Introduction

In recent years, the topic of the ethical status of nonhuman animals has become a legitimate focus of philosophical inquiry. Attempts to justify the widespread practice of giving little or no consideration to the vital interests of animals (the most obvious one being the interest in avoiding suffering) have been made from several different ethical perspectives. This lecture will explore three of the most common perspectives-utilitarianism, natural rights theory, and social contract theory--and explain why none of them is likely to justify activities such as factory farming and (at least most) animal experimentation. Despite the existence of a vigorous and vocal animal rights movement, the majority position is that the moral status of animals is vastly inferior to that of human beings. While many people may be somewhat disturbed at learning the details of factory farming methods and many medical and psychological experiments involving animals, relatively few seriously challenge the moral permissibility of such practices. The status quo in this regard appears to be that, minor details aside, our treatment of animals raises no serious moral questions. I will discuss the utilitarian approach in section 1, where I will argue that the utilitarian case against the status quo is overwhelming. In section 2, I will consider various attempts to defend the status quo from within a natural rights framework, and will argue that all such attempts fail. Finally, in section 3, I will turn to social contract theory, which appears to hold out the most hope for the defender of the status quo with respect to our treatment of animals. In a recent book, Peter Carruthers has vigorously defended the view that social contract theory can justify the claim that all and only humans have basic moral rights. His approach, he claims, provides the only satisfactory way to justify giving greater weight to the interests of severely retarded humans than to those of animals with equal or greater cognitive capacities. That is, it gives an answer to what is commonly called 'the argument from marginal cases.' I will argue both that social contract theory fails to give such an answer, and that all the well-known versions of the theory actually beg the question against attributing basic moral standing to animals. The ways in which both a natural rights approach and a social contract approach attempt to answer the argument from marginal cases embody a deeply flawed view of morality.