and efforts earlier, made with the Sunnis in combination, was important at turning the Sunni views towards us. Second, I think the person of Maliki, willing to be serious about security, sectarianism a part of him, yes, protecting the Sadrists, yes, but nevertheless being serious about security, not feeling uncomfortable about use of force, which Jaafari did, and taking [01:17:00] responsibility, which he was willing, where Jaafari was not, was important. And third was that our investments over many years for establishing and supporting these Iraqi security forces paid off. Especially in combination with the Americans. That without the American increased presence, they wouldn't have performed as well. As we tested them earlier, as they did in that environment, and the change in our kind of approach to conflict, how to deal with the conflict, had an empowering effect on them, too. And so, it was all four of these things together that made the Surge the success that it was. But if we look at that decision that the President made, in a very difficult environment that was a singularly important and courageous decision. [01:18:00]

O'SULLIVAN: Great. Thank you so much. Have we taken you back to --

KHALILZAD: Now I have to go and talk to Bahram about this, I will report this to him. I

don't know what he will say about it.

O'SULLIVAN: Thank you so much. This was great.

[END OF AUDIO/VIDEO FILE]