PhD ANU, 2006
MA Sydney, 2001
Lic. ès Lettres Geneva, 1999
Hyer Hall 210A
Southern Methodist University
P.O. Box 750142
Dallas TX 75275-0142
Most of my work is in the philosophy of
perception, focusing on: (1) the non-conceptual content of experiences and
whether concepts are required for perception (they aren’t!), (2) the
non-transitivity of looking the same, (3) the ontology of experience and
temporal experiences in particular (whether experiences have or represent
duration—they don’t). Some related interests include the nature of appearances,
the difference between naïve realism and representationalism, perceptual
projectivism, and questions surrounding perceptual justification. I also dabble
in epistemology, having done some work on epistemic norms, kinds of defeaters,
and have various interests in metaphysics.
• Forthcoming. Temporal Experiences & their Parts. Philosophers' Imprint.
• 2010. Non-transitive Looks & Fallibilism, Philosophical Studies, 149(2):
• 2009. Epistemic Norms without
Voluntary Control, Noûs, 43(4): 599-632
• 2009. Non-conceptual Content, in Tim
Bayne, Axel Cleeremans, Patrick Wilken, eds., The
Oxford Companion to Consciousness, Oxford University Press.
• 2007. Indiscriminable Shades &
Demonstrative Concepts, The Australasian
, 85(2): 277-306.
• 2007. The Riches of Experience, in
Rocco Genarro, ed. The Interplay between
Consciousness and Concepts: Special Issue of the Journal of
Consciousness Studies, 14(9-10):
• 2006. Demonstrative Concepts without
Re-identification, Philosophical Studies,
Work in Progress
• Conceptualism & the structure of
• Conceptualism & the phenomenal
character of experience
• Perceptual extension & perceptual
• Non-transitive looks: why not?
• Advanced Topic (Philosophy of Perception)
• Introduction to Philosophy